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ABSTRACT
RESILIENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING CHANGING ECOSYSTEMS
THROUGH MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
SEPTEMBER 2013
CASEY STEVENS, B.A., NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas
International governance is increasingly defined by multilevel governance; with
short-term projects, transnational cooperation between different groups, and unclear
institutional space. In this situation, a key issue is the resilience of governance
arrangements or the ability of governance arrangements to respond to political and
ecological shocks to the system. Using international biodiversity governance, this study
explores the question: What social and political processes produce resilient governance?
This study argues that the key to understanding resilient governance is the
network structure within and outside of the governance arrangement. Modular
network structures are able to generate ideas from multiple sources, able to solve
political problems on small scales, and able to insulate institutions from political
contagion. Centralized network structures, in contrast, often result in top-down
learning, politicization of the entire governance arrangement, and inability to adapt in
response to problems. Those governance arrangements with limited network structures
are unlikely to learn at all. The network structure theory argues that network dynamics
vi

are shaped by the structure and result in different learning and different adaptive
outcomes.
This argument is made in the context of international biodiversity governance
which presents has a number of cases of resilience in difficult to explain cases. Chapter
2 and Chapter 3 look at the network impacts in 10 different international biodiversity
governance arrangements. Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 explore these dynamics
in the context of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) and the Caribbean
Challenge. These empirical cases present a complex and robust analysis showing that
network structures, more than the governance institutions or national context, shape
the resulting impact of governance arrangements.
The implication of this finding is that effective institutions also need resilient
modular networks in order to have lasting environmental impacts. Strong institutions
can be constrained by centralized networks which limit learning opportunities following
shocks. This study thus complements studies of effectiveness in international relations
by providing a crucial dynamic piece of the overall situation. Response to shocks is
shown to be shaped by network structure and importantly by early learning and
network connections. Without these, effectiveness can be disrupted by political or
environmental shocks.
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CHAPTER 1
NETWORK STRUCTURE MATTERS
Shocks impact biodiversity governance institutions in a number of different
ways. The early history of the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species
(CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) look similar in many respects.
Both saw significant political struggles in one arena cause intractable conflict
throughout as nongovernmental organizations and blocks of activist states became key
veto players throughout the organizations. However, the two organizations largely
went on different trajectories as CITES was able to routinize and compartmentalize
political debate but the CBD was able only to get weak progress on issues with even
lower levels of political agreement. In some ways, the results could be expected to be
different: the CBD is a stronger organization with wider agreement (although it is
missing an important member with the United States not involved) than CITES, the
networks involved in the CBD are wider than they relatively narrow ones involved in
CITEs, CITES has better enforcement capability but lower autonomy from other
organizations. These puzzles come out across the field of international biodiversity
governance with unlikely institutions adapting to be robust governance arrangements
and strong institutions failing to adapt at all. The social and political processes which
animate these outcomes are the focus of this study.
Why some multilevel governance institutions prove resilient to shocks while
others instead reinvest in the status quo and still others collapse entirely is a puzzle for a
number of different fields of study. By focusing on resilience of international
1

governance arrangements, the study contributes to studies of common property
resource management at local levels (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2003, Ostrom
1990, 2005, Poteete and Ostrom 2008), questions of how to design effective
international environmental institutions (Miles 2002, Young 1999b, 2010), and
questions of the power of networks of substate and nonstate actors in international
politics (Haas and Adler 1992, Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, Keck and Sikkink 1999,
Lipschutz 1996, Wapner 1995) and the ability of these actors to make knowledge claims
in a complex governance context (Martello and Jasanoff 2004, Drori 2003, European
Environment Agency 2013, Gulbrandsen 2008, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002, 2011, Litfin
1994a, Siebenhuner 2002). Resilient biodiversity governance is a puzzle for these
various perspectives because it highlights non-linear emergent mechanisms which can
cause the surprising variation of outcomes in biodiversity governance.
This study argues that the crucial feature that produces resilient governance is
not regime design (the strength of the institutions and their enforcement provisions)
nor in the social capital of any one particular network (whether in a national
constituency, an international coalition, or an advocacy network). Rather, the crucial
animating feature which facilitates resilience or alternative outcomes is the network
structure, particularly the connections and mediating points between different
networks. This argument challenges much of the conventional arguments which are
given for resilient governance and highlight some potentially important aspects for a
fuller understanding of effectiveness in international environmental politics. The rest of

2

this chapter will highlight the basics for this argument and the empirical basis for its
claim that will be expanded in the rest of this study.
Resilience and Effectiveness
The road to effective environmental governance is rarely a direct path and this is
certainly true when looking at the history of biodiversity governance. While both
historical institutionalist studies (Peters 2005, Fioretos 2011) and rational choice
institutional focus on transition costs (Tullock 1975) emphasize the self-replicating
aspects of institutional structures, this does not necessarily mean that the ability for
institutions to effectively manage problems will self-replicate. The issue becomes even
more important if the focus shifts away from these institutional views to a view that
sees institutions as embedded in political contestation (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).
Biodiversity politics around the world emphasize that effectiveness is not self-replicating
with a multitude of cases from around the world. For example, the country of
Madagascar had constructed a significant and increasingly robust system for biodiversity
protection through the country over the past year. However, following a 2009 coup, the
system went into complete disorder and much of the progress was quickly undone (Yu,
Levi, and Shepard 2010). In addition to the risk of external political shocks disrupting
biodiversity governance, the internal dynamics of the governance arrangement can
disrupt efforts. In the Tongass National Forest in Alaska, a lease regime created a fairly
effective management of the forests but became increasingly brittle with changing
economic and environmental conditions (Baier, Lovecraft, and Chapin III 2009).

3

Effectiveness alone then is not sufficient, but biodiversity governance institutions must
also be resilient in order to have lasting impact.1
The study and practice of international environmental institutions has focused
significant attention on the factors which contribute to effective governance
institutions. Effectiveness studies have largely explored the factors that contribute to
building institution. These studies have broadly identified the bargaining process,
strong institutions, and the role of epistemic communities or scientists as playing key
roles in achieving effective governance (Breitmeier, Underdal, and Young 2011, Mitchell
2006, Miles et al. 2002, Young 1999a, Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993). These findings
have shown wide applicability, have been supported by multiple different
methodologies and approaches, and explored a number of different political and
environmental contexts. However, one limitation of these studies is that they did not
directly deal with temporal effects and the factors which may be related to maintaining
effective institutions. Although some studies have attempted to remedy this neglect
(Grundig 2012, Young 2010), this section will argue that adding temporality into
effectiveness primarily needs to account for the way institutions respond to shocks and
disruptions.

1

Resilience itself has become a problematic buzzword in international relations recently and is
used increasingly in reference to the war on terrorism, global response to financial crisis, and
other governance issues. Most notably, resilience was the major theme of the 2013 World
Economic Forum meeting. The popular conception of resilience is often implicitly defined in a
very narrow manner often denoting the vision for some “return to normalcy.” Resilience, as
used in this study differs fundamentally from this conception in that it is a dynamic process that
involves adaptation and learning rather than any return to a supposed stable point of
governance.
4

Effectiveness has been defined in a variety of different ways. Effectiveness for
this study is broadly defined as a change in the behavior of actors as a result of human
institutions which generates a positive and expected environmental output. This
definition fits closely with the broader definitions of effectiveness shared in the field but
emphasizes the political and environmental outputs (Young 1999a). Other definitions of
effectiveness focus on other aspects; for example effectiveness has been defined as
simply whether international institutions help avoid resource wars (Dinar 2011, Helm
and Sprinz 2000), whether they lead to transformation of policies in member states
(Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993), or whether they foster general multilateralism (Downs,
Rocke, and Barsoom 1998, Perkins and Neumayer 2007). These political aspects have
been increasingly coupled with improved environmental conditions as a key aspect of
effectiveness (Underdal and Young 2004, Young 1999a). The definition used here of
effectiveness includes political outputs, requiring change in the policies by institutions,
and improved environmental conditions in a basic definition of effectiveness. 2
Effectiveness studies have focused significantly on the conditions preceding
effectiveness: from institutional bargaining, scientific inputs, and institutional design.
However, by focusing on the inputs into effective arrangements, the studies may miss
crucial factors that develop after a governance arrangement is formed. Oran Young
notes in a recent assessment article that “environmental regimes are dynamic in the
sense that they change continually after their initial formation. After established,
2

Some studies appear to equate effectiveness with resilience as the same outcome. This is true
both in local level studies of resilience and in international studies. Although in practice they do
overlap significantly, as will be explored in Chapter 3, conceptually we can best identify the
processes and mechanisms of resilience by treating them as distinct outcomes.
5

institutional arrangements do not remain static over time. Environmental regimes wax
and wane in terms of their capacity to solve problems” (Young 2011, 3). The problem
then is in how to capture this dynamic change in governance arrangements (Duit and
Galaz 2008).
Taking account of dynamic governance must include studying the adaptation of
governance arrangements in responding to different shocks. Shocks can be broadly
defined as events which cause a significant number of actors in the governance
arrangement to question the rules used by the institutions. Understanding response to
these events means being aware of surprise, cascade effects, tipping points, idea
generation, etc. (Duit and Galaz 2008).3
Adding a focus on resilience offers one productive route to begin to understand
the dynamic features of governance arrangements. Resilience can be broadly defined as
the ability of a system to respond and reorganize to a variety of shocks to the
organization of the system. Lance Gunderson defines this concept of resilience as
“measured by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system
redefines its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior”
(Gunderson 2000, 426) It can be contrasted with robustness, or what Holling termed
engineering resilience (Holling 1973), which is the ability of a system to remain in a state

3

The approach to dealing with dynamic aspects of institutions goes beyond attempts to add
temporal features into effectiveness studies. Using the collective optimum criteria to evaluate
effectiveness (Underdal and Young 2004), Grundig integrates temporal aspects in evaluating the
effectiveness of institutions in terms of difference in gains from faster or slower moving
institutional processes (Grundig 2012). This approach does improve the effectiveness studies;
however, it does not focus on nonlinear aspects like surprise and cascade which are crucial in
understanding the adaptation of governance arrangements.
6

of equilibrium before being tipped over.4 Resilience then is largely about the adaptive
capacity of a system and its ability to reorganize without collapsing permanently
(Walker and Abel 2002, Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002).5
The integration of resilience into governance studies should not take the
metaphor from biological systems too far. As will be argued below, the general findings
emphasizing diversity, modularity, and tightness of feedback loops is of limited use in
understanding transformations of governance arrangements (Walker and Salt 2006,
and see also Levin 2002). However, focusing on the resilience of governance
arrangements adds two components into studies of effectiveness.
First, stability may not demonstrate resilience of governance arrangements. The
ecological studies of resilience have emphasized this by arguing that stable ecological
states are often very brittle and their stability is based upon a narrow and vulnerable
resource base (Gunderson 2000). This is exemplified with the adaptive cycle depiction
developed by Gunderston and Holling (Gunderson and Holling 2002). The adaptive cycle
illustrates some key stages that systems develop through and a way to understand
4

A helpful metaphor to understand this distinction is to imagine a ball in a cup versus a ball on
the top of a very narrow peak. In the ball in the cup approach, the ball can roll around the sides
going up different directions before leaving the cup itself. The resilience here is in finding a
variety of response situation to move around under general system organizing features
(Gunderson and Holling 2002). The ball on the peak, in contrast, has a stable state and even the
slightest shock will topple the ball toward the sides. This view, what I term robustness,
contrasts with resilience in that it simply measures the ability of the ball to remain in one place
rather than move around a broad area of stability. The distinction is not always clear in the
literature, but a clear distinction helps make the idea of resilience in this study clear (Jen 2005).
5
Resilience is an eclectic set of studies with some cross-citations, but limited coherence as a
field of study. In addition, it is quickly sprawling into a range of different approaches. An
introductory set of literature is: (Anderies, Walker, and Kinzig 2006, Carpenter, Brock, and
Ludwig 2002, Carpenter et al. 2001, Folke 2006, Gunderson 2000, Lebel et al. 2006, Lundberg
and Frodin 1998, Peterson, Allen, and Holling 1998, Resilience Alliance 2007a, b, Walker,
Anderies, et al. 2006).
7

resilience emphasizing the point that resilience is primarily about reorganization after a
shock.6 When applied to governance, the result is that strong institutions may be fairly
vulnerable to shocks and weaker institutions may have significant ability to respond to
shocks. Even robust governance arrangements, those resistant to change, may be quite
brittle when focusing on their ability to adapt. The Network Structure argument
pursued here, if true, offers significant reason to bring into question arguments about
robust institutions being sufficient to result in resilience.

Figure 1.1-Gunderson and Holling’s visual representation of the adaptive cycle
(Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Second, systems are never insulated from the adaptive cycles of other systems
connected with them. The world is not designed by clear hierarchies, but rather
panarchies where systems have dramatic and sizable impacts on the adaptive cycle of
6

Holling provides an illustrative walkthrough the adaptive cycle writing: “For an ecosystem such
as a forest, think of the century- or centuries-long cycle of succession and growth from pioneer
species (r) to climax species (K) followed by major disturbances such as fire, storm, or pest (Ω).
Such disturbances occur as wealth accumulates and the system becomes gradually less resilient,
i.e., more vulnerable. As a consequence, a disturbance is created to release accumulated
nutrients and biomass and reorganize them into the start of a new cycle (α). That reorganization
can then exploit the novelty that accumulates but is resisted or lies latent during the forward
loop” (Holling 2005, 14)
8

other systems. In the words of resilience scholarship, this would mean that systems are
always nested in other systems (Abel, Cumming, and Anderies 2006, Gunderson and
Holling 2002, Carpenter and Turner 2001). The second addition that resilience adds to
studies of effectiveness is identification of these systems which may not appear to be
directly linked but which can have disruptive or resilient effects on governance
arrangements. This proves to be crucial in understanding the dynamic relationships of
surprise, adaptation, and creativity that is essential in governance arrangements.
The question of effectiveness thus becomes much richer with the addition of
focusing on the ability of governance arrangements to respond to shocks. This allows a
more dynamic view of effectiveness of environmental institutions and also allows
identification of institutions which may respond to shocks in a productive manner and
develop increasing effectiveness.
International Biodiversity Governance
International biodiversity governance is a very valuable arena for studying the
issue of resilience in international environmental governance. Biodiversity governance
has become an important global force over the past few decades and is a significant
terrain of environmental governance generally. Over 10% of the world’s land area and
significant amounts of the marine areas have been declared protected areas (World
Database on Protected Areas 2010). Global spending on biodiversity projects from all
sources has been estimated at between $36 and $38 billion for 2010 (Convention on

9

Biological Diversity 2010).7 These projects have grown increasingly complex since the
1980s with a host of diverse governance arrangements: parks with people, ecological
corridors, payment for ecological services, certification of commodities, public-private
partnerships, regional integrated plans, and a host of other programs. Biodiversity
governance projects have been developed in local communities, individual states, entire
regions, and globally in order to attempt and conserve the remaining diversity of
species.
With a diversity of forms of governance projects, there has also been a
significant divergence in the outcomes of these projects (Rodrigues and et. al. 2004,
Smith et al. 2003). In terms of the development of the governance arrangements, some
have persisted and adapted to changing environmental conditions, scientific theories
and approaches to managing those environmental conditions, and shifts in political
constituencies. Other governance arrangements have been folded into newer
governance arrangements, have been locked in a single approach and failed to adapt, or
have collapsed entirely. The issue of resilience is thus highly relevant in this field of
environmental governance.
This question is not unique to biodiversity and is of increasing importance in a
number of problems in international environmental politics. Although there are some
transboundary and global problems that have seen the development of comprehensive
7

This puts global spending on biodiversity above the National GDP of about half of the world’s
countries, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Serbia, Kenya, etc. In terms of
environmental spending, the $36 billion spent on biodiversity issues globally is more than spent
on solar power (about $30 billion) and double wind power (about $14 billion). It still is far
behind the global pesticides market (about $50 billion) and many other industries, but is
nonetheless significant.
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treaties, the coverage is not extensive and even those with developed treaty systems
often have punctuated progress in the development and implementation processes
(Biermann and Pattberg 2008, 283-284). The formal promotion and integration of TypeII partnerships around the Johannesburg Conference and through Global Environment
Facility (GEF) funding has led to a proliferation of various governance arrangements
including certification and market-based regimes, collaborative networks, and local-local
coordination (Najam, Christopoulou, and Moomaw 2004, Andonova and Levy
2003/2004, Andonova and Mitchell 2010). In addition, as the political roadblocks to
significant treaties in many fields has restrained the creation of multilateral
environmental agreements, a complex and multilevel governance systems has become
of primary importance in realms like climate change (Dimitrov 2010), forests
(Humphreys 2003), and excess nitrogen (Erisman 2004), among others. Global
environmental politics, in general, is seeing a significant rescaling in efforts over the past
two decades and the development of a polycentric system of projects (Andonova and
Mitchell 2010, Ostrom 2010b). The question of resilient governance is thus valuable to
a large and growing set of problems in international environmental politics.
Although the question of resilience is a common one, international biodiversity
governance offers some very unique aspects that make it a particularly valuable terrain
for study. First, biodiversity loss is one of many different problem types that is locally
problematic but globally aggregate. These types of problems are impacted to a large
extent by behavior at the local levels and often have their largest impact on local
provision of ecosystem services, but which aggregate to give the problem a global
11

dimension (Conca 2006, 12-20, Hale and Manzerall 2004). This type of problem
presents new challenges to the study of international environmental politics in that it is
of a different nature than transboundary pollution problems (such as acid rain) or
problems that may largely have a global impact (such as climate change or ozone layer
depletion). Conca (2006, 13) writes “Most of the problems that have attracted serious,
sustained regime-building efforts involved environmental harm that flows directly
across borders…Formation of a regime has also been a common remedy for problems
associated with an international commons that exists outside the territory of states.” In
contrast, locally problematic, globally aggregate problems such as deforestation, soil
erosion, solid waste management, and freshwater management often deploy
alternative governance forms than formal, treaty-based regimes. Investigating
governance resilience in biodiversity can add unique insights into the various political
areas beyond regimes.
Biodiversity projects also provide important hard cases for resilient governance
because they often do not have the institutional supports or stable constituencies that
are seen as normally crucial to producing effective regimes.8 This is not simply a result
of the unique problem-type of biodiversity governance, but is also a result of the
particular development of international efforts to deal with the problem. The major
8

For ease of discussion, “international biodiversity governance” relates to those international
efforts that are largely focused on the improvement or maintenance of the overall diversity of
species in ecosystems. It is thus distinct from some species-specific governance efforts that
focus their attention on management of a single species. This division is not simply an analytic
decision but reflects the geography of governance efforts. Biodiversity related treaties are often
separate from efforts in the fishing regimes, whaling regime, or other species-focused regimes.
There are, of course, key interactions and linkages, but they are separated in terms of most of
their interaction.
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biodiversity agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), operates more as
a bazaar of various different coordinating spaces than a formal agreement or regime
(Faizi 2004, Le Preste 2002). The result being that international biodiversity governance
occurs without clear international guidelines setting the context. National
constituencies are crucial in articulating policies, developing strategies, and in
implementation of any international efforts at biodiversity management (Fee et al.
2009, Zimmermann 2009). However, effective biodiversity governance still requires
coordination and action across multiple jurisdictions. The result is a host of regional
actors and transnational networks providing a complex array of different biodiversity
strategies and projects. The insight to the question of resilient governance from looking
at biodiversity governance is understanding how resilience can happen in a difficult
environmental and institutional context.
Defining Resilient Governance: Adaptive Capacity and Authoritative Capability
Resilient governance is defined as a governance arrangement which can adapt
and respond to both shocks to the political context and shocks in the environmental
condition. As a broad concept, resilience is defined as the ability of systems to respond
to shocks in a way which does not permanently change the functioning of the system
(Holling 1973). The opposites of resilience would be governance arrangements which
either do not adapt following shocks or those which collapse entirely (Gunderson 2000).
Operationalization of the concept is difficult to the extent that resilience is often a latent
variable and cannot be identified precisely without regular shocks and disturbances to
the system and adequate evaluative tools to analyze resilience. However, the definition
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above would find that resilient governance is those arrangements that are high in both
authoritative capability and adaptive capacity.
Two examples of resilient and non-resilient governance in biodiversity
governance at the local level can help ground the discussion of the concept. The
positive case is that of the Ecomuseum Kristianstads Vattenrike (EKV) in Sweden which
has seen a significant updating of procedures and behavior over the past decade and a
half. Originally, the Kristianstads wetlands had been declared a Ramsar conservation
site in the 1970s and received some significant conservation support from the Swedish
government. Despite these efforts, the wetlands continued to see significant decline
through the 1970s and 1980s. One individual in the 1980s, Sven-Erik Magnusson who
was an assistant curator of the Kristianstad County Museum, began organizing a
network in order to highlight the natural condition of the wetlands. This effort resulted
in collection of the environmental knowledge about the wetlands, brought in various
groups that were noticing similar declining trends but were not largely connected, and
raised the public profile of the declining wetland condition. The result was the creation
of EKV, headed by Magnusson, as a loose organizational space which developed a series
of interlinkages with various different actors, eventually being integrated into the
municipal government, and supporting constant adaptation and fine-tuning of
procedures. The result is that EKV has developed a highly-adaptive management
strategy and a diverse base of support allowing it to weather both natural and political
disturbances (Gunderson et al. 2006, Lebel et al. 2006).
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An example of a non-resilient institution is that of the Everglades in Florida.
Much of the Everglades have been transformed over the past 75 years with large parts
of the northern part being turned into agricultural land and much of the Eastern part
transformed to serve the urban areas. A group of individuals (centered in a 6-person
expert panel including C.S. Holling) began developing an active, integrated, and adaptive
management plan for the Everglades in the 1980s. In addition, a series of severe
environmental shocks (fire, flood, and drought) and actions by environmental
policymakers and activists raised the prominence in the public of protecting the
Everglades. In 2000, the area received an authorization for over $7.8 billion from
Congress to encourage the restoration of the area. Despite a designed adaptive strategy
for the Everglades and significant support from the national government though, any
implementation of experimental management has been disrupted by political struggles.
Gunderson and Light explain that “The Everglades process of experimentation has been
hindered by (1) long standing feuds among special interest groups (agricultural and
environmental) who seek certitude in policy, rather than understanding through
experimentation; and (2) outmoded policies and practices that hamstring
experimentation efforts and (3) resistance from agency scientists” (Gunderson and Light
2006, 327). The result has been that this system has seen declining ecosystem health
indicators and even preliminary adaptive management ideas have been short-circuited.
Resilient governance then needs both the adaptive capacity and the ability to
continue to discuss and implement decisions (the authoritative capability). Political or
environmental disruptions or shocks can both derail governance efforts at the local and
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at the international level. Oran Young organizes the various possible shocks into those
internal to the governance arrangement and those external to the governance
arrangement (Young 2010); although Young’s organization is instructive, when defining
the necessary components of resilient governance it is more useful to divide them
between whether the shocks disrupt the adaptive capacity or the authoritative
capability of the organization. Political disruptions involve the defection of major
actors, the loss of leaders, network breakdown, the development of intractable and
opposing coalitions, and wider geopolitical issues, among others. Environmental
disruptions can include natural disasters, disruptions to ecosystem services, scientific or
popular reports on the severe situation, and internal assessments about the
environmental conditions. Resilient governance is governance that can adjust and
adapt to these different types of disruptions.
Dealing with political shocks requires authoritative capability within the
organization which revolves around the ability of the governance arrangement to make
rules and keep actors committed to those rules (Bernstein 2004). In some instances this
relates to the trust that actors have in one another and in other times the “delegated
authority” of the institutions they create to achieve the ends they were designed to
address (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Governance arrangements which are unable to
keep important members involved or which are unable to make and update rules will
not be resilient but will instead be in either states of arrested development or in some
instances outright collapse. International environmental politics has seen cases which
exemplify these lessons. Agreements like the United Nations’ Framework Convention
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on Climate Change and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol have both been beset by lacks
of authoritative capability and have been unable to develop significant additional
agreements (for the general discussion of arrested development, see:Young 2010
chapter 4, which also explores the particular case of climate change, for more on
climate see: Dimitrov 2010, Thompson 2010, for the Biosafety protocol, see: Andree
2007, Oberthur and Gehring 2006).
Coupled with this, adaptive capacity relates to the ability of the governance
arrangement to develop and integrate scientific information into their rules and
procedures. The studies of resilience and adaptive capacity at the local level have
emphasized the importance of trial and error, policy experimentation, learning based
upon new understandings of the problem, and the ability to communicate these results
across levels as key to sustaining resilience (Ostrom 2005, Folke 2006, Gupta et al. 2010,
Pahl-Wostl 2009b). Studies of international environmental politics has likewise
emphasized the importance of learning and integrating in new understandings into
procedures as crucial to their maintenance (Haas and Haas 1995, The Social Learning
Group 2001). The lack of adaptive capacity has held back a number of international
agreements; highlighted most significantly in the collapse of North Pacific Fur Seal
efforts, where natural disease and the failure to take this into account caused the
collapse of the institution (Young 2010).
To help understand the wide range of possible outcomes, it is useful heuristically
to see resilient governance as one of four different governance outcomes based upon
different levels of authoritative capability and adaptive capacity. Governance
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arrangements with low authoritative capability and low adaptive capacity will be seen as
collapsed arrangements. They are largely unable to develop rules or to integrate new
information and will be particularly vulnerable to shocks. Some arrangements have a
large ability to generate and integrate new information, but lack the political will to do
so. Using Young’s term “arrested development” (Young 2010), these arrangements
have high adaptive capacity but without the authority to implement them. Conversely,
some arrangements have generally high political engagement and authority but which
are largely unable to generate usable knowledge to the organizations. These
organizations are here termed equilibrium in that they generally bargain to specific
equilibrium points and under certain stresses they may experience punctuated progress;
however, the adaptation is not a constant or engrained process. Finally, resilient
governance arrangements will be those which are both high on authoritative capability
and adaptive capacity. Figure 1.2 collects this information with some key examples of
specific international regimes.
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Adaptive Capacity
Low

Low
Collapse
Regional Seas
Program in
the Persian
Gulf

Authoritative
Capability
High

High
Arrested
Development
UNFCCC

Fur Seals

International
Convention on
Whaling

Equilibrium

Resilience

Antarctic
Treaty System

Ozone
North Sea

Table 1.1- Different possible governance outcomes based upon their authoritative capability and
their adaptive capacity. Cases are drawn from: (Miles et al. 2002, Young 2010)

Network Structure Theory of Resilience
This study argues that the crucial feature which enables some governance
arrangements to maintain adaptive capacity and authoritative capability is the network
structure. In particular, network structures which evolve to have distinct clusters of likeminded actors and institutionalized linking agents bringing these distinct networks
together. The key aspects then involves both tightly coupled modules within the
network and agents able to diffuse ideas and policy options between the different
modules of the network. If there is not a modular network structure or if the modular
network structure is not held together with linking agents then the governance
arrangement will result in an alternative outcome. Within this broad articulation, the
theory makes some specific hypotheses and expectations about relevant causal
mechanisms that will be crucial in contributing to resilience.
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Theoretical and Empirical Basis for Modular Network Theory
The theoretical and empirical basis for the modular network theory of resilience
develops from a number of different streams of governance research. The mixed
theoretical lens which develops emphasizes the important role of bottom-up, emergent
processes and the important role of adaptive management created through focused
learning by small groups. However, there are a lot of other conditions identified as
relevant to resilient governance which the modular network argument finds to be of
secondary relevance to resilience on the international level.
Before proceeding, it is important to point out that although the primary studies
of resilient governance study local level institutional interactions this study is primarily
concerned with resilience at an international and multi-level setting. The dynamics that
operate in the local level may be irrelevant or difficult to apply to international settings.
The modular network theory builds from findings and theoretical arguments about
resilient governance at the local level and sifts these disparate studies to generate a
generalizable argument for resilience at the international level.
Rather than a unified field of analysis, the insights relevant to the question of
resilient governance derive from a number of different streams of research on resilience
of social-ecological systems and governance studies. The most significant analysis has
happened in studies of the resilience of linked socio-ecological systems, work often
affiliated with the Resilience Alliance, studies of common-pool resource management
and polycentric governance, and studies of coordination in multilevel governance
environments.
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Before exploring governance studies to develop insights about a theory of
resilience, it is necessarily to deal with the limits of the resilient theories of ecological
systems. As argued above, the resilience findings can assist in developing a dynamic
approach to governance that focuses on the adaptive processes within governance
arrangements. The approach helps understand that robustness and resilience are not
confused and that the full array of nested, interacting systems are accounted for.
However, the metaphor from ecological systems should not be widely applied to
governance systems.
To apply the findings across systems often leads to broad arguments that try to
apply ecosystem dynamics to those of governance institutions. For example, Walker
and Salt identify three key system dynamics that are applicable across resilient systems:
diversity, modularity, and the tightness of feedbacks (Walker and Salt 2006, and see
also Levin 2002). Walker and Salt explain the components of the three factors
explaining that: “Diversity refers to variety in the number of species, people, and
institutions that exist…both functional and response diversity…Modularity relates to the
manner in which the components that make up a system are linked…[And] Tightness of
feedbacks refers to how quickly and strongly the consequences of a change in one part
of the system are felt and responded to in other parts” (Walker and Salt 2006, 121).
While possibly important broad aspects of resilient governance, the problem with these
answers is that they explain little about the actual adaptive processes of governance
arrangements.

21

The metaphor becomes most strained when studies using resilience as a general
approach began discussing leadership. Studies use the concept of leadership to explain
the preparation and shepherding of governance arrangements through various states
(Olsson et al. 2006). While work has shown keystone species play key roles in organizing
and reorganizing ecological systems (Mills, Soulé, and Doak 1993, Walker 1992), it
seems strained to understand leadership in similar ways. Leadership often becomes ex
post explanations which point to individuals as key leaders to explain certain
governance changes (Skodvin and Andresen 2006). The null condition or absence of
leadership proves analytically difficult. While not denying the possible importance of
leaders and leadership in the processes of adaptation and resilience, the argument here
is simply cautious in suggesting that ecological studies provide some important
suggestions, but the development of theory is best done by looking at governance
studies.9
Governance literatures and resilience
Three different, but related, streams of governance studies provide some useful
insights for understanding resilient international governance. None of them directly
apply to wider international governance arrangements, so each will provide some key
facets that together will contribute to the network structure theory of resilient

9

Even the broad insights of modularity, diversity and tight feedback may become stretched
when applied to multilevel and international governance. Diversity, for example, may mean
different things at different levels of governance. The challenge for a theory of resilience in
multilevel and international setting is to provide an understanding of how these factors may
play out in different levels and across levels.
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governance. These three streams can be most usefully classified as socio-ecological
system governance, polycentric governance, and multi-level governance.
Socio-ecological system governance work has increased dramatically over the
past decade and focused on a number of different cases but primarily on governance at
the local or subnational level. The research has used ideas of shock, adaptive capacity,
and regime shifts (concepts largely drawn from the resilience in ecological systems
studies) to explore changes in resource use and ecosystem use by people (Garmestani
and Benson 2013, Anderies and Janssen 2011, Norberg et al. 2008, Walker, Gunderson,
et al. 2006, Anderies, Walker, and Kinzig 2006, Folke et al. 2005). These studies have
explored a number of different dimensions involved in resilient governance but in
general have emphasized learning, cross-system impacts, and network connections as
crucial processes in understanding resilience. The limitation of these studies for
understanding international governance is that they do not account for large differences
of interest between actors. In situations of diverse interests and coordination problems
made more difficult in multiple jurisdictions, it is unclear whether the same findings
would be relevant.
However, two ways these studies inform the network structure theory is that
they emphasize the importance of wider connections beyond a single institution and
that learning systems mediate network form. In regards to the first, with the idea of
panarchy and nested systems (Gunderson, Holling, and Peterson 2002, Carpenter and
Turner 2001), these studies have observed in a number of instances the importance of
wider systems in shaping the processes within a governance arrangement. For example,
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in a study of Uzbek drought response, Herrfahrdt-Pähle and Pahl-Wostl find that the
larger Soviet management system persisted after the fall of the Soviet Union shaping
the adaptability of the water regime (Herrfahrdt-Pähle and Pahl-Wostl 2012). The result
is that other systems with connections to a governance arrangement can cause shocks
and also prevent adaptation. The second conception is an emphasis on learning as a key
mediating factor. While network structure may have an impact, it is learning that
largely mediates that impact in practice. In the EKV case earlier, the network structure
in the EKV was important but only became active because of the ability to generate and
spread new ideas across the network (Olsson et al. 2006). This provides a core insight
for theory development in that it means that learning dynamics are a crucial mediating
variable which shapes resilient outcomes.
Polycentric governance studies contribute to this conception by emphasizing
coordination rules and the risks and rewards of modular and centralized network
structures. The literature initially developed in studies of urban politics in the United
States which emphasized that coordinated action amongst different municipalities was
not only possible, but could contribute to inventive policy learning (Ostrom, Tiebout et
al. 1961). This led to empirical work in municipal governance in the United States and
the United Kingdom (Rhodes 1996, Stoker 1998) and to work in management of
common pool resources such as shared irrigation systems, forests, or fisheries (Dietz,
Ostrom, and Stern 2003, Ostrom 1990, 2005). The literature developed a sustained
evaluation of common management regimes that worked without reliance on
hierarchical control mechanisms or competitive market forces (for theoretical work this
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literature is generally responding to, see: Demsetz 1967, Hardin 1968). Governance
from this approach is the development and following of collective rules between
functionally equivalent participants. Such a system develops from unit-level
mechanisms of trust and reciprocity which gradually build into rules and rule-based
behavior (Ostrom 2005, see also Axelrod 1986). The mechanisms that then cause such
rules and institutions to persist are supported by rule following behavior, the use of
specific type of rules such as monitoring, conflict resolution procedures, and increasing
returns (Ostrom 1990). Coordination then in context of the polycentric governance
stream then entails development of norms, rules for collective action, and design
principles for maintaining those rules.
The major insight for international and multilevel settings from this work, which
similarly to socio-ecological governance studies is largely at a single level even if it
includes multiple actors, is that it highlights the importance of network structures on
shaping learning behavior. One of the major observed advantages of polycentric
governance arrangements has been that they allow trial and error experimentation and
local adjudication of rules which can generate better post-disruption lessons for the
governance arrangement (Ostrom 2010b, a, 2005). However, while these systems can
work, the large risk with them is that they will not be connected enough together to
matter or that power or economic dynamics (such as free riding or rent seeking
behavior) will disrupt the dynamic learning potential in these agreements (Andersson
and Laerhoven 2007, Gibson et al. 2005).
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Finally, multilevel governance studies focus primarily on the ways in which
coordination and collaboration can occur across jurisdictional scales. Developing
primarily in studies of the European Union (EU), this stream emphasizes the
development of transnational linkages by subnational units in ways which make and
shape policies. Hooghe and Marks’ study of the European Union emphasizes that
“subnational actors operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating
transnational associations in the process” (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Further
explorations have specifically found that pressures on both the European Commission
and local governments have resulted in each jurisdiction depending on one another to
achieve certain goals (Ward and Williams 1997). The theoretical foil for multilevel
governance has largely been the state-centric perspective of EU integration which has
emphasized the integration process as constrained by state actors and keeping the
formal policymaking impact firmly in the hands of centralized states. The empirical
contribution of multilevel governance studies then is on emphasizing the policy
networks that exist between bureaucrats, subnational units, and nongovernmental
organization networks (Börzel 1998, Kriesi, Adam, and Jochum 2006, Bugdahn 2008).
Each stream of governance research adds some aspect which together
contribute to the network structure theory of resilience below. In addition, each adds
some unique causal mechanisms which would be relevant for fully understanding the
causal process. Using cross-governance studies to construct a theory of resilient
governance has some risks involved. However, these risks can be dealt with effectively
through an eclectic approach studying the mechanisms of governance (Sil and
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Katzenstein 2010). A crucial part of the theory will thus not simply be the broad insights
from the three different streams, but some of the mechanisms used in the different
theories.
Network Structure Theory of Resilient International Governance
Simply stated, the network structure theory of resilient governance argues that
different network structures shape the learning that occurs within governance
arrangements following shocks and this shapes the adaptive response to the shocks.
The crucial independent variable is the network structure (broadly defined as being of
various ideal types, modular, centralized, or limited). When a shock happens to a
governance arrangement, the network structure shapes precisely the potential learning
dynamics which can occur and be implemented by the different aspects of the
governance arrangements. Modular networks will enable broad, bottom-up learning
driven by ideas from multiple clusters of the governance arrangement while centralized
structures will tend to foster top-down learning driven by one particular part of the
network. These learning approaches will then shape precisely how the governance
arrangements adapt and respond to the shock. Bottom-up learning will facilitate the
resilience of the governance arrangement, while centralized networks will facilitate
limited adaptation and often support of current streams of political resources from the
institutions, and limited networks will see little learning. The result is that even if they
appear complex and disorganized, broad and modular networks are the most likely to
facilitate resilience. Robust institutions are not sufficient, and may even be detrimental
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at some points, and social capital in some aspect of the network is unlikely to be enough
to spur resilience across the network.
Network Structure
The network structure argument contends that the crucial shaping condition for
resilience is the governance network structure which exists before a shock occurs. The
articulation of different network structures and how precisely to describe these abound
throughout a number of different literatures and no standard articulation has been
developed (Börzel 1998, Rhodes 1997). The articulation developed here is an original
depiction of the different possible network types and remains an ideal type articulation
rather than a definite measure for study across fields. The articulation develops from
separate understandings of political networks focusing on the coalitional composition of
networks (Steinberg 2009, Thelen and Mahoney 2009) and the importance of linking
and bridging actors (Granovetter 1973). Coalitional politics as the basis for institutional
dynamics alerts us to the broad networks which are connected to any governance
arrangement while the linking actors show the pivotal role played by actors who can
perform functions in multiple networks at the same time, whether this is bilateral
activists operating in domestic and international spheres (Steinberg 2001) or whether
these are norm entrepreneurs or scientists serving policy roles who operate between
different functional spheres (Haas 1990a, Cortell and Davis 2005). The ideal types then
vary on the organization of the coalitions that make up the network and on the role of
linking agents.
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Modular networks are defined as those with multiple, separate coalitional
groups of actors that are joined by key and persistent linking agents. A module is
described as a group of actors in a network with significantly more connections to one
another than they have to other members of the network (Newman 2006). Centralized
networks are those with few separate groups of actors and with linking agents serving
brief roles linking coalitions which quickly dissipate in future rounds of institutional
conflict. Finally, limited networks are those without extensive and repetitive network
connections outside of the arrangement. As will be shown in the cases, these networks
develop for a variety of reasons and are linked together through largely historically
dependent reasons. The specific causal pathways and likely mechanisms are captured in
the heuristic Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.2– Visual depiction of the causal processes expected as a result of network
structures.
The first set of hypotheses in the modular theory argument relate to the
argument that the network structure will shape the processes of idea diffusion during
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and after shocks. Hypothesis 1 expects that if there is a modular network structure then
there will be bottom-up diffusion of information. Hypothesis 2 expects, in contrast, that
if there is a centralized network then there will be top-down diffusion of information.
The theoretical basis for these distinct pathways is found in all three literatures explored
above but have distinct mechanisms. Hypothesis 3 expects that when there is no
network organized, then there will be no diffusion of information.
Relevant mechanisms for Hypothesis 1, linking modular networks to bottom-up
diffusion of information are circumvention projects and trial and error experimentation.
Circumvention projects would be those projects organized around the governance
organization which link different actors than are linked in the governance arrangement
projects. This feature is described in a number of different empirical descriptions in
polycentric and multilevel governance studies. Pahl-Wostl terms these connections
“shadow networks” (Pahl-Wostl 2009a), Hooghe and Marks broadly discuss them as
local-regional linkages (Hooghe and Marks 2001), and other descriptions do not usually
provide a clear conceptual name. This mechanism has been observed in regional
governance, primarily in the EU context. Hooghe and Marks explore this dynamic in
bringing municipal governments and EU actors together in a variety of projects for
different ends. They write that in the 1980s in Europe, “subnational governments were
discovering Europe at the same time that Europe, under the leadership of Jacques
Delors, was discovering subnational governments” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 81).
Municipal governments wanted additional autonomy and resources to implement
policies, while supranational institutions wanted additional efforts with municipal
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governments so they could pursue their agenda items. Once established these
connections became deeper and deeper and were valuable in their own respect in the
EU context. . This mechanism is crucial in understanding policy development in both
the EU context (Jordan and Schout 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2001) and ASEAN context
(Caballero-Anthony 2004). It provides a crucial mechanism linking the modules with one
another in diverse ways to allow the bottom-up diffusion of ideas and information.
Similarly, the mechanism of trial and error experimentation provides an
additional process by which the modular network structure leads to bottom-up diffusion
processes. Polycentric governance studies and resilient social-ecological system studies
have emphasized the key role of trial and error policy experimentation in producing
learning by governance arrangements (Ostrom 2005, Anderies, Walker, and Kinzig 2006,
Cardenas 2004). In single governance arrangements, the findings are robust that trial
and error experimentation can lead to bottom-up learning; however, in multilevel
settings with experiments in many different modules, the relationship is not clearly
established. Multilevel governance studies add some idea of how experimentalist
efforts may work in a regional setting (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, Börzel 2012), but any
generalizations appear largely specific to that context and of limited theoretical
guidance elsewhere. The contrast with broadcasting, a primary mechanism for
hypothesis 2, helps clarify the conditions. In broadcasting, learning occurs primarily by
an agent directly telling another agent the conclusion reached. In trial and error
experimentation, learning occurs through local experimentation but also building on the

31

work of others through borrowing their findings, which may include the conclusion but
could also include other aspects of the experiments elsewhere.
Diffusion processes
The second part of the modular network theory contends that the diffusion
processes shape the governance outcomes. The theory contends broadly that bottomup diffusion processes will result in resilient governance which is both adaptive and
authoritative while top-down learning will lead to governance arrangements which are
limited in some terms of adaptation or authority. Those cases with limited networks will
see no diffusion of information and largely result in governance arrangements which do
not adapt and are limited in their impact. Bottom-up diffusion processes can be broadly
defined as those which involve idea development and spread through multiple actors
with no centralized communication center. Examples abound in international
biodiversity governance of attempts to organize this: whether that is the use of
indigenous biodiversity knowledge, organized science committees, or multiple levels of
different projects. The key aspect is that learning is not collected by a centralized body
which then transmits the conclusion to the rest of the actors. This is top-down diffusion
processes and can be best understood to operate in typical international bureaucracies.
Policies and ideas are established by some organ in the institution and then the lessons
are broadcast to the rest of the modules in the network. The theory expects that
bottom-up diffusion of lessons, associated with modular network structures, will result
in resilient governance while top-down diffusion, associated with centralized network
structures, will result in either equilibrium or arrested development governance. Those
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governance arrangements with limited networks will see little diffusion and will see
neither adaptation nor authoritative capability.
Hypothesis 4 is if a system has bottom-up diffusion of lessons and policy rules,
then that system will be high in adaptive capacity and authoritative capability.
Hypothesis 5 similarly argues that if a system has top-down diffusion of lessons and
policy rules, then that system will be low in either adaptive capacity or authoritative
capability. Hypothesis 6, finally, argues that if a system does not see any diffusion to a
wider network, then that system will be low in both adaptive capacity and authoritative
capability.
Similarly to the first set of network structure hypotheses, each of these
connections is expected to operate under different mechanisms. Bottom-up diffusion
leads to resilient governance through 1. Proliferation of ideas and 2. Tight feedback
loops. Top-down diffusion leads to stale governance arrangements through 1. 2.
Emergent Causation
Network structure is an emergent phenomenon, in the sense that the whole is
larger than the sum of the parts, and as such is not reducible to simple linear causal
models. Emergent causation is a different type of process of description than linear or
aggregate effect causation in that it fundamentally involves both upward and downward
causation simultaneously. The challenge confronting research is how to maintain a
coherent argument for empirical evaluation that is simultaneously mainly about agents
and structures (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998). The challenge is best dealt with through
a mechanism-based focus of the argument because this allows both separations of the
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different dynamics while retaining enough consistency to weigh different possible causal
pathways.
Direct or linear causal stories, of the type X causes Y or an increase in X increases
the probability of Y, focus primarily upon simultaneous changes in variable conditions.
However, if it is contended that an outcome results from emergent processes, such
relationships between variable conditions may be misleading. The problem of
confounders becomes highly problematic if it is possible that there is an emergent
process. For example, although supporting national constituencies or strong
international institutions may correlate greatly with resilient governance, it could be
caused by other dynamics that are not captured in the correlation story.
Emergent causation involves two different processes working in close
relationship. First, there is an uncoordinated action by units that are analytically
independent from one another. This is the bottom-up aspect of emergent causation.
Second, the decisions made by these agents creates a structure that impacts future
actions by those individuals. This can be conceptualized either as the feedback loop (in
unstructured forms) or as the structural effects (Sawyer 2005, Davies 2006). The selffulfilling prophecy of bank collapse is a clear example of this. Many individuals, possibly
for very different reasons, form a belief in the weakness of a bank and express the belief
that it might fail. These individual level actions can form a result where people begin
withdrawing their funds, weakening the bank, and possibly leading to the prophesized
end (Merton 1948). The bottom-up aspect and the feedback loop need not be of the
same form and all that is necessary for emergent causation is that both the bottom-up,
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uncoordinated processes and the feedback loop operate actively. Emergent causal
stories need to have both aspects or it is different type of causation happening; so if the
bank is making poor investments and that is what impacts its health rather than
individual perceptions, that would undermine any emergent causal story.
There are some unique challenges to empirically evaluating emergent causation.
A first problem is the difference between strong and weak emergence which relates to
the amount of coordination at the lower levels (Chalmers 2006). Weak emergence can
involve unstructured interactions between social agents that is not purposefully guiding
the outcome. Back to the bank example, if account holders talk to one another about
their belief in the strength or weakness of the bank they are not intending to produce
the outcome of bank collapse but nor is the process completely uncoordinated. Strong
emergence involves exactly that uncoordinated interactions where individuals make
their own small decisions which are not communicated directly to other actors. For
example, if account holders in the bank reduce their investment in the bank on their
own, this will restrain the bank’s ability to lend which may then cause other individuals
to make their own beliefs further restraining the bank’s activities. Weak emergence is
far more likely in the social world (Clemens 2007), but the distinction between it and
directed action may not always be clear.
This leads to the second problem which is how to identify and assess the
strength of emergent processes in complex social environments. One popular approach
is agent based modeling or the use of computer programs to test the ability for limited
logic agents to create complex environments (Johnson 2001, Axelrod 1997, Holland
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1992). These computer aided approaches are unique in their ability to test if units
operating with simple logics can create social patterns of interest without directing their
behavior. Like all laboratory findings, the limitation is on connecting these findings to
real world settings in useful ways. It is also possible to do direct empirical assessment of
the emergent propositions, but it is important to refine the analysis to the actual
processes of production rather than variables or structures.
The focus on mechanisms then allows clear empirical support or disconfirmation
of emergent causation and allows comparison with other possible systems.
Mechanisms are the direct generative processes that produce key outcomes or steps in
the eventual outcome of interest. They allow excellent views for evaluation of
outcomes in that they can quickly disconfirm emergent arguments. If processes were
generated through directed, hierarchical action, or if the feedback loops are not
operative in a meaningful sense, then the empirical argument is fundamentally
weakened. However, at the same time, if the bottom-up processes occur through
undirected action and if there is an effective feedback mechanism for all agents, then
there is good evidence of the emergent argument. The network structure theory relies
upon this form of causation in order to understand and deal with the issues of complex
causation and the role of network structures which are constantly in flux.
Alternatives: Regime Design and Coherence of Clusters
There are two alternative arguments often given for explaining resilient
governance which do not find significant support in the history of global biodiversity
governance. The first argues that regime design shapes the ability of the institutions to
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respond to shocks and the second instead argues that the coherence of some cluster or
party within the network is what is crucial for explaining resilience. For ease of
discussion, the first will be called the robustness argument and the second will be called
the social capital argument.
The robustness argument contends that stronger institutions, variously defined,
will be the most capable of surviving shocks and responding to them. This argument has
been pushed the farthest by Oran Young who argued that the fit of the internal
dynamics of regimes will shape their dynamics (Young 2010). In this argument, the
regime design matters significantly and poorly designed regimes would likely fail to see
adaptive growth. Young constructs a set of different variables in the inside of
organizations which would be expected to shape the resilience of organizations. The
network structure argument is distinct from this argument because it both extends the
focus outside of the regime itself to the larger network, as will be seen so does the
social capital argument, and also because it finds that strong institutions can create
significant disincentives against adaptation. Institutions create stable flows or resources
and power to some and not others, to say it another way, they are distributional
instruments (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). This can create powerful interests wedded to
the institutions which exist and preventing adaptation or, in more perverse instances,
widespread rent seeking behavior as actors work to maintain resource flows rather than
achieve positive environmental action. The network structure argument highlights both
the necessary strength by institutions to hold networks together in times of shock, but
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also some of the limitations on adaptation which can be introduced by these robust
organizations.
The second approach emphasizes that what is necessary for resilient governance
is for there to be a significant invested constituency pushing the resilience. The
epistemic community approach focuses on the important role of scientific communities
while the national constituency approach focuses on the importance of a domestic
political group dedicated to the resilient approach (Haas 1990b, Steinberg 2009). Both
of these arguments see concerted, focused groups of agents working to push any
governance resilience. In addition, this social capital and trust between members could
be between the state members of the governance arrangement who view the effort as
legitimate (Bernstein 2004). The Network Structure perspective differs from this by
giving it a specific shape in arguing that it is not necessarily any trustful relationship
between one cluster of actors able to push the other actors, but rather the existence of
multiple different, polycentric clusters of actors. In addition, the mechanisms expected
to operate in the social capital argument may differ significantly from those expected to
be important in the network structure argument: namely, the emergent mechanisms.
Some of the evidence provided in the analysis of global biodiversity politics will
provide significant challenges for explanation from either of the alternative arguments.
The hard cases for explanation by both approaches are the UNESCO Man and Biosphere
project and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. Both of these examples are ones
where neither other argument can fully illuminate the outcomes: with weak institutional
support and the limited support from a single cluster of policy-focused actors. Rather,
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these cases, as will be shown are best explained through an understanding of the
network structures which undergirded these governance arrangements. This does not
mean that either argument is necessarily falsified by this study; rather, their limits are
very apparent when looking at the various biodiversity cases which have been built
around the world in the past 30 years.
Approach
Multilevel governance and resilient dynamics present challenges for study. As
explored above, resilience involves multi-system dynamics and often surprising changes
in system structures. Studying governance system dynamics requires an approach that
is not limited to a single level and which is able to account for complexity. This study
approaches these issues by paying particular attention to the cross-system dynamics,
through developing multi-method indicators, and through
This study begins with a large survey of global biodiversity governance and
resilience in those cases. Focusing on 10 cases from a population of 38 cases, Chapter 2
analyzes the impacts of resilience across cases. The primary methodological choice for
these cases involves brief process tracing identifying the network structure and the
impacts that has had on the governance outcomes. The 10 cases for analysis are
selected specifically to get representation across levels (with some global arrangements
and some regional arrangements). This small-n comparison allows general findings to
be developed and applied across cases. A particular focus is in identifying and tracing
the causal mechanisms which operate in the various cases and attempting to
understand their necessary conditions. This method departs from a linear, correlational
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analysis (although some of these tools will be used in Chapter 3) and focuses instead on
the complex conditions which generate the observed outcomes. Appendix II will
explore the epistemic understandings which support this approach.
Following this multi-case comparison, Chapters 3-5 will explore the resilient
dynamics in a more focused comparison between two cases discussed in Chapter 2.
Two cases for in-depth study involve the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) in
Central America and the Caribbean Challenge in the Caribbean islands. The MBC as
originally constructed in the late 1990s largely excluded the country of El Salvador from
participation in the project. However, as a result of local-level coalitions linking up with
international funders, in the redesign of the governance arrangement El Salvador
became of crucial importance. The governance arrangement was able to deal with
shifts in political constituencies, institutions, and scientific thinking and adapt a
expanded and strengthened biodiversity governance approach. The corridor idea has
influenced a number of projects in El Salvador which, with the support of local
governments, have shown dramatic results. The Caribbean Challenge as it was
implemented in the Dominican Republic, in contrast, largely supported their typical topdown creation and expansion of protected areas without inclusion of alternative
approaches. The governance arrangement remains tied strongly to a small group within
the government which drives the biodiversity policy. In general then, the MBC has
shown itself to be a resilient governance arrangement and the Caribbean Challenge has
shown itself to be unable to adapt and change. Aside from being ideal cases for the
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study of resilient governance, these cases present empirical puzzles that require indepth explanation.
Within case analysis involves mixed methods for analysis including process
tracing, interview and archival data, and social network analysis. This provides
triangulation of indicators allowing for multiple support for claims. Study on both core
studies the Caribbean Challenge and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor focused on
two national cases to focus the scope of analysis: the Dominican Republic and El
Salvador. In both cases, archive data was gathered in the national environmental
ministries. In El Salvador, the agricultural ministry and election ministry were also
visited for select data retrieval. In the Dominican Republic, the tourism ministry
document service was used for similar access to key select data. Other documents were
requested from specific organizations and used in the analysis, but unless noted archival
work was not conducted. In both cases, interview participants were selected as crucial
individuals in the multilevel governance system. In both countries, this includes local
governance planners, national level NGOs and members of the Environmental ministry,
international funders, and technicians of CCAD and TNC depending on the case.
Participants were selected based on elite sampling techniques aiming for individuals
active in multiple levels of governance. These interviews yielded 14 interviews in El
Salvador and 17 in the Dominican Republic using this selection technique. However, in
order to get a fuller view of the situations in both countries, other individuals were
interviewed informally in both countries for insights about particular issues. This
included practitioners like ecotourist operators or protected area guards (included in
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multiple site visits in both contexts) and also interviews with National level NGOs that
were not part of the multilevel governance arrangement to include alternative
perspectives. These additional interviews will not be quoted or used for key analysis but
will be referred to as necessary.
In addition, social network data was utilized in both cases to further test the
context. The information for the social networks developed significantly out of
cooperative environmental grants at the international, national, and local-local manner.
In addition, formal yearly accounts by most national NGOs provided significant
information about cooperation, coordination, and membership of board of directors for
the NGO. These provided significant introduction to the social networks of the two
cases. Chapter 5 will go into the social network data in a more thorough manner, but it
formed a crucial aspect of the study.
The limitation in both instances is that the multilevel nature of the governance
arrangement restrains the extension of the findings throughout the governance
arrangements. Indeed, case studies by other researchers about the MBC in Belize,
Nicaragua, and Mexico found different outcomes. This limitation cannot be overcome
in the analysis, but this does not fully restrain the point of the analysis. Multilevel
governance itself does not move through uniform processes throughout the network
and identifying conditions that allow or constrain resilience in one part of the network is
sufficient for studying the mechanisms of resilience. The limitation is highly relevant for
understanding and generalizing the findings, but the focus on mechanisms allows the
research to have middle level generalizability even with this limitation.
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CHAPTER 2
GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND RESILIENCE
What processes allow international biodiversity governance arrangements to
adapt to changing environmental conditions and changing political conditions?
Biodiversity governance has experienced a number of different outcomes in terms of
resilience and it is an excellent area for study of these dynamics. The modular network
theory expects that those organizations with modular network structures will see
bottom-up diffusion in response to shocks and then will see resilient governance as a
result. Alternative network structures will result in different outcomes.
This chapter analyzes the pattern in a number of global biodiversity governance
arrangements in order to examine the explanatory power of the modular theory of
governance. The chapter will include in-depth study of ten different biodiversity cases,
selected from a larger population of 38 biodiversity governance arrangements, to
identify the specific articulations of the modular network theory. The analysis finds that
the network structure theory provides an excellent explanation for the outcomes in
global biodiversity governance.
The Terrain of Biodiversity Governance
International biodiversity governance is one of the most complex and diverse
issue areas in international governance. Unlike other areas of governance, biodiversity
governance is not organized into any single, coherent organization and agreements and
as a result the field has significant gaps in coverage and also significant overlap on other
aspects (von Moltke 2001, Raustiala and Victor 2004). The result is that the problem of
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identifying the relevant institutions participating in biodiversity governance has been
limited and discerning the clear effects from any single institution has been difficult.
To make sense of biodiversity governance, analysts often use two different
approaches: focusing on a single agreement and trying to isolate effects or focusing on
the interrelationships between multiple agreements. Some examples will illustrate the
limitations of these two approaches. The single regime approach is precisely the choice
made by Curlier and Andresen in one of the most extensive evaluations of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. In this analysis, the focus is
solely on CITES and the impact it has had on protecting overall biodiversity. The
problem is that Curlier and Andresen conclude that while CITES has been quite effective
in creating shared expectations between states and stopping international trade of
endangered species and products, but because it only deals with a part of the overall
issue of wildlife biodiversity then the treaty has been of low effectiveness (Curlier and
Andresen 2002). While valuable the approach misses some relevant dimensions about
the role of CITES in a larger connection of biodiversity agreements. The second
approach then is to try and capture the overall effects of the various institutions by
looking at their interactions or the effects of regime complexes (Raustiala and Victor
2004, Kim 2004). Although valuable, these approaches can downplay the role of any
single institution and the possibility for a single organization to disrupt the efforts of the
other organizations. The most effective analytic approach then seems to be to focus on
the inner-arrangement dynamics while keeping an eye on relevant interconnections.
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International biodiversity governance arrangements are those with a major focus
on biodiversity in general, and not a specific species or genus of flora or fauna, which
involve actors in more than one country. There are a number of these governance
arrangements and there does not exist a preexisting listing of the various projects. The
first step in developing the analysis is to establish a list of the universe of cases which
are relevant.
To construct a list of international biodiversity governance arrangements, the
research started with the recently established Liaison Group of Biodiversity-Related
Conventions (established in 2002) which is a group represented by the large 6
biodiversity related treaty organizations. From these set of the 6 main biodiversity
treaties I included other international organizations with memorandum of cooperation
or understanding with the different treaties. This method of developing a universe of
cases is extensive and significant in finding a set of supranational biodiversity
governance organizations. Table 2.1 provides the list of cases with 38 cases that have
developed and have memorandums of understanding with the Liaison Group of
Biodiversity Related Conventions.
Liaison Group of
Biodiversity-Related
Conventions
Bonn Convention or
Convention on Migratory
Species (CMS)
Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)
Convention on
International Trade of
Endangered Species (CITES)
Convention on Wetlands of

Global Biodiversity
Governance Arrangements

Regional Biodiversity
Governance Arrangements

UNEP World Conservation
Monitoring Center (WCMC)

Amazon Cooperation Treaty
Organization (ACTO)

UNESCO Man and
Biosphere Project (MAB)
Global Environment Facility
(GEF)

ASEAN Centre for
Biodiversity
Cartagena Convention
(Caribbean)

IUCN

Barcelona Convention
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International Importance,
especially Waterfowl
Habitat (Ramsar
Convention)
International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources
(ITPGR)
World Heritage Convention
(WHC)

(Mediterranean)

TRAFFIC

South Pacific Regional
Environment Programme

International Whaling
Commission (IWC)

Inter-American Convention
for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles
Comision Permanente del
Pacifico Sur

Global Programme of
Action for the Protection of
the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Activities
Global International Waters International Commission
Assessment
for the Protection of the
Danube River
Wildfowl and Wetlands
Lake Chad Basin
Trust
Commission
The Nature Conservancy
Niger Basin Authority
(TNC)
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Comission Internationale du
Bassin Congo-OubanguiSangha (CICOS)
Wildlife Conservation
Carpathian Convention
Society (WCS)
Conservation International Conservation of Arctic Flora
(CI)
and Fauna
Ducks Unlimited
Western Hemisphere
Migratory Species Initiative
International Tropical
East Asian-Ausralasian
Timber Organization (ITTO) Flyway Partnership (EAAFP)
Bern Convention (Europe)
Mesoamerican Biological
Corridor
Table 2.1- List of Supranational Biodiversity Governance Organizations as of December
2011
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Sufficient evidence is not available on all the cases and repeated evidence of the
development within the cases is not covered by the secondary literature or available
primary evidence. The set of 38 cases of supranational biodiversity governance
organizations though allows some initial insight into which of them have been resilient
and which of them have not been resilient or lack some of the conditions behind
resilience. Although full evidence for process tracing will not be available in all cases, it
is possible to learn enough about most of the cases to
Resilience Outcomes
There is a diverse set of outcomes and full evidence is not clearly available on all
cases in terms of resilience. In addition, adaptive capacity and authoritative capability,
the measures this study uses to assess resilience, may mean very different things in the
different cases. However, there are some broad indicators which will produce basic
evidence for both aspects of resilience which can assist in answering this question. The
lack of either indicator would be clear evidence of a lack of adaptive capacity and
authoritative capability, although there existence should not be considered definitive
evidence of either factor.
For adaptive capacity, a basic indicator which can be applied across biodiversity
cases is whether an institution has adopted and incorporated Ecosystem-Based
Management (EBM) into their policy framework. The Ecosystem Perspective or
Ecosystem Based Management has become a prolific idea in both policy-directed
biodiversity science and biodiversity governance over the past 20 years. In general, the
ecosystem perspective contends that policy to deal with biodiversity should be
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geography based, rather than single issue based, and with a goal of ecosystem
sustainability (Slocombe 1998). In practice, it would entail breaking bureaucratic
boundaries, avoiding specific policy targeting, focus on multiple drivers of biodiversity
decline or risk, and often would involve broadened stakeholder involvement (Murawski
2007). The early articulations argued for taking account of all environmental drivers and
processes within a given geographic zone and not simply the resource of interest
(freshwater, for instance) and for biodiversity would suggest not focusing on single
conservation zones or single-species focuses (Gregory et al. 1991). It has been
problematic in its articulation throughout the international environment with some
agreements being quite active in their incorporation of the ideas and others being quite
resistant. Crossing bureaucratic and funding specific focuses is quite problematic in the
international biodiversity scene. Whether governance organizations have adopted a
clear strategy of incorporating the ecosystem perspective is a excellent basic indicator of
adaptive capacity within the organization. Table 2.2, based primarily on the websites
and most recent documents within the organizations and groups divides the cases based
upon their incorporation of the ecosystem perspective.
Incorporated Ecosystem Perspective
Ramsar Convention
MAB
IUCN
Cartagena Convention
Barcelona Convention
South Pacific Regional Environment
Programme
Carpathian Convention

Limited Incorporation of Ecosystem
Perspective
Bonn Convention (varies based upon
treaty)
CBD
CITES
WCMC
IWC
GIWA
Waterfowl and Wetlands Trust
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East Asian-Ausralasian Flyway Partnership
(EAAFP)
GEF
MBC
Caribbean

TNC
WWF
CI
Ducks Unlimited
Bern Convention (Europe)
ITTO
ACTO
ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity
Lake Chad Basin Commission
Niger Basin Authority

n=27
Table 2.2- Cases Divided by Incorporation of Ecosystem Perspective.

In terms of adaptive capacity, a good indicator is the development of additional,
strengthened rules shared by the members. Advanced common understandings may
seem to be a natural result of institutions, organizations, and regimes; however, there is
significant variation in this in terms of outcomes in biodiversity governance
arrangements. Some have developed significant, strengthened rules of procedure (for
example, CITES rules on listing procedures) while others have been largely locked in
place (IWC, for example) or advanced only around specific issues (for example, the CBD).
This indicator provides a basic requirement of adaptive capacity that can be evaluated in
the different cases. The evidence derives from the past five meetings (through 2011) of
the parties and whether they have made significant updates to the core agenda of the
biodiversity arrangement. This is a constrained and yet quite advanced indicator of the
adaptive capacity of organizations. Table 2.3 shows the distribution.
Revised Core Agenda
WCMC (adaptation is built into meetings)
MAB

Limited Revision of Core Agenda
ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity
Lake Chad Basin Commission
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IUCN
GIWA (adaptation is built into meetings)
Barcelona Convention
South Pacific Regional Environment
Programme
Carpathian Convention

Niger Basin Authority
Ramsar Convention
IWC
Waterfowl and Wetlands Trust
East Asian-Ausralasian Flyway Partnership
(EAAFP)
Ducks Unlimited
ITTO
ACTO
Cartagena Convention (Caribbean)
WWF

CITES
TNC
CI
Comision Permanente del Pacifico Sur
Global Programme of Action for the
Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Activities (adaptation
built into meetings)
Bonn Convention (varies based upon
Bern Convention (Europe)
treaty)
CBD
Caribbean
CBM
n=29
Table 2.3- Cases Divided by Incorporation of New Rules

Using these two indicators, it is possible to develop a general understanding of
25 of the 38 cases in order to understand the general distribution of biodiversity
governance arrangements. Using the table developed in Chapter 1, it is possible to align
the cases in the four different possible systems originally developed in Table 1.1. The
result is a dispersion of cases contained in Table 2.4. The evidence shows that most
supranational biodiversity governance organizations are low in states of collapse or
equilibrium. One common theme in the cases is either a focus on a few species or
funding from a few sources. The IWC, those arrangements focused on seabirds, and the
dispersion of the Bonn Convention (CMS) are the exemplary cases in these categories.
Also, the big 3 conservation organizations (TNC, WWF, and CI) have only moderately
incorporated the ecosystem perspective but are quite able to adopt changed agendas.
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Other arrangements like the Ramsar Convention, the Cartagena Convention and the
East Asian-Ausralasian Flyway Partnership are in a state of arrested development. They
have developed with incorporation of the ecosystem perspective, in form and possibly
substance, but have not been able to mobilize actors to deepen the requirements on
actors. A few agreements have been able to update rules and simultaneously
incorporate the ecosystem perspective.
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Adaptive Capacity

Low

Authoritative
Capability

High

Low
Collapse (n=8)

High
Arrested Development (n=3)

IWC
Waterfowl and Wetlands Trust
Ducks Unlimited
ITTO
ACTO
ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity
Lake Chad Basin Commission
Niger Basin Authority
Bern Convention (Europe)

Ramsar Convention
Cartagena Convention (Caribbean)
EAAFP

Equilibrium (n=8)

Resilient (n=6)

Bonn Convention
CBD
CITES
WCMC
GIWA
TNC
WWF
CI

MAB
IUCN
Barcelona Convention
(Mediterranean)
South Pacific REP
Carpathian Convention
MBC

n=25
Table 2.4- Distribution of governance outcomes based upon their authoritative
capability and their adaptive capacity.
This procedure yields significant guidance in terms of which cases can provide
significant analytic leverage. Prioritizing diversity of levels and diversity of connection to
the Liaison Group agreements can provide a set of cases that control for different
institutional features. However, evidence for identification of mechanisms is not
available in all cases and thus presents a particular barrier. The cases for extension then
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include ACTO, ITTO, and the Bern Convention (from collapse), Ramsar Convention and
Caribbean efforts (from arrested development), CBD and CITES (from equilibrium), and
MAB, MBC, and Carpathian Convention (from resilience). These 10 cases are excellent
opportunities to understand the mechanisms that produce resilient governance at
different supranational levels and contexts.

Collapse: ACTO, ITTO, the Bern Convention and the Limits on Adaptive Capacity and
Authoritative Capability
Amazon Cooperative Treaty Organization
The development of the Amazon Cooperative Treaty Organization (ACTO) is
largely defined by sustained precariousness of the institution and staggered
development. ACTO was started in 1978 as an effort by Brazil to expand and transform
its foreign policy but was provided little substance or structure. Meetings were held
irregularly and simply started programs typically with international funders. With
changes in 2002, the organization gained a permanent secretariat and the Secretary
General, Dr. Rosalia Artega, was an important pusher in strengthening the organization.
However, highlighting the precarious nature of the organization, when she left the
organization many of the efforts faltered and the organization took a substantial
amount of time naming a replacement (Hochstetler 2011). This case provides an
excellent case on some of the crucial limitations on the resilience of supranational
biodiversity governance arrangements.
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ACTO is highly linked directly to Brazilian interest in the Amazon region. When
the military came to power in Brazil in 1964, they made development of the Amazonian
region one of their primary goals. Making the Amazon a space for national
development, the military government treated the area as crucial site for national
security (de Onis 1992, 55). In the1968 A National Security Policy for Amazonia
developed by the government, they contended that the “planned and methodical
occupation of the region to impose, on the full extent of the territory, the characteristics
of our civilization and integrate it forever into our national structure” (quoted in de Onis
1992). This entailed the deployment of massive resources into road, hydroelectric, and
infrastructure projects in the Amazonian region, and the deployment of military bases
and troops into the Amazon. The neighboring states were often startled by the military
deployment and Brazil generally saw declining relationships with many in the Amazon
basin (Ferris 1981). Regional cooperation during this early period was often based upon
the goal of securing and developing the Amazon with cooperative infrastructure
projects with other military governments, participating in the Bolivia military coup, and
other activities (Ferris 1981). However, this foreign and regional policy eventually was
replaced with the Third World Foreign Policy that Brazil adopted in the late 1970s. The
oil shocks, deteriorating relationships with the United States (who had secured much of
the infrastructure funding for the Amazon), and changed goals by the government
resulted in the development of a foreign policy aimed at connections with other
developing countries particularly within the region (Ferris 1981). Brazil actively sought
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out improved relations with neighbors, but with the Amazon retained and increased in
prominence as a site for national development (Hochstetler 2011).
Within this context, the Brazilians proposed and provided the initial push for
ACTO. The treaty largely adheres to their regional goals; namely, promoting the
harmonious development of the Amazon region while retaining national sovereignty
over natural resources. Negotiations about the treaty were progressing slowly when
the major focus was only on the development of the Amazon with the other states in
the region being nervous about Brazilian efforts in this regard. In negotiations then,
“Brazil needed a wholly different rationale for Amazonian cooperation, so diplomats
negotiating the pact seized on environmental protection” (Foresta 1992, 137). Although
environmental components are one area for dialogue under the treaty, the early
development primarily focused on other issues of cooperation (Hochstetler 2011).
Brazil’s prominence in the treaty system was further accented in the particular
incorporation of environmental issues in the 1989 Amazon Declaration. Section 2 of this
declaration specifies the rational use of natural and environmental resources so that
they can be available to future generations, but Section 3 and Section 4 assert clearly
that regional cooperation was intended to strengthen sovereign ability to freely use
natural resources (Schrijver 1997). The 1980s were the height of the nationalist
response in Brazil to international pressure to conserve the rainforest and as such the
government sought to simultaneously reduce the critique while asserting national
control (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). The Amazon Declaration served to respond to
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domestic criticism in Brazil and articulate the sovereignty-emphasized position of
Brazilian conservation. As a result, it produced little sustained environmental activity.
As Brazil transitioned away from conservation obstruction to begin to embrace
conservation and environmental action, the ACTO was transformed to reflect this
changed priority. In 1998, the organization was relaunched with additional focuses,
including the environment and a permanent secretariat was created in 2002
(Hochstetler 2011). The result was a set of work programs developing in the late 1990s
focused on the environment and biodiversity issues. However, these were mostly
focused on short-term projects of coordination and meetings without much sustained
activity occurring on a regional level (Garcia 2011, Botto 1999). These developments
provide clear evidence of the network structure of the organization until the 2000s
which was largely a nonexistent network. Early the organization itself lacked any
permanent bureaucracy and would be convened simply on an ad hoc basis as needed by
the parties. However, even after the secretariat was founded, there were few
permanent connections forged to allow an expanded network. The structure then
would be of a largely limited network which neither centralized nor developed distinct
modules.
Dr. Rosalia Artega, the former Vice President in Ecuador (and President during
the crisis of 1997), became the Secretary General of ACTO in 2004 and attempted to
change this. Artega was able to provide significant oversight of the organization,
bringing in funding from UNCTAD, GEF, and other international funders to help the
biodiversity projects of the organization. In addition, she expanded the stakeholders
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involved and included a host of NGOs, both environmental and indigenous, in the
deliberations of the organization (Hochstetler 2011). However, the shock that impacted
the organization was when Artega’s erm ended and the organization went two years
without a new Secretary General and the networks largely languished. During this
period, projects slowed, were halted, or ended entirely under the ACTO. The positive
impact of a single individual actually highlights the precariousness of the organization.
Hochstetler summarizes that “A small amount of political will and institutionalization
positively transformed the organization—but it also languished again between the end
of Artega’s term and when her successor was finally designated in 2009. The apparent
importance of a single individual suggests that ACTO may be a piece of regional
environmental governance, but is certainly not one that can be taken for granted”
(Hochstetler 2011, 135).
ACTO has been constrained through 1. Brazil’s impact in the organization in the
early development and 2. Institutional weakness . Brazil has never relented any
sovereignty over the Amazon and has used ACTO as a forum to improve that control
with different tools. ACTO furthered obstruction when Brazil wanted to obstruct
international efforts to stop Amazonian deforestation. ACTO furthered environmental
coordination when Brazil wanted to deepen regional environmental efforts. Coupled
with distrust by other states about Brazil’s projects in the Amazon, Brazilian dominance
over the organization freeze adaptation or increased authority (Schrijver 1997).
Similarly, institutional weakness was a crucial limitation on the organization at a number
of key moments and the agreement had largely gone into disrepair through much of its
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time. For much of its early development, the organization had not continued
involvement in between meetings of the parties lacking even a stable repository of
documents (Botto 1999). Although this may have changed under the leadership of
Ariega, the large impact she had that quickly fizzled is probably better evidence of
institutional weakness and a limited network than any permanent change.
International Tropical Timber Organization
The International Tropical Timber Organization is a global organization tasked
with developing global management of the tropical timber trade. Developed originally
as an organization primarily dealing with trade issues around tropical timber, the
organization had some environmental provisions in the treaty that have become a
priority in the organization and it has become increasingly important in biodiversity
politics. However, largely as a result of the trade focus engrained in the voting rules of
the organization, it has suffered decreased importance and relevance as non-state
certification schemes have become increasingly prominent governance tools. The result
is that its environmental programs have been largely locked in place and replaced in
terms of governance by other organizations and governance areas.
The negotiations for the ITTO began during the 1960s with a series of meetings
focused on the issue of tropical timber in the United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Poore 2003).
At UNCTAD IV negotiations in 1976, an African state coalition proposed including
tropical timber into the Integrated Program for Commodities (IPC), a price stabilization
effort. The boom and bust nature of international tropical timber markets persists and
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may hinder environmental efforts (Vincent 1992). However, tropical timber was not
included in the program and negotiations in UNCTAD really began in 1977. Japan
proposed a resolution to creating a tropical timber agreement structured like the
International Jute Agreement (Colchester 1990). This started a series of negotiation
meetings which were largely stuck in place between consumer states and producer
states until UNCTAD brought in forestry experts and UNEP into the negotiations (Poore
2003). One crucial organization include was the International Institute for Environment
and Development (IIED) which argued in negotiations that any trade treaty had to
include ecological issues. After this meeting, most of the substantive issues were
worked out and voting rules within the organization became the main roadblock
(Colchester 1990). Eventually a compromise was developed where producer states
would have 1000 votes divided between them, consumer states would have 1000 votes
divided between them, and 2/3rds vote would be required to pass provisions.
Consumer votes were distributed based upon the amount of tropical timber bought
creating a situation where “the more a country destroys tropical forests, the more votes
it gets” (Colchester 1990, 167). Japan, as the largest consumer, begun with the largest
share of votes. The final International Tropical Timber Agreement was open for
signature in November 1983 tasked with promoting the trade in tropical timber, but also
must encourage sustainable use and conservation of forestry resources.
The political dimensions of the different parties became significantly polarized in
the negotiations before it went into force about the first executive director. The
Consumer states quickly became divided between Western Europe on one side and
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Japan on the other, with Western Europe encouraging a more conservation focused
executive director. The Producer states were split between Africa and Southeast Asia,
with Africa favoring a more conservation focused executive director. Japan, in the end,
promised significant financial support to the organization, made a series of alliances
with South East Asian countries, and according to some NGOs gave international aid and
preferential trade to African and Latin American states to secure enough votes to get a
Malaysian named the first executive director (Colchester 1990). Although Japan’s
dominant position in the organization in later years is less clear (Dauvergne 1997), this
early effort shows significant strength by Japan in deciding outcomes within the ITTO.
The environmental agenda of ITTO developed slowly after the treaty entered
into force in 1985. Friends of the Earth, IUCN, and IIED became very active with ITTO in
developing and trying to find tractable possibilities for sustainable logging. In the late
1980s, these efforts resulted in few developments. There were some sustainable
logging goals set, but they were vague and the organization was very hostile to any firm
commitments for requiring any portion of the trade to be from sustainable sources
(Dauvergne 1997). Colchester writes that “any moves to suggest regulations on the
trade in unsustainably produced timber have been hotly resisted and even moves to
monitor the trade are viewed with hostility” (Colchester 1990). Although the number of
sustainably harvested timber hectares has increased significantly, much of this may be a
result of switching to plantations and not through protection of forests (Poore 2003).
Similarly, the ITTO chose to sponsor and support a number of projects in developing
countries to encourage sustainable forestry and develop applicable best practices. The
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process was not clear, it was cumbersome, and states had to often develop multiple
drafts in order to receive endorsement for a project (Poore 2003). The most
controversial project was the Sarawak Mission in the late 1980s that highlighted the
limited ability of ITTO to ascertain and promote sustainable forestry practices (Poore
2003).
From 1990 on, the organization has been constrained by a number of different
factors. Financial constraints on the organization began being a constant preoccupation
of meetings in 1987. In addition, a number of studies constantly showed poor progress
on increasing the sustainable forestry management or the practices in tropical timber
production (Poore 2003). Problems of this sort have caused ITTO to focus an increasing
amount of its efforts on dealing with illegal logging enforcement (Gulbrandsen and
Humphreys 2006). Although sustainable logging is still a key agenda item, there has not
been significant new goals or progress on the issue since the mid-1990s. This is most
discerning in that the overall timber governance issues have seen a huge increase in
programs of sustainable forestry, mostly in non-state market driven certification
mechanisms (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004, Gulbrandsen 2004). ITTO was initially
the prime location for discussion about forest certification to take account of
biodiversity and sustainable forestry. In 1990, the UK and Friends of the Earth
introduced a proposal for an international certification scheme (Poore 2003). Producers
quickly rejected this approach and discussions largely stalled within the organization.
ITTO focuses on stopping illegal logging issues around the world, but has largely become
marginal in discussions about sustainable logging.
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The constraint on adaptation is the voting rules formed when the organization
was intended to primarily be a trade organization, the alliances that formed in the
organization which were hostile to the organization, and possibly a role of the
preeminent power of a single country. It is important to note again that the role of
Japan is not clear in the literature with some proposing that it is quite constraining on
the organization and other authors finding it to be unclear. Supply chain linkages
between Japan and supplier countries are quite significant and complicate any clear
view (Gellert 2007). These hierarchical mechanisms are quite limiting in their impacts
upon the organization and have constrained adaptation or adoption of new rules for the
organization. This has resulted in generally marginalized role for ITTO and its position
may be significantly reduced in the current era of forest management.
The Bern Convention
The Bern Convention (or Berne Convention) sits in an interesting space between
a host of different biodiversity governance arrangements. Developed in the Council of
Europe, the Bern Convention and its governance overlaps significantly with the
European Union’s Habitats Directive and focusing on migratory species brings it into
direct connection with the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds Convention and other
Convention on Migratory Species treaties. However, it extends beyond the EU
membership, including countries in Africa, Turkey and the former Soviet Union as active
members and engages a host of efforts that work differently than other migratory
species over the same area. In general though, this position between other agreements
has largely limited the development of governance in the Bern Convention.
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The Council of Europe is an international organization separate from the
European Union that includes 47 different state members (including Russia and Turkey)
and a number of active observer states (including the U.S. and Japan). Its aim is to
promote the well-being and democracy throughout Europe and is composed of bodies
made up of representatives from all of the countries throughout Europe. One primary
organ of this body is the European Convention on Human Rights; however, it has
produced a series of different declarations, treaties, and guidelines on a host of
different issues.
At the 1976 Second European Ministerial Conference, they advised the Council
of Europe to establish a committee of experts to draft a conservation treaty (Lyster
1985). This group of experts quickly assembled a draft treaty that was opened for
signature at the meeting in Bern in September 1979. This was the same year as the first
major biodiversity policy developed in the European Union with the Birds Directive of
1979 although neither made mention to the other agreement (Ostermann 1998). The
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, or the Bern
Convention, aims for conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats with an explicit focus
on protected species divided into Appendix I (plants), Appendix II (animals), and
Appendix III (species with special protections). At the time, the Bern Convention was
one of the most developed conservation treaties around. State parties had strict
obligations to prohibit the inference with protected animals or picking of protected
plants and were required to create conservation areas to further these requirements. In
addition, there is no provision for exemptions or excluding action and the requirements
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are declared as mandatory on all ratifying states (Lyster 1985). Despite these
requirements, the agreement entered into force in a reasonable timeframe by 1982.
The Bern Convention governance has been active in expanding membership
throughout the organization. It was one of the first treaties under the Council of Europe
that was adopted by states after the fall of the Soviet Union and in recent years has
extended to include African countries in the projects (Burkina Faso, Morocco, Senegal,
and Tunisia) contending that such states are crucial for migratory species important in
Europe. Although this membership reach is valuable for the organization, the 2011
assessment of the Bern Convention found that “The geographical coverage of African
countries by the Convention is also not very logical. It covers neither all countries
important for European migratory species nor even all the countries close to Europe”
(Lotman 2011). The extension seems to facilitate small-scale, short-term projects
between these countries and the Bern Convention, but not be tools for increasing the
overall level of protection in countries.
The primary tool of the governance arrangement over the past decade has been
the Emerald Network, which is a list of protected areas that meet criteria established
through standing committee decisions. The Emerald Network was established under
the Bern Convention in 1996 (Standing Committee Resolution #3) to create a
coordinated list of protected area sites within the member states. The project aims to
supplement efforts taken within the EU countries to extend to additional countries. In
the European Union in 1992, the European Commission created the Habitats Directive
which includes a major focus on creating a network of protected areas with significant
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management in those areas. The EU created a program called Natura 2000 to achieve
the ratcheting up of conservation areas and includes significant requirements and
monitoring provisions (Ostermann 1998). The Emerald Network was designed to
explicitly expand the Natura 2000 efforts beyond the EU countries to the wider
membership of the Council of Europe. The Natura 2000 effort has some problems and
in the decade or its activities only about half the members of the EU have met the
requirements (Lotman 2011). The Emerald Network has not been able to significantly
improve the requirements on protected areas and most of its activities have been
primarily aimed at pilot projects in a few countries. The most effective projects have
been in countries surrounded by EU members, like Norway and Switzerland (Lotman
2011). In terms of financial support, although they include similar land areas and
possibly more crucial areas to be protected in Council of Europe countries, Natura 2000
receives much more significant funding. More than 550 Million Euros will be allocated
for Natura 2000 sites in 2011 while Emerald Network will receive 787,000 Euros for all
its projects (Kettunen et al. 2011).
European biodiversity governance should be considered a crowded area. In
addition to Natura 2000 and the Emerald Network there is the Pan-European Ecological
Network (Jones-Walters 2007), the Pan-European Biological and Landscape Diversity
Strategy (Jongman and Kamphorst 2002), and a number of non-state led biodiversity
networks (Vasiljevic and Pezold 2011). The key analytic question is whether this rich
policy environment is oversaturated or possibly even overwhelming the policy capacity
and causing the Bern Convention to not maintain either adaptive capacity or
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authoritative capability. Clear evidence of crowded governance areas would be if their
amount of international funding were decreasing overtime. In the biodiversity political
arena, international funding is in most cases increasing overtime or at least staying
steady and decline across a region may be a sign of a crowded governance setting with
other programs and projects getting that international funding. In the area covered by
the Bern Convention, most of the parties are eligible for GEF funding (Norway and
Switzerland are not) and the Emerald Network has added countries overtime. The
region should be seeing increased GEF biodiversity funding and in some countries it is.
However, as a whole, the biodiversity funding from GEF to the countries within the
Emerald Network are declining over the period of the project. Table 6.5 presents the
general decline of GEF funding to the region. In addition, other international interest is
far less on the Emerald Network than on Natura 2000 or other biodiversity projects.
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Figure 2.1- Number of GEF Biodiversity Project Per Year in Emerald Network Countries
The Bern Convention started with significant strength and was one of the first
regional biodiversity or conservation agreements to require action by states. Working
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with, but outside of the E.U. system has presented some opportunities and challenges
for the Bern Convention. Starting in 1992, with the E.U. Habitats Directive and their
development of the Natura 2000 program, the Bern Convention was no longer the main
biodiversity related organization in Europe. The synergy between the two conventions
is cooperative at many points, but while Natura 2000 has developed significant
monitoring and compliance requirements, and partially integrated in the ecosystem
perspective, the Bern Convention has changed little since the original 1979 Convention
and not actively adopted the ecosystem perspective.
Arrested Development: The Ramsar Convention and the Caribbean biodiversity
efforts-- Adaptation without New Rules
Ramsar Convention
The Ramsar Convention, agreed to in 1971 and entering into force in 1975,
during much of its early development lacked significant capacity with a weak structure,
no permanent Secretariat, and no significant monitoring capability. Although it
deployed listing as a primary tool of governance, similar to some of the other projects
discussed, the listing criteria were not clearly articulated until much later and the
monitoring of sites throughout the network remains weak. The weak institutional
capacity has had significant impacts upon the ability of the governance arrangement to
adapt provisions. However, it has been able to integrate and improve adaptive capacity
with increased use of the ecosystem perspective (Finlayson et al. 2011). The
development of the Ramsar Convention illustrates well the way that weak institutional
capacity can limit resilience.
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The Ramsar Convention was developed as an extension of identification and
protection of important wetlands in Europe and Northwest Africa spearheaded by IUCN.
The most direct antecedent to the Ramsar Convention was Project MAR and the
development of the MAR list of important wetlands. Project MAR was a program
organized under the Commission on Ecology at IUCN focused on improving efforts on
marshes, bogs, and other wetlands. A 1962 Conference organized by IUCN, the
International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP), and the International Waterfowl
Research Bureau (IWRB) in France started Project MAR and provided its initial focus.
The primary goal to develop out of the conference was a decision to create a list of
wetlands of international importance in Europe and Northwestern Africa and to
prioritize research and conservation in these areas (Carp 1980). The list was capped at
200 sites in order to maximize the conservation focus and impact of the efforts.
Simultaneously, the International Biological Program (IBP) in conjunction with IUCN was
creating Project AQUA which created a similar list of lakes and rivers which were
deemed of particular importance to freshwater science. Although conservation was a
goal in Project AQUA, it was not as high a priority or focus as it was in the MAR List. The
MAR List, for reasons of available evidence and focus of the scientists involved, chose to
emphasize ornithological criteria and evidence for the construction of its list. These
programs were limited in their intended scope but were crucial first processes that were
taken up in negotiations throughout the 1960s, led by IUCN, IWRB and the Dutch
Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Welfare to develop an international
convention on wetland conservations (Carp 1980).
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The ornithological and waterfowl focus of the MAR List was retained through the
drafts of the international treaty resulting eventually in the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance, especially Waterfowl Habitat negotiated in Ramsar, Iran in
1971 (referred to commonly as the Ramsar Convention). The main tool in the treaty is
the provision that each country must declare one or more suitable wetlands of
international significance and take conservation impacts to improve the health of those
wetlands. IUCN served as the repository of the list of wetlands of international
importance but there was no substantive secretarial or administrative functions
developed within the treaty. The Ramsar list includes many sites in the MAR List and
AQUA List and extends it internationally, but it flattens the categories in these earlier
lists somewhat and notably excludes some of the AQUA List that did not have clear
waterfowl connections (Carp 1980).
Two major changes to the Ramsar Convention happened in 1982 with the Paris
Protocol that simply added a procedure for amending the Convention and the 1987
Regina Amendment that produced a series of organizational changes. The Regina
Protocol agreed to in Regina, Canada created a Secretariat shared between IUCN and
IWRP and most importantly created a Wise Use Working Group within the organization
to develop criteria for sustainable guidelines for management of wetlands. These
amendments were partial in a number of respects and the infrastructure of the
organization did not become complete until the mid-1990s with the creation of the
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (1994) and criteria for inclusion developed
through the 1990s.
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The most significant development is the conceptions of Wise Use included in the
original treaty and significantly focused during the 1990s. Wise use is one of the key
goals of the current articulation of the Ramsar Convention. Wise use, according to the
Convention, aims to maximize sustainable human use of wetlands while maintaining
natural properties of the ecosystem (Farrier and Tucker 2000). Although wise use of
wetlands was expressed in the original Convention, the idea was not seriously
articulated until the 1990s. The Working Group developed a series of guidebooks that
were crucial in informing the work in the various listed wetlands of international
importance. The initial guidelines developed in the mid-1990s specified that wetland
preservation should integrate sustainable utilization, although not necessarily
development, into the efforts at protecting wetlands (Finlayson et al. 2011).
During the 1990s, the organization also deepened its connections with other
organizations in the biodiversity environment. Formal Memorandum of understandings
have been an active part of the approach of the convention. This includes cooperative
projects with other international agreements and with professional organizations: the
list includes agreements with the WWF (2004), Cartagena Conventions (2000),
International Association for Impact Assessment (2001), UNEP Global Program of Action
(2006), UNCCD (1998), Birdlife International (2006), Society of Wetland Scientists
(1999), World Heritage Convention (1999), Convention on Biological Diversity (1996),
and the Man and Biosphere (1999) project. In addition, in 2003 they appointed Peter
Bridgewater as the Secretary General of the organization who brought a significant
experience in other organizations to the fore: being chair of the International Whaling
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Commission 1995-1997 and UNESCO’s MAB Project 1999-2003. Bridgewater is a
prominent proponent of the ecosystem perspective as it developed in the 1990s and
saw the wise use goal as a core connection between the Ramsar program and other
biodiversity efforts (Bridgewater 2008).
Ramsar sites vary greatly on their impact and sustainability, similarly to a lot of
the other projects. However, the list of wetlands of international importance is far less
developed than other international environmental listing procedures. Monitoring of the
sites is done primarily with national reporting and little international oversight (UNEP
2007). To date, no site has been delisted from the Ramsar wetlands of international
importance list and no evidence that delisting has ever been considered by the
organization for noncompliance. Adaptation of approach certainly has been increased
in the past few years with the connections and Bridgewater’s leadership; however, the
involvement has not created a general strengthening or deepening of the organization.
The weak institutional setting of the organization appears to be a constraint on abilities
to adopt new rules.
However, the guidelines of Ramsar developed by the Conference of the Parties
and expert committees have drawn significantly on ecosystem based-management. The
conventions guidelines, which are adopted to varying degrees in member states, have
drawn on integrated policy and focusing on multiple drivers since the mid-1990s, but
particularly since the Ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2005 has made
the ecosystem approach the basis for wetland sustainability (Finlayson et al. 2011). The
implication is strong in that it suggests that Ramsar Convention has a fairly coherent
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suite of tools for the application of the ecosystem perspective, but that it does not have
the authoritative capability to integrate these into requirements or even best practice
considerations. The constrained institutional setting appears to have allowed significant
science-policy generation, local-learning, and other adaptive practices but not the ability
to implement these lessons significantly. This lesson is significant for further discussion
of resilient governance.
Caribbean Biodiversity
Caribbean biodiversity management started under the auspices of UNEP’s
Regional Seas Programme. However, the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas
and Wildlife had difficulties being ratified and although it has begun to implement the
ecosystem approach in a number of aspects, the implementation is severely
constrained. Because this will serve as one of the more in-depth cases for analysis, this
section will only briefly detail the case and more can be found in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Within the patchwork of regional governance over the Caribbean, the main
environmental actions taken have been through the Caribbean Environment
Programme (CEP). CEP was founded under the aegis of the newly created United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1976 as one of its Regional Seas
Programmes. The CEP is affiliated with CARICOM and ACS; however, UNEP and its own
secretariat provide the primary organization for the agreements. The primary legal
instrument is The Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (the Cartagena Convention) which opened
for signature in 1983 and entered into force in 1986. For much of the early years of the
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agreement the CEP was met with general indifference from member states and the
agreement was severely limited in funding and significance (Barker 2002). However,
since the mid-1990s, CEP has been able to establish fairly regular funding to the
Caribbean Trust Fund (the primary financial mechanism) from members and
contributions from other environmental funders (GEF, UNEP, etc.) and continued to
develop some forums for future use. However, aside from the Oil Spill Protocol adopted
at the initial meeting, the development of significant international environmental law
has been limited within CEP (Miller 1996, Barker 2002).
The most significant regional biodiversity governance in the Caribbean has been
the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) in terms of
states involved and diplomatic efforts. SPAW is a multilateral environmental agreement
throughout the Caribbean that attempts regional cohesion in protected areas and
species protection and expansion of these protections. SPAW encourages the creation
of conservation areas throughout the countries of the region, with an expanded focus
on marine protected areas, and aims to create a permanent fund for the management
of these protected areas. These broad goals will be largely mirrored in the Caribbean
Challenge, although some of the relevant actors will have changed.
The initial background for the SPAW agreement initially developed in 1986 from
an expert panel within CEP and not from any state negotiators (de Fontaubert and
Agardy 1998). The initial impetus to create regionally coordinated protected areas and
species protection, however, hit a number of negotiating roadblocks. Negotiators
agreed on little about the purpose or particular construction of conservation areas,
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whether certification by some scientific panel would be necessary to evaluate state
progress, and even how representation would be established on the science body. For
example, one major point of debate was whether each U.K. territory would get one
representative or would there only be a single U.K. representative for all of the
territories (Vanzella-Khouri 1998). The negotiations consistently pushed back
timetables and at the final round of negotiations there was not enough time to finish
agreement on the necessary annexes to the agreement and so they were left to be
worked out later (Vanzella-Khouri 1998).
Out of these negotiation hurdles developed an agreement with some
substantive foci, but mostly a least common denominator requirement with wide
leeway for national interpretation (de Fontaubert and Agardy 1998). Rather than a
focus on some key or endangered species, SPAW did aim to integrate an ecosystem
perspective and was one of the first multilateral environmental agreements to
specifically integrate this perspective into the agreement. In addition, of all the
different Regional Seas species efforts, SPAW was one of the most far reaching in
working on issues of marine species and terrestrial ecosystems (Vanzella-Khouri 1998).
Thus, the agreement declared protection and the need for conservation of all
mangroves in member states. There was some emphasis of cooperative approaches to
conservation with the need to include various social and economic actors in the
agreement.
SPAW itself is in a problematic position in terms of its ability to adapt and hold
parties together. This is emphasized in both its political ability to develop and its
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capacity to update with the developments of biodiversity science over the past 20 years.
The agreement took significant time to be approved by members of the agreement and
largely came into force without significant changes to any member governments’
policies. Initial enthusiasm about the protocol was lost as efforts shifted to ratification
and implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) after 1992 and the
weakness of the CEP secretariat in being able to support the protocol (Barker 2002).
According to the CEP ratification website, only two members, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines and the Netherlands, had ratified the agreement in SPAW’s first five years of
being open for ratification. With an energized secretariat in the mid-1990s, there were
6 more ratifications in the 1996-1999 period. This included the Dominican Republic
which acceded to the agreement in 1998 (at the same time that it ratified the CEP and
the Oil Spill Protocol). After a decade of being open, the agreement was one member
shy of entry into force which came later that year with the ratification by St. Lucia.
Although there is not exact overlap between SPAW and the CBD, states seem to find
SPAW requirements relatively easy after they have developed a national strategy for
biodiversity under the CBD and can access the funding mechanisms available under
SPAW to help them with CBD efforts. During its long time entering into force, activity
was conducted under interim committees which could not implement decisions but
which met and developed some updates on the annexes and other procedures. When
the agreement came into force significant updating of the agreement began to occur
(Barker 2002); however, most of this updating was devising procedures for amending
the annexes and did not change the protocol significantly. Other than sea turtle
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management, which does appear to be relatively well implemented with some
significant regional coordination, SPAW has seen little effort beyond the creation of
some limited protected areas in the countries of the Caribbean.
Most significantly, SPAW has not altered its 1990s goals or procedures
significantly to account for changed research in conservation biology over the past two
decades which encourage increased participation, a richer ecosystem perspective, and
accounting for, not halting, human modifications (Chazdon et al. 2009). On the ground
efforts under SPAW have pushed for the creation of conservation areas and protected
reserves, but not developed more advanced management strategies regarding the
inclusion of surrounding communities or areas. One review of the efforts in St. Lucia
concluded that “In many respects, then, the SPAW Protocol is the product of a bygone
era when conservation was approached in a very narrow way, with little consideration
for livelihood and development issues” (Krishnarayan, Renard, and John 2006). SPAW’s
efforts to push an ecosystem perspective in conservation management have not
materialized in post entry adaptations which have largely focused solely on individual
species nor in on the ground efforts which have instead limited to the creation of
conservation areas.
Recently, the region has adopted the Caribbean Challenge designed primarily by
The Nature Conservancy (TNC). It is the second largest biodiversity governance
arrangement ever in the region, next to SPAW, and commits the countries of the group
to creating protected areas over 20-25% of their territory. Most importantly, it targets
both terrestrial and marine biodiversity.
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In terms of adaptive capacity, the ecosystem approach has been significantly
central in recent discussions in Caribbean biodiversity systems. However, in terms of
applying this or developing coherent specifications for the ecosystem approach, this has
not been a priority. Far more popular of an approach has been the declaration of parks
and protected areas, both terrestrial and marine, with limited socio-economic
provisions and then little else. Ecosystem assessment is done on a largely ad hoc and
voluntary basis depending upon the country, a system which can have significant
problems. Some policy relevant information is produced in both systems, and in terms
of adaptive capacity, this is probably the strongest aspect as regional actors spend
considerable time trying to develop learned management lessons and diffusing them
throughout the region.
Equilibrium: The CBD and CITES and Limited Adaptation
Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was one of the major treaty
outcomes at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Summit. Like the other Rio treaties, the CBD was
cast broadly to organize global focus on a problem but without specific requirements or
mandates. The treaty is cast quite broadly and focuses on a number of different
substantive areas. In the 20 years since the treaty came into force it has increased the
specificity of some provisions but has largely not mobilized on the core issue of
biodiversity. This particular process of policy adaptation around the edges is an
interesting outcome of a open governance system that has included a variety of
different actors.
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The CBD treaty sets large objectives for the treaty consisting of 1. Conservation
of biological diversity, 2. The sustainable use of its components, and 3. The fair and
equitable sharing of benefits from the utilization of biological diversity. The specifics of
how the treaty aims to achieve this goal is contained in 42 separate articles each with
broad conditions regarding some specific conception. Most of them provide broad
conditions towards the achievement of the goals: for example, states are responsible
for biological diversity within their territory, they should protect it while retaining
protection of indigenous knowledge, etc. The treaty provides a number of different
potential areas for policy adaptation to occur (Le Preste 2002). However, since being
established the treaty has worked primarily through requiring states to submit
biodiversity plans. Although the first round of these biodiversity plans were often late
and broadly written, they have grown increasingly complex for the second and third
versions. The organization though does minimal evaluation or assessment of these
state submissions and instead the goal is simply to have them developed. Aside from
the reports, efforts within the treaty structure have focused significantly on two major
protocols that focus on trade in genetically modified organisms and access and benefit
sharing.
The Cartagena Protocol to the CBD is the major component treaty, negotiated
between 1996 and 2000, dealing with the trade of genetically modified organisms or
living modified organisms. The treaty requires that states exporting these organisms
achieve proper licensing and permission from other states based upon full disclosure of
the specifics of the contents and allows states to prohibit the importation of these
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organisms on precautionary grounds. The disclosure aspect of negotiations was
relatively easy in negotiations while the incorporation of the precautionary concept was
quite contentious. The debates about what the precautionary concept meant was
whether the decision of prohibiting exporting of genetically modified organisms should
be based upon unknowns about the impacts of the organism (this is the approach
articulated by those pushing for the precautionary principle in the protocol) or whether
it should be based upon risks discovered in the available science (this was the approach
taken by the Miami group of genetically modified organism exporting countries) (Andree
2005). In the end, the group adopted a clear precautionary approach in allowing states
to stop importing of these organisms even without clear scientific evidence of harm.
One crucial aspect through negotiations was that NGOs were particularly active and
spent extensive resources to impact the negotiations (Arts and Mack 2002). The timing
of negotiations closely followed anti-neoliberalism protests against the WTO in Seattle
and was also a time of heightened public awareness about GMOs in many parts of the
world which spurred NGOs to see the Cartagena environment as one conducive to
pressure to mitigate the impacts they saw in free trade (Kleinman and Kinchy 2007).
The Cartagena protocol has had some significant applications in many countries but the
large exporters of genetically modified organisms have not become members of the
protocol membership.
In 2010, after a decade of negotiations, the Nagoya protocol a second protocol
dealing with issues of access and benefit sharing (ABS) opened for signature and
ratification. Although discussions had been developing regarding the issue for a decade,
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it had reached a near crisis point at the Nagoya Conference of the CBD and the creation
of a protocol on ABS was considered a vital outcome (Tsioumani 2008). The CBD’s selfestablished goals for 2010 were not going to be met and parties needed some success
to support the legitimacy of the organization. When this outcome seemed lost, the
head of the conference pulled key members aside for a brief meeting to develop
consensus eventually reached at 1:30 AM (Tsioumani 2010). Disagreement between
members resulted in a protocol that defaulted to earlier agreements: namely the access
requirements which defaulted largely to the sovereignty standard of the CBD treaty and
the benefit requirements which defaulted largely to the Bonn guidelines developed
earlier. Contentious issues either simply reiterated earlier agreements within the
agreement or were left out entirely from the eventual Nagoya protocol. Similarly to the
genetically modified organism issue, access and benefit sharing was a major focus of a
large number of the NGO community. Indigenous rights organizations had been
mobilized within the CBD in the discussions on Article 8(j) for over a decade and were
heavily invested in the process (Jonas, Bavikatte, and Shrumm 2010). Anti-neoliberal
NGOs had been active on the issue of plant breeders rights as part of their opposition to
the WTO’s Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIP) agreement and with their
mobilization against Monsanto’s terminator seeds (Zainol et al. 2011). They were key
pushers on the issue and their interest may have created the push on this issue as the
major achievement in the last decade in the CBD.
The particulars of the protocols and the negotiations emphasize the role of NGOs
in pushing for particular issues in the CBD. However, to fully understand the outcome it
80

is necessarily to evaluate this pressure in light of the other important possible actors,
states and scientists.
State parties enthusiastically ratified the CBD treaty with its broad provisions and
limited costs of agreement. The only major state party to remain outside of the treaty is
the United States and this absence has two perverse effects on the development of the
organization. First, it actually brought in a number of state parties into the organization.
The CBD was quickly ratified and entered into force (quicker than either of the other Rio
treaties) and achieved functional universal membership within two years of being open
for signature. Raustiala and Victor explain that “the CBD’s popularity stems in part from
the United States’ initial refusal to sign it” (Raustiala and Victor 1997). However, this
perversely may include actors not willing to see the success of the organization and
limits the depth actors are willing to go without the United States. Discussions at the
organization have focused on the U.S. problem facing the organization and actors seem
unwilling to push for funding or significant requirements without the support of the U.S.
(Faizi 2004). The result is that state membership is broad but shallow. Although a
number of parties are willing to expend significant effort pushing for strengthening of
the agreement, there appears not to be a critical mass dedicated. This extends to other
groups of actors as well and the networks of the CBD are broad and inclusive, but rarely
robust or well-developed in clusters.
Scientists have a number of possible entries into the work program of the
organization. However, the two major agreements of the organization on biosafety and
access and benefit sharing are areas where environmental and conservation scientists
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are largely marginalized: biosafety being primarily an issue of trade in the negotiations
and ABS being an issue for the distribution of benefits. In addition, the Subsidiary Body
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSSTA), as the main science body of
the organization is often a site for additional political contestation. Koetz, et. al. write
that this body “remains trapped between trying to be a body of scientific nature as
originally conceptualised, and depreciating the more political nature it has developed in
reality, and which at least officially it is not permitted to have. SBSSTA 13, where an
over-emphasis on procedural considerations has led to deadlocks and to much of the
text of the recommendations transmitted to CoP9 being bracketed (i.e. not agreed on),
is an example of the consequences of such situation, and left many concerned about the
Convention’s functioning in general” (Koetz et al. 2008, 506). The SBSSTA meetings are
attended significantly by NGOs, key states, and other parties and there is no apparent
insulation between the science body and the other bodies in the organization. This
presents constraints on the ability of scientists to articulate and interpret their findings
to the overall organization.
The CBD development is characterized by policy strengthening in issues of
primary importance to NGO communities. States are largely not invested in
strengthening the agreement although they will shape it when it comes to
strengthening and scientists are restrained in their ability to create and provide
information to the actors. Policy augmentation of the core three goals of the
agreement or integration of scientific advice have not occurred to any significant level.
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Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) was one of
the first orders of business for the newly formed United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP). CITES, agreed to in 1973 at the Washington Conference, aims to
regulate the trade in live and the products of endangered species around the world.
The program revolves around country restrictions and regulation of species based upon
international standards. Initially the international listing standards were highly
politicized and contestation within the organization and interference from UNEP largely
stalled efforts within the treaty system. However, a reorganization of the processes and
the building of increased monitoring efforts were able to create a very different
environment based largely on the evaluation of arguments based on established
criteria. There are some excellent evaluations and secondary sources of the
development of CITES (Sand 1997, Curlier and Andresen 2002, Gehring and Ruffing
2008) and so this section will focus primarily on building from these sources and some
original documents. Since the Ivory issue regarding elephants has been crucial, the
section will highlight the roles that it plays in the development of the organization.
Although the impetus for CITES had been around for years and IUCN had
pressured a number of countries to unilaterally adopt import restrictions on endangered
species, the agreement itself lacked clear details on the processes by which the treaty
was to function. Peter H. Sand, who was the Secretary General of CITES from 19791981, explains that “Most of the institutional structure of CITES emerged only after the
treaty’s entry into force, under the residual decisionmaking powers of the Conference of
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the Parties. A total of 190 recommendations adopted…since 1976 laid down a whole
new body of rules…. Even though Conference recommendations interpreting and
elaborating the text of the Convention are not considered legally binding, they have
shaped the CITES regime in a manner hardly foreseeable at the time of its creation”
(Sand 1997, 21). The treaty itself is fairly vague and broadly construed to establish a
general structure for the convention including the Conference of the Parties, a
Secretariat and the broad development of the listing system used by CITES.
The listing procedure by CITES is a very simple set of trade restriction by which
state parties prohibit or regulate the trade of certain species or their products. Species
can be listed in one of three different appendices. Appendix I are those species which
are threatened with extinction and as a result the CITES provisions expect that
international trade should be largely prohibited, except in extreme circumstances.
Appendix II are those species which are not threatened but which either need to be
monitored and trade regulated or those species which closely resemble Appendix I
species and so need to be similarly regulated by parties. Appendix III is a less specific
category that involves states listing species that are protected within their jurisdiction
and which the country wishes to have international recognition of these efforts. The
parties have also developed a possibility of a split-listing, where the species is deemed
endangered in one country and listed in Appendix I but deemed stable and allow trade
from another country. The procedures and politics behind listing, delisting, and
adjusted listings of species is thus very important because each level implies significantly
different requirements on states and impacts on the trade of certain species.
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As established in the 1973 treaty there are no clear guidelines leading the
Conference of Parties in its listing decision and the result was a lot of confused listing in
the early years of the convention. Listing was made based largely on the political
dynamics of the organization and only partially about the scientific evidence. Curlier
and Anresen write that “during this first phase of its history CITES grew through a
continuous adding of new species to the appendices—often without much knowledge
or scientific justification” (Curlier and Andresen 2002). This process is exemplified in the
early Whale decisions of CITES. Prior to the 1979 meeting of the Conference of Parties
to the treaty in San Jose, Costa Rica, the United Kingdom in conjunction with the premoratorium International Whaling Commission (IWC) recommended listing of all whales
in Appendix II. This was essentially a move to bring CITES listing into agreement with
the IWC regulations at the time. However, while the IWC continued debating whether
to stop all whaling or continue with its stock-quota system over the next couple of
years, some actors preferred to try and gain leverage on the issue in CITES. West
Germany was a major pusher at the 1981 COP in New Delhi and the 1983 COP in
Botswana to list all whale species in Appendix I. In the 1983 COP, the parties voted to
list some key species, most notably the Minke whales, in Appendix I, despite the fact
that there was no evidence presented of their endangered status at the meetings
(Gillespie 2002). The United States and the Secretariat of CITES both argued extensively
against this proposal, but did not receive majority support (Curlier and Andresen 2002).
This decision was so divisive and controversial that the Secretary General chose to delay
its implementation until after the IWC moratorium came into effect. Political wrangling
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and not the particular status of a species were more common on the controversial
listing decisions in the early era of CITES protection. The result was protracted, ongoing
struggles to get enough votes to list species in a particular way and a preference for
those “charismatic” species of large mammals (Gehring and Ruffing 2008).
The listing problems in CITES came to a head in the late 1980s with the ivory
dispute creating significant discord within the organization and bringing it to a large
scale crisis in the legitimacy of the organization. Starting in 1985 there began to be
significant proposals from countries for listing the African elephant in Appendix I which
would then require states to prohibit the trade in ivory from the elephants. Significant
study was expended to evaluate the status of the African elephant and provide a basis
for action. In early 1989, UNEP and CITES own Ivory Trade Review Group released their
studies identifying poaching and trade in ivory as significant threats to the health of the
species. These were significant in spurring the most significant proposal in the 1989
meeting by Australia for moving the African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I.
Range states responded in a variety of ways to this proposal. West African states where
the species was in the most dire situation generally embraced the new listing for the
African elephants while South African countries emphasized that populations were
stable in their countries and that the changed listing could make elephants into a
nuisance species if there is no economic reason for their maintenance. Botswana, for
instance, responded that “The government needs to maintain the economic value of the
elephant so that increased conflicts with genuine human development and negative
impacts to habitats where elephants congregate most will not be viewed as an
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unlikeable species. The elephant must remain in Appendix II and decisions to the
contrary must be based on country to country merits” (CITES 1989). There was thus
significant divergence in positions and the listing decision was highly contentious.
The Secretariat of CITES was particularly active through this process. Eugene
Lapointe, a Canadian lawyer, had been the Secretary General of CITES since 1982 and
had begun embracing the endangered species as resources view in some of the earlier
listing disputes (for example, the crocodile decision.). The Secretariat in general
included a set of actors committed to this view of endangered species, namely Jacques
Berney, Obdulio Menghi and David Brackett. Lapointe, Berney, and Menghi retain today
relevance through their leadership positions in the IWMC World Conservation Trust
which advocates sustainable level of endangered species use as the economic pathway
to maintaining population health. This group of actors in the Secretariat actively
opposed the proposal by Australia and instead supported a country by country system
that would allow continued sales of ivory from African elephants. IUCN, WWF, and
TRAFFIC were powerful NGOs that also supported the split position which would keep
populations in South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe in Appendix II listing.
This active role of the Secretariat was strongly opposed by the strict
conservation NGOs mainly located in the United States (led by Greenpeace, Defenders
of Wildlife, and the African Wildlife Foundation, and the Environmental Investigation
Agency). 26 of these NGOs sent a letter to Mostafa Tolba, the Secretary General of
UNEP the governing organization of CITES, demanding the termination of Lapointe and
his staff. Criticizing a “lack of leadership and judgment” by the Secretariat, the letter
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specifies that “'Mr Lapointe and his staff have exceeded the responsibilities and
mandate of the secretariat” (Cater 1989). The Greenpeace report of the meeting found
that “The Secretariat have been openly lobbying against an Appendix listing for African
elephants and were manipulating the meeting, timing of debates, votes etc. to favour
their position.” This pressure led to the United States delegation requesting UNEP to
take the situation under its consideration. The UNEP inquiry revealed no evidence for
some of the more serious allegations of financial mismanagement or significant
wrongdoing. However, by early 1990, Lapointe and the staff had been dismissed by
Tolba without consultation with the Conference of the Parties.
This legitimacy crisis within the organization resulted in two significant changes
for the organization. First, it highlighted the need to bolster a system of listing that was
not subject to significant political wrangling. The treaty itself provides little specification
for how the decisions about listing are to be reached. At the first meeting of the
Conference of Parties, they adopted the Berne Criteria for listing and delisting species.
The Berne Criteria (Resolution 1.1) had broad conditions for listing a species in Appendix
I, primarily that it be threatened with extinction and that trade impacts that status. It
was far more precise in adopting a high level of necessary evidence that trade would not
harm a species status. The result was controversy that the inclusion of species would be
largely politically determined but that delisting would be very difficult (Lyster 1985).
The not surprising result was a significant proliferation of species in Appendix I in the
1970s and early 1980s. The parties in 1983 began an effort to assess whether the
species listed in Appendix I were actually or still endangered and sought to establish a
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scientific basis for the listing decisions. 1983 they created the Plants Working Group
and in 1987 they created the Animals Working group which were both made up of
scientific experts to assess the status of various species. However, these were not
formalized bodies and did not have significant impact on the discussions in the later part
of the 1980s. The 1994 meeting in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida resulted in significant
refinement of both the explicit listing criteria and strengthening of the Animals and
Plants Committees (Wijnstekers 2003). Although further refinement followed of these
provisions, the listing process had been changed dramatically.
Second, the legitimacy crisis around ivory clarified the role of the organization
with other international environmental organizations: namely UNEP. The dismissal of
the Secretary General by the UNEP Executive Director caused a serious problem in
regards to the legitimacy of CITES procedures. As a result, UNEP and CITES developed
an agreement between the organizations regarding how this nesting procedure would
operate. The solution derived at was that the Executive Director of UNEP would retain
appointment and dismissal authority over the Secretary General of CITES but only after
consultation with the sitting committee of CITES. This is significant in providing some
crucial check on outside involvement and the consultation has generally meant that
both the Conference of the Parties and Secretary General have been largely together in
many issues since 1990. This clarity has increased the independence of CITES and yet
retained a close relationship with UNEP and other organs of international environmental
politics.
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These changes, with adaptations and adjustments at future Conference of
Parties, have changed fundamentally the processes inside of CITES. As opposed to the
political wrangling of many of the early listing decisions, listing decisions now are
channeled into specific committees and collectively established criteria for listings.
Gehring and Ruffing argue that ¨The scientific assessment stage establishes a veritable
discourse on the merits of a listing proposal. Its triadic structure and its integration into
the larger listing procedure deprive the member states, and other stakeholders, of their
bargaining power and commit them to the commonly accepted listing criteria. As a
result, a protected niche for the exchange of arguments emerges¨ (Gehring and Ruffing
2008). The triadic structure discussed by Gehring and Ruffing is the division of decisions
split between the Animals and Plants Committees, the Conference of Parties, and the
Secretary General. The process now moves through each of these different bodies with
discussion on the situations for the species as they meet clear criteria ending with
decisions by the Conference of the Parties and the 2/3rds vote requirement to list or
delist a species.
The continued ivory issue in CITES emphasizes this changed situation. The
controversy continued at the 9th COP in Fort Lauderdale and the 10th COP in Harare,
Zimbabwe. In Harare, the state parties agreed to a significant review to discuss the
elephant population health through an expert committee. The Committee was to be
composed of 6 members with geographical diversity and work closely with TRAFFIC,
IUCN, and UNEP. Coupled to this was the creation of the Elephant Trade Information
System which aimed to provide relevant information. Evidence is gathered through the
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various research arms including the Elephant Trade Information System, the Monitoring
of Illegal Killing of Elephants, TRAFFIC, and other sources (Stiles 2004). The Expert Panel
then uses this evidence to make very specific recommendations to the Secretary
General and the Standing Committee. Negotiations by the COP finalize any decision
about listing or granted exemptions from listing status. There is extensive monitoring
established through these committees and every sale of ivory on the international
market is very well monitored. Sales of ivory from range states were permitted twice
since the 1989 ban. NGOs and many states have argued that these create a legitimate
market to hide illegally harvested elephant ivory. In both occasions the decision has
been quite contentious, but has not resulted in opting out like the 1989 decision did nor
the legitimacy crisis in the organization that followed the 1989 decision.
CITES has changed since its establishment from a hyper-partisan organization
that held together largely because of very easy opt-out clauses for any decisions
reached. However, following the high point of this contestation around the ivory issue
in 1989, the organization underwent a series of reforms that have changed the
discussion dramatically. This transformation has added independent assessment and
monitoring capacity, focused discussions, and criteria for decisions to be made by the
parties. This is a significant transformation in the organization and really adjusted its
procedures.
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Resilience: MAB, MBC, and the Carpathian Convention
UNESCO MAB Project and the World Network on Biosphere Reserves
The Man and Biosphere Project (MAB) under UNESCO started in the early 1970s
as a project focused primarily on research of human impacts on the environment. It
was initially designed for a short-term international science initiative but has developed
over 40 years into a significant and lasting biodiversity project linking conservation
projects, studies of relationships between humans and biodiversity, and exchange of
ideas from varied locations. This process occurred as a result of rebranding the
organization and expansion from Europe and North America to additional regions. The
result has been an adaptive organization with significant lasting power.
The Man and Biosphere Project (MAB) developed starting in 1966 when
UNESCO, responding to declarations for a health of the environment conference by
IUCN and the United Nations Resource Research Advisory Committee (headed by Michel
Batisse), passed a resolution to host a conference to “continue to stimulate research
and training relating to the natural environment and resources of the land areas and
their conservation by encouraging synthesis of knowledge” (UNESCO 1967, 1).
A steering committee, consisting of representatives from UNESCO, IUCN, the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), and the
International Biological Program (IBP- part of the International Council for Science ICSU),
began work organizing a conference on the “rational use and conservation of resources
of the biosphere” (UNESCO 1967). The conference in September of 1968 brought
together over 300 representatives of states, international organizations, and
92

nongovernmental organizations (UNESCO/MAB 1993). The Biosphere Conference was
heralded by some as the first major world environmental conference. Batisse wrote a
year after the conference that it was the “first occasion on which representatives of
governments have met to appraise the world [environmental] situation and to initiate
steps for remedial action” (Batisse 1969, 4). Concluding with a plea for a balanced
approach between consumption and preservation and finding that “man is the key
component of the biosphere”, the Conference made 20 separate recommendations.
The final one encouraged UNESCO to create in the 1969-1970 period, the groundwork
for a long-term program dedicated to studying the role of man in producing positive
outcomes in the biosphere (UNESCO 1969).
Work on this long-term program began almost immediately in UNESCO and led
to the development of a strategy for establishing such a program. The strategy from the
beginning was defined as primarily aimed at developing a scientific basis for
understanding the interactions between humans and the environment. The initial
statement for the creation of the program maintained: “The general objective of the
programme is to develop the scientific basis for the rational use and conservation of the
resources of the biosphere and for the improvement of the global relationship between
man and the environment” (UNESCO 1970, 7). As originally conceived, the program was
to have some limited scientific-research aims and to complete most tasks in about 10
years. 31 interdisciplinary research themes were developed focusing on various
different ecosystems for study. It is within this context that the World Network of
Biosphere Reserves developed. Biosphere reserves were justified on the research
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opportunities that they produced for the scientists affiliated with the MAB project. The
1970 foundational documents proclaimed the need for biodiversity reserves because “it
is foreseen that the pursuit of the various studies called for in the programme will
require the availability of undisturbed natural areas for scientific study as well as areas
in which the conditions or disturbance are under careful control by the scientists involve
in the research projects under the programme” (UNESCO 1970, 23) From a scientific
study standpoint though “the presently existing national parks, biological reserves, and
similar areas are representative of only a small part of the ecosystems of the world”
(UNESCO 1970, Annex I, 10). It was thus seen as necessary to create a funded and
supported worldwide network of protected areas that will be representative of different
ecosystems and maintained for representative scientific study. The report then
continued by specifying that “it will be essential therefore for each Member State to
designate within its boundaries ‘biosphere reserves’ containing representative areas of
each of the major or otherwise relevant ecosystems within the nation’s boundaries”
(UNESCO 1970, 23). In the plan to develop the world network of biosphere reserves,
the plan was largely aimed at creating best practices: best practices in protected area
management for scientific study and highlighting in the network sites of excellence in
these practices (UNESCO 1970, Annex I). The World Network of Biosphere Reserves
then was a primary part of the UNESCO MAB focus on scientific study.
The WNBR has generally seen four different stages of governance which make
identification of dynamics within the arrangement easier. The first stage dates from the
implementation of the organization in the mid-1970s until the First World Congress of
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Biosphere Reserves in Minsk in 1985. The second period dates from this until the
Second Congress in 1995 in Seville. The third is the period following Seville and ended
with the development of the Madrid Action Plan in 2008. We are currently in the fourth
period which is scheduled to last until 2013. The expansion of the World Network of
Biosphere Reserves arrangement has varied widely during these periods. The World
Network started with very vague requirements and little actual change in policy by
states to transform protected areas into biosphere reserves; however, with the Seville
Strategy in 1995 and the Madrid Action Plan (2008), the MAB has transformed this
network into a governance arrangement which could transform and improve practices
of state agents and local actors (Price, Park, and Bouamrane 2010).
The first period was largely characterized by rapid growth in the number of
biosphere reserves; however, evidence suggests that few of these sites included in the
World Network changed substantially their management as a result of their application
or inclusion in the program (Batisse 1997, Shelton 1988, UNESCO 1996, UNESCO/MAB
1993). The first era was largely defined through the identification of sites for unique
scientific research into ecosystems and management of the areas aimed to further this
investigation aim (Batisse 1997). With the largest scientific budgets, scientific
infrastructure, and expert personnel being located in the United States, Canada and
Western Europe and with extensive protected areas already existing in these regions,
most of the early creation of protected areas overlapped with already protected areas
whose management did not change significantly as a result of inclusion in the World
Network (Ishwaran, Persic, and Tri 2008). International governance of the areas was
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weak and ill-defined in the first period and, if positive effects occurred, it was largely a
result of the specific political will at the national or individual protected area level.
The second stage was an era of limitation in the expansion of the World Network
of Biosphere Reserves. Conservation fatigue among professionals, the loss of easily
designated sites, lack of even basic protection over some sites, and local resistance to
conservation all seriously slowed down the expansion of biosphere reserves around the
world. For example, in Latin America the number of annually designated biosphere
reserves fell from 4.5 in the 1970s to 2 in the 1980s and to 1.8 from 1990-1996 (and this
includes the aberrantly large year of 1993 when Latin American countries were most
enthusiastic about biodiversity governance because of the recently completed Rio
Conference and international support) (Danielle and Carenzo 1999).
The addition of this more complex focus and the wider problems regarding
conservation were coupled to institutional difficulties faced by MAB’s secretariathosting organization of UNESCO. The United States and the United Kingdom withdrew
support for UNESCO in the 1980s with strong criticisms about the management of the
organization. The United States government had long had a quite suspicious attitude
towards UNESCO, including investigations of the organization under the House UnAmerican Committee’s work, criticisms of the organization over Israel and China issues,
and a number of other issues. In the 1983 withdraw statement, the United States
argued that although it supported the projects of UNESCO, the forum had become
“politicized” (Preston Jr., Herman, and Schiller 1989, Jordan 1984). MAB was one of the
projects sparred as U.S. scientists and all of the biosphere reserves remained within the
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WNBR. However, the larger situation did prevent UNESCO from supporting MAB or the
WNBR to a significant extent. A problem highlighted in the SCOPE review of 1991 that
noted that the UNESCO General Council had been resistant to reforms suggested by ICC
and the MAB Bureau (ICC-MAB 1992).
The large result then on the WNBR was that the 1980s was a lost period with
little improvement in the structure of governance or in the expansion of the
membership. Only 84 new sites were designated during this period from 1985-1995 and
not much more than that were proposed to MAB for inclusion. The vast majority of
these (80%) were limited to Europe and the Americas with little expansion in Africa,
Asia, or the Middle East. Many of these sites were either already planned prior to the
conference in Minsk or were part of the focus on biodiversity in Latin America around
the Rio Conference. In addition, problems of vagueness in guidelines and monitoring of
sites persisted throughout the second stage. The Minsk conference produced some
notably expanded ideas of what a biosphere reserve was, but without clear procedures
or guidelines for management of those sites (ICC-MAB 1988a). However, there was
significant operation within the organization in the late 1980s and 1990s around the
Action Plan for Biosphere Reserves which had begun discussing integration of
sustainable development into biosphere reserves in 1984. However, very few of these
were integrated and used to strengthen the governance arrangement. It is not a stretch
to say that the WNBR was close to collapse during this period. The 1992 report,
following the Rio Conference, emphasized at a number of points that the membership
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was actively engaged in justifying their program to the world biodiversity governance
community (ICC-MAB 1992).
However, some significant efforts did occur during the 1980s which helped
transform the organization in the 1990s. Of initial importance were a host of different
reflexive activities. The 1984 meeting specified the creation of two internal efforts at
reform of the organization. The Biosphere Reserve Survey involved a significant effort
at understanding some of the basic conditions that were happening in biosphere
reserve efforts (ICC-MAB 1988c). The most significant finding of this effort was that the
World Network of Biosphere Reserves was not a functioning network (ICC-MAB 1988b,
Annex I). There was no clear processes of feedback, exchange, or sustained
engagement with various sites. This was exemplified by the results that engagement
with other national biosphere reserves and other international biosphere reserves were
ranked as the least two types of actors of interaction by biosphere reserve managers in
the survey. Any connection or glue of the network was achieved through the common
methodologies for creation of biosphere reserves, study of those reserves, and
reporting. Haas, Williams, and Babai explain that “The main function of the MAB
secretariat has been to contact these groups, link them with an international network of
similarly or newly created committees, and urge them to continue their research in a
manner relevant to the MAB projects and consistent with uniform methodologies. This
stress on a common methodology…has been one of MAB’s successes. Thus, countries
without the resources of a strong national committee have been able to
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participate…through a regional division of labor made possible by comparative research
methodologies” (Haas, Williams, and Babai 1977).
These reflective practices did yield results as proposals for changing MAB and
the WNBR program did begin to percolate in the development of the Action Plan for
Biosphere Reserves, adopted in the 1984 meeting but with significant efforts in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Most of the governance increases focused around the 10 th
meeting of the International Coordinating Council in 1988 which developed a strategy
for the period of 1990-1995 which built from the reflective processes discussed above
and set the ground for the breakthrough in Seville. Since the Biosphere Reserve Survey
emphasized that development functions were largely not dealt with, the 10 th meeting of
the ICC recommended deepening development and inclusion of local communities in
the action plan for 1990-1995 (ICC-MAB 1988a). Recognizing financial limitations
relating to UNESCO, the action plan for 1990-1995 largely emphasized developing and
encouraging sites of excellence that emphasized the changed focus supported by the
Survey and the General Scientific Advisory Panel and also to work at deepening the
network (ICC-MAB 1988b). Specific focus was aimed at regional cooperation in key
areas of the world that had not been fully represented, namely Latin America and to
“seize opportunities for developing a new generation of activities at the interface
between man and the biosphere….making a distinctive contribution to the issues of
sustainable development and global change” (UNESCO 1989, 11). These various
changes then resulted in an Action Plan that aimed at a reassessment of the World
Network of Biosphere Reserves and MAB more generally in the period of 1990-1995.
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This reassessment resulted in the 1994 Seville Strategy aiming to provide better
guidance to resource managers. This is exemplified by the fact that two years after the
Seville Strategy was developed, the North-east Svalbard Biosphere Reserve in Norway
was withdrawn by the National MAB authority for not having any population in the
biosphere zone (this was the only biosphere reserve in Norway and one of only four in
Nordic countries) (Price, Park, and Bouamrane 2010). Coupled with this, the Seville
Strategy created growth in new sites that could be developed, expanded the
management in those sites (which now had to include management with local
communities), and encouraged development of biosphere reserves outside of Europe
and North America. During the post-Seville phase, Asia and Latin America both saw their
most dramatic increases in biosphere reserves, and every region saw a significant
upswing in the number of new biosphere reserves. In addition, although Europe and
North America had designated more than half of the new sites in the first and second
phases, in the third phase they still made up the largest percentage of any region but
had decreased to 40% of newly designated site.
The Madrid Action Plan is following up on this with further internal review of
biosphere reserves, network deepening, and seeks to further augment funding from
other sources for biosphere reserves. The Madrid Action plan aims on “developing
models for global, national and local sustainability, and for biosphere reserves to serve
as learning sites for policy professionals, decision-makers, research and scientific
communities, management practitioners and stakeholder communities to work
together to translate global principles of sustainable development into locally relevant
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praxis” (UNESCO 2008). It involves 30 different explicit goals for the organization, its
national membership organizations, specific biosphere reserves, and partnerships. The
Madrid Action Plan specifically emphasizes “result-oriented” partnerships with private
entities, universities, and civil society to deepen managed use and monitor biosphere
reserves around the world. The Seville Strategy and the Madrid Action Plan largely have
their results in the efforts taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s to broad and deepen
the network behind the WNBR.
This strengthening occurred to a large part as a result of the expansion of the
agenda and scope of the project in the 1980s. Including additional actors allowed the
organization to gradually ratchet up the relevance of the organization. Constant
reflective practices, involving both internal and external evaluations, similarly proved
crucial in spurring the adaptive changes of the organization. Limits on the resilience in
the 1980s were the constraining institutional setting, the resistance to the expanded
agenda by some of the original members, and wider constraints about conservation
fatigue. This long history and level of adaptation and improved stance of the
organization are quite significant.
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC)
The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) had significantly transformed
between its formation in 1997 and its relaunch in 2010. Starting as a largely centralized
project that only narrowly included El Salvador, it grew into a set of local projects linked
together in a variety of different ways that expanded activity in El Salvador significantly.
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This expansion of the project will be the focus of later chapters, in comparison with the
Caribbean case, so this will simply be a brief description of the project.
The MBC began as a project to link the major protected areas from Panama to
southern Mexico with a variety of corridor and other protected areas in 1997. However,
overtime this transformed significantly into a project led by hundreds of local projects
throughout the region. Table 2.6 shows one indicator that accents this point and the
development of the project from the mid-1990s until 2010 as recorded by GEF corridor
related grants. The early project from 1997-2000 was dominated by a few, heavily
funded projects. Most of these were large regionally organized GEF grants for the
corridor project. Small grants during this time involved in the corridor were completely
dedicated to Costa Rica efforts. Starting with a grant to El Salvador in 2002, the small
grants became more diverse and included all the countries in the region in the efforts.
The centralized project largely gave way to a variety of different projects throughout the
region connecting with the corridor. The GEF funding decreased, but as will be
highlighted below many of the projects diversified funding and brought in a number of
alternative funding sources. Exploring this process more generally adds specific ways to
understand the development of resilient governance.
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Figure 2.2- Number and Amount of all GEF Corridor Related Grants to Central American
Countries 1994-2010.

In many respects, the MBC project shifted from the centralized management and
few funders to a variety of projects at local levels. The initial effort largely revolved
around state members expanding protected areas, creating buffer zones and corridors.
Funding came either from those states or from international funds those states could
acquire from international funders. Costa Rica’s Paso de la Danta project was funded
primarily by the government of Costa Rica, the Atlantic Biodiversity Corridor in
Nicaragua relied upon funding from the World Bank. El Salvador’s shade coffee efforts
with the corridor was initially given funding from the World Bank and the government of
El Salvador (Miller, Chang, and Johnson 2001).
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Starting after the initial funding from the project, however, a host of national
and local NGOs and groups became active in developing their own projects aiming to
deal with ecosystem fragmentation. A first change was that the actors involved in the
corridor project changed dramatically in the post 2002 era as a host of national and local
NGOs began to be involved in corridor projects. As discussed earlier with Table 2.6,
smaller and more varied grants became crucial in the arrangement and replaced the
larger projects. Without the coordination office from 2006 on, this became more
pronounced. Second, this represented an expansion of the project. Costa Rica NGOs
had been engaged in corridor activities even before the formal establishment of the
MBC and used the project to increase their projects. However, starting in 2002, a small
GEF grant to an El Salvadorian community NGO really opened the involvement of local
NGOs from countries throughout the region. These different strategies were distinct as
one national NGO leader mentioned in El Salvador, they did not intend to follow “the
Costa Rica example.” Related with both of these, participation took a predominant role
in many of the areas. Local NGOs and indigenous groups actively engaged with the
corridor project. Various NGOs affiliated with the Kuna indigenous group in Panama had
resisted earlier attempts at linking the MBC over their territory with claims of a lack of
accountability. However, these same NGOs in the later project were leaders in receiving
funds and undertaking a variety of different project with the corridor focus. One
addition move for this era was that funding changed from large individual projects with
significant funding from one or two sources to projects with multiple different funding
streams. The Atlantic Biological Corridor in Nicaragua was almost exclusively funded by
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the state and World Bank. NGO involvement, however, without the stable large stream
included a host of different funding stream from Conservation International, Critical
Ecosystem Partnership Fund, and international aid groups from Switzerland, Denmark
and others.
One aspect which continued largely throughout the decade was the extensive
aerial monitoring exercises. NASA’s jet propulsion laboratory continues to be engaged
with CCAD on detailed analysis and findings regarding fragmentation in the region.
However, with the switch there are a variety of other indicators of success that are
integrated into programs. With the variety of funding sources, each adopts different
indicators of effectiveness and most projects include some assessment in funding
requests. Ecosystem service provision is one popular indicator in many of the GEF Small
Grants Programme funding provisions, with freshwater availability being one of the
most common. This information is often integrated into future funding requests and
management choices by local and national NGOs. One aspect that has been lacking in
the program throughout has been regular, organized assessment of management
lessons. Although some assessments have happened, these are largely ad hoc, partial,
or completely unconnected from the ongoing work being done by actual managers (IEG
(Independent Evaluation Group) 2011). Policy relevant knowledge generation then is
partial and although many insights are created, they are not assessed in a regular
fashion.
The impact of a regional corridor project has had a lasting impact. In 2010, for
example, every single biodiversity focused GEF Small Grant going to Central America
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tied in with the corridor project in some manner (GEF Small Grants Programme 2011).
The MBC remains a key invocation in policies and proposals and efforts; the map of the
MBC is prominently displayed in environmental ministries.
One crucial transformation from the first project design to later articulations was
the inclusion of projects in El Salvador. The country was largely left out of the project
conception in 1997 and considered to only contribute little to the implementation or
creation of the corridor. In a context of a fairly weak environmental ministry with only
limited efforts on biodiversity protection, little primeval forest remaining, and the
severe destruction of the civil war, El Salvador seemed unlikely to engage to a significant
extent on regional biodiversity projects. Indeed, the environmental decision-makers in
the state of El Salvador were generally unenthusiastic about the involvement of the
country in the MBC. The map of the MBC then only highlighted some restricted use
areas that El Salvador would create to link in with the project, around the borders of the
country. Starting with the shade coffee proposals in the Western part of the country
and expanded efforts in the Eastern bay contested by Nicaragua, Honduras, and El
Salvador though the project increased significantly.
Carpathian Convention
The Carpathian Convention, which entered into force, is designed to be a
governance project working toward sustainable development of communities living in
the Carpathian Mountains, including parts of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and the Ukraine. Spurred by concern within the
states about the Carpathian region, an international focus on the environment in
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mountain regions, and key assistance from environmental organizations resulted in a
highly dynamic and active treaty in the region that has already seen a major protocol
enter into force that relies significantly on the ecosystem perspective.
The Carpathian mountains form a key geographic region that has key
environmental areas for Europe, including the sources of freshwater resources, primary
forests, and some of the last populations of large European mammals. With the end of
Soviet inspired systems in the region after 1989, a number of social forces impacted the
ecology of the region. Farmland abandonment, private property lines resulted in
increased parcelization of the land, and increased extractive industries (namely logging)
became significant problems in the post-1989 era (Hoster et al. 2008).
Europe had a number of policy networks and organizations that had been
dealing with mountain ecosystems for years, mainly around the Alps. In 1952,
International Commission for the Protection of the Alpine Regions was founded by some
of the governments, IUCN, and some German mountaineering organizations. This group
called for an Alpine conservation convention in its founding statement but functioned
primarily as an expert stakeholder group until 1987. In that year, an extensive IUCN
study surveying hundreds of local governments, NGOs, and other actors was released
providing a spur to negotiations (Price 2000). After two years of extensive negotiations,
the Alpine Convention was opened for signature in 1991 and came into effect in 1995.
The Convention is primarily a framework convention and the content was to largely
come from protocols. Despite its broad, hortatory form it still had significant delays in
ratification by key states like Italy and Switzerland (Price 2000). Italy did not ratify until
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1999 and Switzerland did not ratify because of canton opposition to the conservation
provisions in the Convention until 2000. This may have been a result of the negotiations
which took place primarily at the level of states and did not include other actors (Fall
2006). The result of this is that although there were protocols developed and signed by
parties, they took significant time and harmonization or consistency between them was
not always clear (Price 2000). Price writes that “On one hand, signed protocols are a
measure of the success of implementation, even if none, except the one dealing with
the addition of Monaco as a party, has yet been ratified. On the other hand, the
sequence of preparation of protocols has led to certain difficulties, given that the
convention has strategic aims and that harmonization is needed both between
protocols and between these and national (and EU) legislation” (Price 2000). At the
date of writing, this has improved with a number of protocols being ratified, including
significant multiple-protocol ratifications by Italy in 2012. However, no protocol except
the one adding Monaco has received full ratification of all members with the Swiss being
particularly hesitant on most protocols. The Alpine Convention though did foster a
series of expert groups, policy advice to other mountain regions, and served as a direct
model for the Carpathian Convention (Regional Environmental Center for Central and
Eastern Europe 2007).
Along with the Alpine Convention, a significant set of mountain experts had been
leveraging the international environmental agenda for years. One of the core areas of
UNESCO’s MAB project was study of Mountain Ecosystems (MAB-6) which spurred a
series of expert meetings on mountains in the 1970s and 1980s. This group was
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dominated by a, self-named, Mountain Mafia of experts who included geographers,
biological scientists and others dedicated to elevating the Mountain issue on the global
environmental agenda. These advocates were able to get mountains onto the agenda
and as a major item at the Rio Conference in 1992 and were able to ratchet up the focus
on mountains after that conference (Rudaz 2011). With a core scientific group focused
on mountains attention of the actors moved to widening participation and including a
host of different actors. These efforts resulted in 2002 being declared the International
Year of the Mountain and the creation of the Mountain Partnership (Ross 2007). These
efforts created a global focus with local experts receiving increasing support in efforts
dealing with mountain ecosystems. This global issue elevation and creation of
partnerships and other networks is essential background for wider movements
contributing to the development of the Carpathian Convention.
The Carpathian Convention process started in earnest in 2001 when Ukraine
petitioned the UNEP-Regional Office for Europe to facilitate consultation among the
Carpathian countries (Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
2007). Negotiations moved quickly and the Framework Convention on the Protection
and Sustainable Development of the Carpathians opened for signature in May 2003.
Nongovernmental parties were quite active during the negotiations with UNEP, WWF,
the European Mountain Forum, Regional Environmental Center, Central and East
European Working Group for the Establishment of Biodiversity, the European Academy
in Bolzano (Italy), and the Northern Alliance for Sustainability were quite active in
negotiations (Ramčilović and Shannon 2008). Austria and Italy were also very important
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non-parties that were crucial in negotiations. Local level actors were limited because
their authority and connections were not clear in most of the states. The result is quite
significant as the Convention is the first one to embody the ecosystem perspective and
transnational protected areas directly within the framework convention (Ramčilović and
Shannon 2008). The Convention entered into force for all parties in 2006 and by 2008
all seven states had passed legislation to bring the treaty provisions into force.
The governance arrangements associated with this project have included some
of the usual biodiversity tools. The Carpathian Network of Protected Areas was created
soon afterward and involves exchange of best practices between the network but few
requirements and the Mountain Research Initiative started the Science for the
Carpathians Network in 2007 which links different research programs together.
However, unlike the delayed Protocols in the Alpine Convention, the Carpathian
Convention has shown relatively coherent updating of basic governance arrangements.
The Protocol on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological and Landscape Diversity
was negotiated quickly after the convention came into force. Opening for signature on
June 19, 2008 and entering into force in December a year later. To date, all members
except Serbia have passed legislation to bring their national laws in conjunction with the
Biodiversity Protocol. Like the original Convention, this protocol advanced cross-policy
implementation of the provisions, working geographically rather than jurisdictionally,
and focusing on ecosystems rather than species. The treaty works through the
Carpathian Network of Protected Areas, increasingly its presence and requirements, and
a list of species for specific attention. Listing criteria are absent from the protocol for
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the list of species except that it shall be based on international criteria. Most
significantly, it includes efforts at restoration and development of native species in its
requirements, which has in some of members of the network involved incorporation of
agricultural landscapes in the species protection. The Biodiversity Protocol and its quick
agreement by most members is a fairly positive sign of the resilience of the
arrangement.
Outside support and guidance coupled with significant state involvement in the
project has created a conjoined effort that is being significant in updating the rules and
doing so in a way informed by information provided to the actors. Focusing on both
biological and landscape diversity in the Protocol to the Carpathian Convention is a
significant push forward. As a young agreement, its adaptive capacity and authoritative
capabilities may be reduced and undermined by various future outcomes. However, it
appears that the external interest in the agreement may provide a significant reservoir
for support in times of stress within the governance arrangement.
Conclusion
The next chapter will explore generalized findings from these cases and how
they show larger patterns of impact. But before moving to that analysis it is important
to take a moment and assess rival possible arguments that do not find significant
support in the arguments. The robust institutions explanation seems to be only weekly
supported by the evidence. Some governance arrangements with significant capability
like ITTO and CITES actually find this constraining on adaptability of the governance
arrangements. Other examples, like MAB and MBC seem to reach resilience because
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they do not have strong institutions directing activity. The institutional robustness
argument finds little initial support in the biodiversity cases. A similar explanation could
suggest that national context determines resilience of governance relationships.
Although the data above is significantly about the governance cases themselves, it is
useful to note that resilience does not appear in many cases to result from national
leadership. ACTO, ITTO, MAB, and other examples seem constrained by powerful states
that exert significant leadership over the structure of the organization. When
leadership is diversified or issue based (like in CITES) then the results appear more
favorable. National context may explain some aspects, but does not fare very well in
the array of biodiversity governance arrangements.
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CHAPTER 3
RESILIENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
The ten biodiversity agreements of the study show wide diversity in terms of
effectiveness. There is some overlap between effective agreements and resilient
agreements, as will be shown. However, there is not exact overlap and the result of a
comparison shows that effectiveness and resilience have different causal structures.
This section will explore the various cases and their outcomes in terms of effectiveness
while highlighting the outcomes in terms of resilience in the previous chapter.
As defined in Chapter 1, effectiveness is simultaneously a political and
environmental outcome involving change to human behaviors and institutions which
produce positive and desired environmental outcomes. For ease in understanding
there are three broadly possible outcomes for effectiveness: 1. Ineffective, those
agreements which neither shape human institutions nor have an impact on the
environment, 2. Politically effective, those agreements which shape human institutions
but do not impact the environment (often because the changes are too minor or not
well-suited to the problem), and 3. Completely effective, those agreements which shape
human institutions and have a positive impact on the environment. Few biodiversity
governance arrangements have reached the level of sustained complete effectiveness.
However, some have seen improving conditions over their part, if an agreement is
considered effective then that means that it has change political institutions in some
way and been able to show clear improvement in biodiversity loss as a result.

113

Factors contributing to Resilience
These cases provide an extensive set of histories and experiences with different
outcomes. What mechanisms help us understand the wide diversity of outcomes
experienced in biodiversity governance? Does the network structure argument about
resilient governance hold generally across cases or is there another set of mechanisms
that is important?
The limiting cases are clearly highlighted in the case as adhering to the overall
theoretical expectations. ACTO, ITTO, and the Bern Convention have limited networks
outside of their organizations and connect in a limited manner to other actors and in
many of those cases even with on-the-ground efforts of their own organization. When
shocks occur, there is little diffusion through the organization or the limited network
and the organizations largely remain weak with limited adaptation and limited
authoritative capability. The null states of the modular network argument and
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 6 then find general support in this instance.
Similarly with the positive cases of resilience, except for the Carpathian
Convention which cannot be said to have experienced a significant shock to study the
diffusion process during and after the shock, the cases largely support the theory. The
most modular network structure of any of the cases studied is the Man and Biosphere
project with wide connections at multiple levels. When there have been various shocks
to the organization, the response is often bottom-up learning, integrating lessons from
individual sites, and transmitting these through informal networks throughout the
governance arrangement. Similarly, in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, as will be
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shown, the modular structure spurred bottom-up diffusion which allowed increasing
membership.
The more difficult cases are the arrested development and equilibrium outcome
cases. Although all but the Ramsar Convention have centralized networks, they vary
greatly in how this network operates with the Caribbean having an elite centralized
network and the CBD having an expansive network including a host of different actors
but without well-organized modules, a similar problem early in CITES although they
have deliberately tried to move to a modular network structure in recent years. The
Ramsar Convention though does appear to have what could be described as a modular
network structure. National committees, a wide network of actors involved, and other
clusters of actors make the Ramsar a modular network. As noted above and discussed
more below, Ramsar may be an aberrant case in that the modular structure is a result of
weak institutional context without the ability to connect the various actors together in a
centralized way. This may explain why rather than leading to top-down or even bottomup diffusion processes, Ramsar has seen limited diffusion.
Case
ACTO
ITTO
Bern Convention
Ramsar Convention

Network Structure
Limited
Limited
Limited
Modular

Diffusion Processes
Limited
Limited
Limited
Limited

Caribbean

Centralized

Top down

CBD
CITES

Centralized
Centralized (moving
to modular)
Modular

Top down
Top down

Result
Collapse
Collapse
Collapse
Arrested
Development
Arrested
Development
Equilibrium
Equilibrium

Bottom-up

Resilience

Man and Biosphere
Project
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Mesoamerican
Modular
Bottom-up
Resilience
Biological Corridor
Carpathian
Modular
No shock for testing Resilience
Convention
Table 3.1- The results of the 10 Biodiversity Governance Outcomes.
Although the ten cases largely adhere to the modular network theory and
provide key support for all the hypotheses, the specific histories of the cases help us
understand the mechanisms and scope conditions that are important here.
Observed mechanisms and scope conditions
The cases highlight a number of mechanisms that constrain resilient governance
in international biodiversity governance at different levels. The specifics seem to
highlight that different processes may impact the different dimensions of resilience
(adaptive capacity or authoritative capability) and thus it may be analytically helpful to
focus on those that impact adaptive capacity and authoritative capability.
In terms of authoritative capability, competition with other governance
arrangements appears to be one condition that is quite constantly constraining on
activity. Competition as a mechanism could be defined as a set of actors making
decisions to gain political or economic advantage over other actors. Preference for the
default position in the Dominican Republic case of the Caribbean Challenge was largely a
result of the competitive environment between conservationists and tourist industry.
Similarly, competition between formal governance and non-state market based
certification seems to have had a constraining role on the International Tropical Timber
Organization. The crowded policy environment with the Bern Convention, competing
with EU-based and other biodiversity governance projects, has similarly caused a well116

developed framework treaty to develop minimally. Further work could reveal that
ACTO was similarly a competitive governance arrangement, but at this point there is not
enough evidence to confirm that basic argument. There are no instances of competitive
governance environments and cases with high authoritative capability which may
suggest that when actors are competitive in a governance space that can often prevent
them from being particularly resilient. Clarifying roles between governance
arrangements, defining overlap precisely, and creating formal linkages between
different biodiversity efforts has been a major goal for the past few years (Pittock 2010).
The evidence from these cases suggests that these efforts are potentially valuable not
just for effectiveness but also for the authoritative capability of the agreements
themselves.
Institutional embedding, defined as a process where an interest group provides
crucial political, financial, and personnel support to an organization, is another fairly
constraining mechanism on the authoritative capability of a governance arrangement.
Political scientists have long found that iron triangles can create incentives among
interest groups and institutions to lock policies in place overtime (Adams 1982). Most of
the organizations with low authoritative capability are defined by the institutional
embedding of some interest group at some level of governance: whether this is Japan in
ITTO, Brazil in ACTO, or the conservationists in the Dominican Republic. Some of the
shadow cases may also highlight this aspect with the limited incorporation of the MBC in
Costa Rica and the mountain experts embedded in the Alpine Convention. Institutional
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embedding of an interest group in a governance arrangement is a highly constraining
force on the ability of it to adopt significant new rules.
However, weak institutional strength is similarly constraining. As a mechanism,
this could be defined as sustained interactions between all actors in a consistent forum.
If forums have irregular, poorly attended, or inactive meetings between members this
would be a sign of weak institutional strength being an active practice. Although a
number of studies of global environmental politics have focused on weak institutional
strength as a constraining force, this definition allows us to see what exactly this would
do in terms of response to shocks. Ramsar Convention has weak institutional strength
until arguably the 1990s. ITTO suffered some financing and relevance parties starting in
the 1990s. ACTO has been a weak institutional space for most of its history. The
Dominican Republic example may be a counter-example to this with the extensive
protected area system; however, the case study reveals that that strong institution may
be constrained by its exclusive forum membership. The Bern Convention similarly may
be an example of a somewhat robust institutional space that still cannot improve its
authoritative capability.
One mechanism that features prominently in the political economy and fit
theories is political contestation. Political contestation is hypothesized to provide a key
dynamic that can constrain the ability of governance arrangements to progress (this
seems to be one of the key conditions in the seal case in Young 2010). This mechanism
appears to be clear in the ITTO example between the European-North American division
from Japan. Voting rules in the organization tended to exacerbate this split significantly.
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Similarly, ACTO may have been restrained by general regional distrust about Brazilian
motives in the Amazonian region. However, it does not find evidence in the Caribbean
Challenge (contestation remained inner-elite), the Bern Convention, or the Ramsar
Convention. Similarly, political contestation is persistent in some of the other cases that
showed authoritative capability presenting limitations on its ability to be considered a
robust finding from the cases.
Case of Limited
Authoritative
Capability

Relevant Constraining Conditions on Authoritative Capability
Competition

Institutional
Embedding

Weak
Institutional
Strength

Political
Contestation

Caribbean
X
X
Challenge
International
X
X
X
X
Tropical Timber
Organization
Amazon
X
X
X
Cooperation
Treaty
Organization
Bern
X
Convention
Ramsar
X
Convention
X=Clear Evidence
=Clear Absense
Table 3.2- Relevant Constraining Conditions on Authoritative Capability in Limited
authoritative capability cases.
In terms of adaptive capacity, the findings support a set of different mechanisms
that can constrain the development and deployment of specific scientific findings for the
governance arrangement. Politicized Science is one mechanism that a number of
analysts have seen as a constraining force on learning (Clark and Majone 1985, The
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Social Learning Group 2001). Interference by political forces, structure of the scientific
meetings, and other shaping exercises by states can be a large constraining force on
governance arrangements. This finding is generally supported with the highly politicized
science body in the CBD, the similarly politicized science body in CITES during the early
years, and in some of the struggles about defining ‘sustainable forestry’ in the ITTO. In
these governance arrangements, the science body is merely another forum for political
contestation and strategy between member states, NGOs, and other groups. The
absence of politicization in ACTO and the Bern Convention is a result of them lacking
scientific bodies of significance. Although both maintain expert groups, they are largely
limited to pilot projects and have not increased their prominence in the organization.
Similarly, limitation of monitoring may interfere in adaptation and limited
funding may prevent significant funding. The CBD, ITTO, and Bern Convention are all
limited by monitoring and funding controls that prove to be highly constraining. State
parties in all three are highly resistant to overly burdensome monitoring provisions;
however, in the case of ITTO, the competitive situation with non-state certification
schemes may be what prevents significant monitoring efforts. CITES, in contrast, has
long had significant monitoring assistance from IUCN’s TRAFFIC monitoring program.
The conclusion is not surprising, limited monitoring prevents adaptation but good
monitoring does not guarantee adaptation.
Based upon the efforts of Tolba in the Ozone negotiations in moving science to
the fore of the debates, there has been an argument that leadership would be essential
for adaptation (Ivanova 2010, Litfin 1994b). The fit theories of governance may consider
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this a crucial aspect in spurring adaptation during times of ecological shock. Lack of
leadership would be seen as a constraining force in adaptation; however, the cases do
not support this contention. In CITES, leadership by the Secretary General caused
legitimacy crises and prevented adaptation of the approach in some of those key
meetings. Similarly, in ACTO, Ariega was a key leader but did not spur enough of a
change to push adaptation in the organization. Lack of leadership may be constraining,
but it was not highlighted in the negative cases of adaptation and finds no support in
this analysis.
Case of Limited
Adaptive
Capacity

Relevant Constraining Mechanisms on adaptive capacity

CBD

Politicized
Science
X

CITES

X (early)

International
X
Tropical Timber
Organization
Amazon
Cooperation
Treaty
Organization
Bern Convention

Limited
Monitoring
X

Funding
Limitations
X

X

X

X

X

Lack of
Leadership

X=Clear Evidence of Mechanism
=Clear Lack of Mechanism
Table 3.3- Relevant Constraining Conditions on adaptive capacity in limited adaptation
cases.
The mechanisms that are seen to be constraining on resilience then include
competition, institutional embedding, weak institutional strength, political contestation,
politicized science, and limited monitoring and funding. This does not supplant the
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process tracing of the cases above; however it does highlight some of the key conditions
that constrain resilience in some of the different cases. Politicized science is a
significant constraint on adaptation and competition and weak institutional strength are
significant constraints on authoritative capacity. These findings do not reverse the study
of global environmental politics and discover constraints accented in the literature. Two
general comments though about these findings of mechanisms that constrain resilience.
First, the fit theory seems to be generally inadequate to the task of explaining
institutional dimensions. Institutions can become grounds for wider struggles and are
kept weak for reasons external to the institution itself. The negative impacts of
competitive environments and institutional embedding on resilience of governance
arrangements is good disconfirming mechanisms of the fit argument if it retains a
explanatory coherence. Second, too little institutional strength constrains resilience and
too strong institutional strength constrains resilience. Institutional weakness is
problematic in that it may limit any possibility for adaptation or development of new
rules. The Ramsar Convention may be the prototypical case that is largely constrained
only by the weak institutional rules in the situation. However, strengthening of the
organization is not necessarily a clear solution and may instead transform institutions
into ground to be gained in contestation with other actors. This risk appears to be
present at local, regional, and international levels and hold in multiple cases in different
aspects.
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Mechanisms that Generate Resilient Governance
Breaking apart the state proves to be a crucial aspect of generating authoritative
capability in the set of governance arrangements. Circumventing Projects is a crucial
aspect of both the MBC and UNESCO’s MAB project. Liking local actors with
international actors creates different policy competencies that can assist significantly in
times of political shock. Similarly, trust in small-scale networks is an important
mechanism in CITES, MAB, the Carpathian Convention, and in the MBC project. As the
network analysis in Chapter 5 found, it is these tightly knit sub-networks that can
provide significant support for resilient governance. The CITES ivory case exemplifies
this with controversy at the point that there are no networks but throw the elephant
study groups, monitoring groups, and just generally expanded stakeholders to create
very trusted networks in the arrangement.
The most insightful aspect appears to be the importance of the policy ratchet
effect and the weakness of stable bargaining outcomes or rule enforcement as crucial
mechanisms in the arrangements. The policy ratchet effect is conditions where new
constituencies are brought into the governance arrangement and this creates a new
base of support for improving governance. The MAB development is one example of
this where sustainable development in the 1980s allowed the members to expand to a
whole host of human-impacted sites for expansion of the program. This new
constituency then proved crucial in pushing the project to further deepen its focus on
development of communities and creative protected areas. Similar arrangements are
seen in CITES, the Carpathian Convention (with its network expansion efforts), and the
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MBC in El Salvador. This finding is significant when compared to some of the other
possible mechanisms for governance arrangement updating: stable bargaining
outcomes and rule enforcement. CITES is notorious as a treaty that has significant
enforcement capabilities with sanctions being used many times to ensure compliance.
MAB’s delisting procedures can be similarly an enforcement mechanism. However,
aside from those examples, there is not clear support that either reaching political
economy bargaining outcomes nor robust enforcement regimes are necessary. The
outlier is the CBD which for the most part does not have any of the mechanisms and yet
does have high authoritative capability. Although there is some competition at a variety
of levels, the CBD is generally treated as the preeminent forum for biodiversity issues
and although it does not have consistent constituencies, it has a constantly large
number of groups attending and participating. This preeminent position may explain its
authoritative capability while the other mechanisms are largely lacking.
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Case of
Positive
Authoritative
Capability

Relevant Generative Mechanisms on Authoritative Capability
Circumventing Trust in
Projects
Local
Networks

Policy
Ratchet
Effect

Stable
Bargaining
Outcome

Rule
Enforcement

X

X

X

X

X

X

CBD
CITES
MAB

X

Carpathian
X
X
Convention
Mesoamerican X
X
X
Biodiversity
Corridor
X=Clear Evidence of Mechanism
=Clear disconfirmation of Mechanism
Table 3.4- Relevant Generative Mechanisms on Authoritative Capability in high
authoritative capability cases.
Adaptive capacity in resilient systems can be fed by a number of different
directions and the difference is really who are the merchants of ideas. Trial and Error
Experimentation (as defined in Chapter 2) consists of a wide range of learners spread
out throughout a governance arrangement with some system of idea exchange. The
Development of Network Norms consists of agreement throughout the network of basic
ideas and then diffusion through membership requirements, meetings, publications, etc.
Institutionalized Persuasion involves learning facilitated by the Secretariat of various
offices or external formal institutions. Ideational entrepreneurship is that mechanism
where a set of experts, working outside of the governance arrangement sharing a
similar basis of evidential requirements begins to articulate policy propositions for the
governance institution. Epistemic communities can be active in these various activities,
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but should be considered to be most active in ideational entrepreneurship and
institutionalized persuasion.
Across the cases, there is significant evidence of ideational entrepreneurship
happening from a variety of different levels. Consensus based expert committees are
important in the Ramsar commission with a coherent wetland experts committee that
has significantly improved the guidelines in the organization, MAB’s committee was
substantially important in pushing adaptation, and the international mountain groups
that had been active since the 1980s were crucial in the Carpathian Convention. There
does not appear to be the same level of activity in the MBC case, but it is possible that
CATIE experts in Costa Rica or other people and parks entrepreneurs like PRISMA in El
Salvador were important. The crafting of ideas in expert groups and articulating those
for policymakers is thus a crucial part of adaptive response. Similarly important across
different cases is trial and error experimentation which is a crucial aspect of adaptation
in the MBC and MAB cases. There are signs of such systems operating in Ramsar and
the Carpathian Convention, but the processes are weak at this point.
Interestingly, the development of network norms (or socialization) and
institutionalized persuasion are found to be weakly important and both cases where
they show impact, ideational entrepreneurship appears to be more significant of an
impact. The development of shared standards across a network and the use of this to
support learning throughout is only clearly evident in the MAB case, although there may
be the beginning forms of this in the MBC and Ramsar. MAB global and national
committee networks are crucial in diffusing the agreements of Madrid and Seville into
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various situations around the world. The integration of local-community participation
throughout the MAB network, for instance, was largely driven by local managers
connecting with national committees to change their approach (Schultz, Duit, and Folke
2011). However, this may rely more on ideational entrepreneurship of key scientific
community rather than a pure case of the impact of socialization. Similarly, institutional
persuasion or top-down learning seems to only be the case, and with weak impacts, in
the Ramsar Convention. The activity of the technical panel in Ramsar is largely as a
mouthpiece for the wetland epistemic community to influence, update guidebooks and
gradually impact wetland management around the world. Any learning impact in
Ramsar though is probably more a result of the coherent wetland expert group
ideational entrepreneurship and not the institutionalized persuasion. In addition, there
is a negative case where the secretariat controversy in CITES appears to be a clear
example of an attempt at institutionalized persuasion with negative resiliency effects.
This form appears to have little impact in the case of MAB, Carpathian Convention or
the MBC which rely upon different, less directed forms of learning primarily.
Socialization and top-down learning then find limited support in the biodiversity cases.
The conclusion will expand on this finding as it seems to have highly relevant
implications for wider issues.
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Case of
Positive
Adaptive
Capacity

Relevant Generative Mechanisms on adaptive capacity
Trial and Error
Development
Experimentation of Network
Norms

Ramsar
MAB

Institutionalized Ideational
Persuasion
Entrepreneurship
X

X

X

X
X

Carpathian
X
Convention
Mesoamerican X
Biological
Corridor
X=Clear Evidence of Mechanism
=Clear Lack of Mechanism
Table 3.5- Relevant generative mechanisms on adaptive capacity in high adaptive
capacity cases.

Many of the mechanisms of adaptive capacity and authoritative capability
appear to be quite complementary with one another. Trust in small networks and
ideational entrepreneurship, for example, are analytically and empirically quite related
to one another. In addition trust in small networks and the policy ratchet effect seem to
be rather consistent intertwined mechanisms. However, circumventing projects does
not appear to be necessarily a collaborative mechanism with any of the other
mechanisms and thus may simply be one pathway amongst many of producing
resilience. In addition, some of the other mechanisms that hold in a few cases appear to
come at the expense of resilient mechanisms. Rule enforcement and stable bargaining
outcomes appear in the cases as crucial aspects of the CBD and CITES which are both
groups that see the limited existence bottom-up learning procedures. CITES sees
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institutionalized persuasion as one key early attempt with problematic impacts,
especially when combined with the politicized science that exists in both examples. This
highlights one of the key findings from this analysis, that authoritative capability and
adaptive capacity made tradeoff with one another at key points. The CBD and CITES
present ideal opportunities for further study to identify exactly how such a tradeoff
exists in practice.
Resilience in Biodiversity Governance
The network structure argument finds general support in the positive cases of
resilience. The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor’s adaptation and authoritative
capability is created by projects that connect local-governments with multiple
international funders in biodiversity projects outside of the central state and trial and
error local experimentation with different biodiversity approaches. This is a largely
undirected process, largely a result of multiple communities responding to natural
disasters in ways which are separate from one another but similar. UNESCO’s Man and
Biosphere governance arrangement responded to political shock in the 1980s by
expanding its focus with sustainable development into Africa, Latin America and
Southeast Asia. Expanding its constituency through active engagement with the central
MAB network resulted in an adaptive agenda integrating in a host of additional creative
procedures and programs. The Carpathian Convention has engaged a host of different
stakeholders in its program which has allowed it to quickly push a new protocol on
biodiversity protection with a large emphasis on the ecosystem perspective. These
cases closely adhere to the network structure theory of resilience.
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The cases analyzed above similarly show that mechanisms which adhere to the
network structure theory are the most important. Undirected action is prominent in
many of the limiting examples: including the CBD and the Ramsar Convention.
However, these limited actions rarely cohere into any adaptive change in the
governance arrangement (Sawyer 2004). This finding is potentially significant in refining
the network structure theory in that it finds that it is not sufficient for a governance
arrangement to encourage multi-actor, undirected action. This type of governance is
deployed actively in the CBD with the result of hyper-politicization, adaptation at the
margins, and few coherent constituencies. However, the severe limiting cases, ACTO,
ITTO, and the Bern Convention, are severely constrained by either competitive
governance environments or weak institutional strength so that emergent mechanisms
have little room to develop. So the limiting cases do generally support the overall
argument, but require refinement in order to make it clear precisely what is necessary.
A precarious aspect of modularity governance then is that it may lead to only
limited learning by the governance arrangement.
Small-group trust connected with other small-groups proves crucial for the
authoritative capability, and possibly also the adaptive capacity, aspect of resilience by
providing groups that are committed to the governance arrangement, but not
completely unconnected. There are clear examples of this process being crucial in the
MBC, MAB, and in post-1996 CITES which is an organization with significantly improved
authoritative capability. Local government networks in El Salvador (Chapter 5)
organized for very different goals became crucial in adapting biodiversity governance
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strategies and introducing them into the network in various places. In MAB, the policy
ratchet effect is largely about building trust in small pockets of national committees and
then expanding them through the system through a variety of reflexive and consensual
processes. CITES segmentation of issues into smaller groups has slowly achieved this as
parties have began to trust the results from micro-groups which retain themselves in
the overall hierarchy. This dynamic of small-groups with trust between them is one of
the key pieces of evidence from the evaluation of network evolution. The argument is
that these provide simultaneously redundancy and modularity to the governance
system which are crucial aspects for resilience (Anderies and Janssen 2011). Smallgroups connected with other small-groups tend to be highly redundant in their
connections with another, often with shared ideas (whether ideological in ex-FMLN
communities in El Salvador or epistemic in the case of the MAB) or shared conditions
(the Usulután activity in biodiversity policy is largely influenced by the land reform
networks established- Chapter 5). However, in addition, these groups prevent shocks to
the authority of the overall network from moving throughout the network. When the
U.S. and U.K. withdrew from UNESCO the shock certainly impacted the overall
organization, but national committees (including those in the U.S. and U.K.) were able to
continue their activities and participate in the ratcheting up of the organization. This
modularity provides a system that can protect itself from wider political shocks which
can prove crucial in international biodiversity governance. This is lacking in all of the
limiting cases that either have small-groups unconnected to other actors, ACTO and the
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Bern Convention, or do not have such small-group activity at all in the organization,
ITTO, Dominican Republic, Ramsar Convention.
However, at the same time, a limiting condition on the situation would be
hierarchical ordering mechanisms which either make the arrangements an environment
of dominance by one small-group or put it in competition with other governance
arrangement. The Dominican case study highlights excellently these situations at the
same time. A strong conservation national system has allowed an active epistemic
community to maintain key relationships with one another and exclusive forum
membership. This group retains prominence and makes the environmental ministry and
international governance arrangements largely go through their significant gatekeeping
role. However, at the same time, this results in a competitive environment with the
tourist economic sector further weakening the adaptive ability of the arrangement.
Similar processes exist in ITTO and its competitive governance environment with the rise
of non-state certification regimes for forests, the Bern Convention and its competitive
governance environment with EU biodiversity programs, and in ACTO with the large
influence of Brazil over the organization. This is not necessarily related to the strength
of the institutions and institutional weakness may be a significant constraint as
highlighted above; however, hierarchical ordering can weaken any supporting efforts by
the organization.
Effectiveness outcomes in global biodiversity governance
In addition to the diversity in resilience, the 10 cases also have significant
diversity in terms of effectiveness. As defined in Chapter 1, effectiveness is
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simultaneously a political and environmental outcome involving change to human
behaviors and institutions which produce positive and desired environmental outcomes.
For ease in understanding there are three broadly possible outcomes for effectiveness:
1. Ineffective, those agreements which neither shape human institutions nor have an
impact on the environment, 2. Politically effective, those agreements which shape
human institutions but do not impact the environment (often because the changes are
too minor or not well-suited to the problem), and 3. Completely effective, those
agreements which shape human institutions and have a positive impact on the
environment. Few biodiversity governance arrangements have reached the level of
sustained complete effectiveness. However, some have seen improving conditions over
their part, if an agreement is considered effective then that means that it has change
political institutions in some way and been able to show clear improvement in
biodiversity loss as a result.
Cases with No Observed Effectiveness
Five cases have no observed effectiveness at this point and have been seriously
limited in their ability to implement governance strategies. The Carpathian Convention
is too recent of an international biodiversity agreement for full assessment and so will
be excluded from the discussion. The other cases with no observed effectiveness then
include the Amazon Cooperative Treaty Organization (ACTO), International Tropical
Timber Organization (ITTO), the Bern Convention, and the Ramsar Convention. These
four organizations have had limited impact on locations with the Ramsar Convention
having the largest impact in the creation of wetland protected areas, but limited impact
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in all of these areas. ACTO has produced few institutions and not significantly changed
behavior in any measurable manner. ITTO, Bern Convention, and Ramsar Convention
have all changed institutions and behaviors, but these have been very limited or
cosmetic. ITTO has undertaken some pilot projects, but has for the most part not been
able to establish effective guidelines for implementation in various countries. Both
Ramsar and the Bern Convention have been significantly limited in their ability to
review, delist, and encourage improvements to their sites. Ramsar is more advanced in
these aspects than Bern and with more time may began showing political effectiveness;
however, right now, there is no observed effectiveness of either agreement.
These cases are similarly some of the lowest in terms of resilience. The last
chapter demonstrated that ITTO, Bern Convention, and ACTO are low in terms of both
adaptive capacity and authoritative capability. The Ramsar Convention is relatively high
in terms of authoritative capability but as of yet limited in terms of integration of
adaptive ideas. The argument pursued in the last chapter is that many of these
organizations are institutionally constrained, clear in the case of ITTO, ACTO, and the
Ramsar Convention and with the overlapping EU and Council of Europe biodiversity
politics of the Bonn Convention may also be said to exist there.
These cases then may be clear examples of where effectiveness and resilience
overlap. In situations that are institutionally weak, it would appear highly unlikely that a
governance arrangement would be either effective or resilient. A strong enough
institutional space to make clear the authoritative structure and to facilitate adaptive
learning appears to be crucial to both resilience and effectiveness. Below some
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institutional strength threshold, it would appear unlikely for either processes to operate
effectively.
Cases with Political Effectiveness
There are a host of other projects which have demonstrated political
effectiveness in creating and changing human institutions, but have not shown
significant results in terms of environmental improvement. The clear cases include the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Caribbean Challenge. If a full evaluation of
the Carpathian Convention’s impacts were available, it would most likely be here. Both
of these governance arrangements have been very effective at spurring the creation of
protected areas around the world; however, they have been limited in their ability to
change how those areas are managed or to see wider impacts on biodiversity generally.
In terms of effectiveness, both the CBD and the Caribbean Challenge have set
significant goals of creating protected areas and both have in general met those goals.
The problems come about through meeting the specifics of those goals (such as creation
of marine protected areas or coverage in multiple biomes) and in creating effective
ways to ensure those protected areas achieve positive biodiversity outcomes. This has
limited any clear evidence of environmental effectiveness and most analyses find that
these are both going to be limited without ensuring protected areas improve
management and reaching out to greater different biomes. The effectiveness has then
been in the political creation of rules and institutions, but limited in terms of if those
rules have been implemented in a meaningful fashion or if they are having a political
impact.
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In terms of resilience, these cases are of different orders with the Caribbean
Challenge largely having a narrow set of authoritative capability and the CBD having
limited adaptive capacity. However, they similarly demonstrate that changed political
institutions hits a wall very rapidly if it does not come with expanded authoritative
capability to implement those decisions. Although the CBD has a wide range of actors
involved and the ability to develop international guidelines, it is limited in terms of
effectiveness by the inability to see those decisions mean much on the ground. The
Caribbean Challenge is similarly limited by the domestic elite in the Dominican Republic
who constrain the ability to develop new rules. A major lesson then about the
relationship between resilience and effectiveness is that domestic elites can be
constraining on both processes. Although national actors are crucial to any governance
processes, they can similarly skew such processes to augment their own interests.
Cases with Political Effectiveness and Environmental Effectiveness
CITES, the MAB project, and the MBC have all shown the most significant levels
of environmental effectiveness in the biodiversity realm. Not all have been universally
effective, but all have shown significant examples of both political effectiveness and
sustained political development. This section will explore each example in terms of
their effectiveness and then conclude with the discussion regarding the relationship
between relationship and effectiveness.
CITES has proved a difficult agreement for there to be clear analysis about its
environmental effectiveness because of its limited scope on trade in endangered
species. The result is that CITES could be quite effective at stopping trade related
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impacts on particular species, but habitat destruction, domestic use, and large scale
problems like global warming continue destroying the species. This problem has made
assessment of CITES difficult to ascertain. Curlier and Anderson look at the prominent
species (such as the African elephant and crocodile species), and the most commercially
valuable and politically contested species in CITES, to find that CITES has been of limited
effectiveness but with some improving potential (Curlier and Andresen 2002). Similarly
the 2000 IUCN evaluation of CITES confronted this by looking at a group of select taxa to
assess effectiveness and similarly finds some limited improvement (effectiveness over
spotted cats, ineffective over rhinoceros species)(IUCN- The World Conservation Union
2000). This is also a similar method as that used by WWF for its 2012 Enforcement
Scorecard that focused on illegal trade of select taxa in different countries (Nowell
2012). In terms of political effectiveness, CITES (working significantly with IUCN) has
developed significant monitoring of trade in species around the world. Membership has
expanded and with some financial help, countries around the world have standardized
and increased regulation in customs offices. However, this has not always had clear
impact on the conservation of species.
Rather than taking a limited view with the taxa that have sufficient information,
there are two other holistic measures possible for assessing effectiveness. One measure
is to evaluate the movement of species between the two Appendices of CITES. This
measure was originally proposed by Wijnstekers contending that every species that
moves from Appendix II to Appendix I is a clear sign of treaty failure while moves from
Appendix I to Appendix II is a sign of treaty effectiveness (Wijnstekers 1995). Updating
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those findings from 1995 shows that although in the early years of the agreement the
primary movement was from Appendix II to Appendix I (showing ineffective treaty
implementation); however, since 1997 more species have been moving from Appendix I
to Appendix II (showing improved treaty implementation) making a larger percentage of
the overall listing moves each year (See Table 7.1). A second measure is to look at the
Review of Significant Trade and analyze the species with improving measures. The
Reviews in the Animal and Plants committees focus on the trade and impacts in a
variety of countries on a variety of species. The record is mixed with some particularly
problematic states, but there has been significant improvement in general in the
Reviews for the past decade. Both of these measures show holistic effectiveness
measures that support the taxa specific conclusions. CITES has been effective over
many realms but is constrained in some range countries and over some key species.
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Figure 3.1- Species listing movement in CITES from 1979-2010.
UNESCO’s MAB program has developed regular requirements on members and
assessments of the biodiversity impacts in its conservation areas and wider areas of
society. In contrast to the CBD or the Caribbean efforts, the MAB has been effective at
creating protected areas, expanding to countries not covered earlier, and doing that.
The question is two-fold to assess environment effectiveness: a. have areas had an
impact and b. how many have had an impact. Secondary literature provides partial
coverage for both of these questions. Between 2001 and 2011 a number of
assessments appeared in articles in different journals. 15 different case studies with
significant evidence show 8 with positive outcomes, 6 with negligible environmental
outcomes, and 1 with no clear outcome. With over 500 biosphere reserves, the 15 that
have received significant scholarly attention is quite limited. However, geographic
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disparity is quite positive with 6 from Asia, 1 from Europe, 3 from North America, 3 from
South America, and 2 from Africa. Additional study occurs within the MAB itself and
shows similarly that while not all biosphere reserves have a positive impact, a significant
number have shown positive impacts in both core and buffer zones. The conclusion
then is that MAB has shown significantly positive impacts with its Biosphere Reserves,
but that this is not true in all cases. In addition, increasing requirements and
evaluations in the organization appears to be improving outcomes(Price, Park, and
Bouamrane 2010). The result then is some significant effectiveness within the project
although in many cases this does not happen.
The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor similarly has shown differing degrees of
political and environmental effectiveness. While Belize and Costa Rica showed little
political willingness to expand protected areas or buffer zones, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
and El Salvador all demonstrated minor expansion at first followed by more significant
expansion after 2004. El Salvador is the most dramatic case, but both of the other
countries similarly experienced project led growth. These efforts have been effective at
restoring significant areas and are a partial contribution to the forest resurgence in El
Salvador. Although it is not possible to fully assess their effectiveness, study in the areas
created through the circumvention projects in El Salvador has shown significant
improvement to the coherence and status of the created areas (Hecht, Kandel, and
Gomez 2006, Valencia et al. 2011)
Importantly, two of these show high levels of resilient governance and the third
is limited in some adaptive aspects but shows high authoritative capability. What is
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unique about these cases, in the universe of cases, is their distinctive modular
structures. CITES divides specialist groups out and has NGOs like IUCN assess and
monitor illegal trade. UNESCO’s MAB project divides into national groups and has
expert management core of experts at international meetings. The MBC is similarly
structured in a highly modular structure. Each is limited in their effectiveness to some
extent by this process but it may be the modular structure which causes resilience and
effectiveness to overlap if at all. The modular structure allows progress on some areas
and zones while others stay limited.
Augmenting Effectiveness and Resilience
The findings above show that effectiveness and resilience are not necessarily
coordinated processes but that there are key conditions for both outcomes. In order to
achieve both, governance arrangements have to find effective means for 1. Institutional
Strength, 2. Preventing Governance Capture and 3. Limiting Political Contagion. Each of
these barriers will be discussed in terms of both their empirical support and avenues for
operationalizing and additional study of the barriers for the study of global
environmental governance.
Institutional Strength
This study makes a unique contribution to effectiveness studies is clearly
identifying a tipping point to the argument about institutional strength. Biodiversity
governance shows that institutional strength can be absolutely constraining for the
ability of governance to be effective or to adapt into an effective effort. This presents a
corollary to the hypothesis that institutional strength causes effective governance by
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finding that any relationship is not linear but of a tipping point type. Below a certain
level of institutional strength, effectiveness or resilience is unlikely. Above that level,
institutional strength contributes to resilience to an equal amount and not an increasing
amount. The corollary hypothesis then is: Institutions with limited institutional strength
are unlikely to develop into stronger agreements if they cannot effectively transmit
ideas throughout the organization.
The evidence assembled here shows is that this problem of institutional strength
is one common to both resilience and effectiveness, but not in a linear fashion. The
Convention on Biological Diversity is, by many measures, the strongest biodiversity
institution and the Caribbean efforts have stronger institutions than the Central
American efforts. However, if institutions fail to reach a certain level to allow
transmission of ideas and clarity of authority, then it is highly unlikely that the
institution will show either resilience or effectiveness. ACTO provides the clearly
constraining case where the institution is unable to coordinate efforts in the region and
its biodiversity projects. Without even a loose coordination role, it appears unlikely that
the agreement can mobilize into a more effective arrangement. ITTO and Ramsar are
both examples where weak institutions with limited ability to coordinate efforts have
been dealt with recently but with less than significant improvement. Both are
constrained and if to see significant improvement on the road to significance will require
expenditure of key political power and will most likely not come from within the
organizations themselves.
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In contrast, other governance arrangements have been able to work on growth
of authoritative capacity internally with some organized coordination, even if very
limited. UNESCO’s MAB project, the MBC, the Bern Convention, CITES, and the CBD are
all arrangements which may not have the most significant institutional strength, but
have a sufficient capability to augment their authority slowly. One condition which is
important is to have a key coordinating organization with connections to other
organizations. Ramsar, ITTO, and ACTO are relatively unconnected in many aspects,
while the other cases of the biodiversity governance programs are more connected with
other agreements. Formal embedding is one aspect that is common in many of the
more effective arrangements but loose connections are similarly important.
One major issue that study of international environmental governance has been
focusing on recently is institutional linkages (Aggarwal 1998, Jinnah 2011, Young 1996,
Oberthur and Gehring 2006). This is recognized in practice in biodiversity as well with
the creation of the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-Related Conventions and other
coordinated efforts. In addition, many of the agreements have also developed linkages
with trade agreements. The CBD is an essential organization developing a variety of
links and fostering multiple connections. This study does not directly evaluate the
impacts of linkages on effective or resilient governance, however the findings can
highlight important aspects about this. Oberthur and Gehring specifically explain how
modular network processes, like emphasized in this study, can lead to effectiveness.
They write “interaction between nested institutions may help extend an obligation from
a smaller institution to an institution with a larger membership and similar objectives.
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Because all members of the smaller institution will tend to favor the extension of the
obligation, the relevant coalition in the bigger institution will be strengthened”
(Oberthur and Gehring 2006). This may be one international form of the policy ratchet
effect described in the El Salvador case in Chapter 3. Effective linkages and interactions
between institutions can provide the minimum amount of institutional strength
throughout the arrangement while still allowing small groups to make their decisions
and move toward adaptation. For biodiversity governance in this study, this process
appears to work in some key instances. Examples include the nesting of local study
groups in CITES, the nesting of local-local agreements in a web of interactions, and the
agreements manifest as small outputs of scientific communities in CITES, MAB, and the
Carpathian Convention. Nesting and linkages then may present a very useful strategy
for achieving a sufficient amount of institutional strength to allow progression. The risks
of governance capture may remain in the situation and nesting is not a guaranteed
factor, but it offers a productive avenue for achieving sufficient institutional strength.
To put the argument differently, weak institutions are absolutely constraining on
the effectiveness of a governance arrangement. The impacts of weak institutions
though is constraining in two respects: 1. Lack of capacity for effectiveness but also 2.
Lack of ability to take advantage of resilient dynamics to eventually grow into effective
institutions. Diffusion of ideas, feedback, and the policy ratchet effect, all of which are
crucial for resilience, do not
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Governance Capture
A second constraint on resilience and effectiveness is the process of governance
capture or a process where the benefits of governance are distorted through actors
making strategic decisions to benefit themselves or their interests. This problem takes
on a number of different forms like free riding, defection after initial project,
opportunistic definition of the rules, and rent-seeking behavior. Two of these are
particularly important when considering resilience and effectiveness: rent-seeking
behavior and defection. Each of these are constraining factors and each are dealt with
in a variety of ways by biodiversity governance arrangements.
Rent-seeking behavior is manifest in international biodiversity governance when
local and national actors become largely dependent on the funding and technology in
projects but divert the resources to keep funding flowing rather than working primarily
on the problem. Rent seeking behavior happens when actors pursue strategic behavior
to achieve access to resources rather than delivering performance. Projects and
international funders provide rents in terms of funding, connections, and resources. In
worst situations, recipients pursue projects for the resources and not for any interest in
environmental action and strategically keep projects unfulfilled to continue receiving
funding. In better situations, recipients simply adhere to project provisions without
local experimentation or learning.
The second problem confronting actors, and one they are very aware of, is that
of short-term gains followed by defection when the projects end. This problem arises
when local and national actors fit projects to receive funding but not adapt any deeper
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implementation of the projects goals. When environmental change only occurs for the
length of the project and then terminates or moves to a new trend in international
funding, then the impact and resilience of the governance arrangement is limited. The
CBD may be an example of both of these features constraining its effectiveness. With
broad guidelines that can be interpreted in a strategic manner there has been the rise of
a number of projects but without significant depth in these efforts. Study into the
lasting nature of environmental projects is necessary for a full assessment of this
problem; however, it is a key problem which may constrain a number of different
governance arrangements in the current milieu.
Effective and resilient governance arrangements deploy a number of ways to
limit the problems of rent-seeking behavior. Listing procedures provide a means of
certification and providing the lasting of projects and increasing their provisions.
Funding from MAB is limited and provides only limited non-technical funds which
effectively limit rent seeking behavior by actors. The MBC in Central America does not
have an effective mechanism to deal with either problems. However, the analysis in
Chapter 3 contends that there is a deeper interest behind the circumvention projects in
local communities, in terms of response to natural disasters, which may provide some
control on the features. In these instances rent-seeking or shallow projects would be
unlikely as long as lessons from natural disasters are present. CITES ban provisions are
quite controversial in many of the assessments and by key members of the CITES
community; however, this highly restrictive process with only very contentious
allowances of trade may provide some key limitation on these provisions. States that
146

want to sell legal ivory, for instance, have such an up-hill battle that their commitment
to conservation and health of the species has to be quite established. Similar to the
MBC, in the CITES there are clear motivations by local actors working against clear rentseeking or shallow project processes.
Political Contagion
This is an oft-noted but not fully analyzed problem of environmental governance.
The condition is one where contestation in one realm results in contestation in other
realms of governance. This may occur through strategic actors who are using some
forum of governance to push arguments in other, as may happen in politicization of
science in the CBD for example. However, it may also occur simply as factions and large
issues contested in one sphere became important in another sphere. The early years of
CITES for example saw contestation move between the different committees with each
one being part of a larger struggle on whether to ban or regulate trade in endangered
species. Political contagion can be a constraining factor on governance by making
political shocks unmanageable, constraining adaptation by limiting the perceived truth
from scientific bodies, and by leading to protracted struggles on small adaptations. As
noted above, agreements that show effectiveness are those which can control this
through the creation of different governance modules insulated from some political
contagion.
Modularity is considered a key aspect in ecosystem studies of resilience because
it allows individual groups of species or components of the ecosystem to remain
relatively safe from disease, natural disasters, etc. The argument is that you want
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connected systems so that feedback mechanisms can operate, but tightly coupled,
connected systems are particularly vulnerable to contagion type shocks. Similarly, the
U.S. power grid is tightly coupled making it a particularly brittle system (Lovins and
Lovins 2001). Modularity is an abstract notion that looks at divisions between the
different parts of the population for whether there are buffers and transmission
processes that can constrain harmful inputs while allowing positive inputs. Systems
should be connected while remaining modular for resilience.
The biodiversity cases in this study demonstrate that modularity is a crucial
aspect of governance resilience and effectiveness also. A number of cases are beset by
chronic political contagion with disputes from one realm quickly impacting all others.
This is the case in ITTO and the CBD. In both of these cases, contestation travels
throughout the organization rapidly impacting multiple different institutions. This is
also what impacted the early CITES structure with disputes moving into all of the
committees and leading to significant problems with its early operation. Modular cases,
with clear buffers between different actors, include the MAB structure which has
buffers between the scientific body and the political body and some buffer between
different national MAB office, and the CITES structure currently. The MBC’s
decentralized system of governance is similarly modularized with different projects
being loosely connected, but with significant difference. Although the problem is not a
problem in all cases, modularity is a crucial guard against political contagion.
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PREFACE TO CASE STUDIES
The location of institutions can tell you a lot about their relationships with other
institutions. In El Salvador, the Environmental Ministry is on the grounds of the much
larger Agricultural Ministry, a ministry which crucially guides coffee production in the
country and the land reform efforts at the end of the civil war in that country. In the
Dominican Republic, the Environmental Ministry sits on a remote hillside, very far from
the rest of the organs of the government. These two comparisons tell significant
amounts about the networks in which these institutions are embedded. The following
chapters will directly compare these two cases to develop a deeper understanding of
the dynamics identified in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
To organize the case studies, the focus will be on analytic stages in the network
structure theory rather than the development in a single case. Chapter 4 will focus on
the network structures, the processes by which these developed, and their impact on
the learning dynamics within the different governance arrangements. After establishing
this comparative distinction, Chapter 5 will analyze the post-shock efforts at learning in
both governance arrangements. El Salvador saw significant trial and error
experimentation result in the creation of many small-scale biodiversity projects. The
Dominican case, in contrast, saw limited development of new perspectives and largely
reiterated the conservation approach that dominates the biodiversity policy in that
country. Finally, Chapter 6 will show that these different learning dynamics, shaped by
the network structures, result in different outcomes in terms of resilience with the MBC
showing significant resilience and the Caribbean case instead resulting in arrested
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development as an outcome. The cases will highlight some of the key mechanisms an
contexts discussed in the previous chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
NETWORK STRUCTURE IN EL SALVADOR AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Network structure has a significant impact on the response to shock in
governance arrangements. Biodiversity governance in the Caribbean and Central
America both involve extensive national and international networks. Each governance
institution has a network structure both within the institution and in a larger embedded
system. While Central America is best defined as having a modular structure, with a
series of distinct clusters of actors, the Caribbean context is best defined as having a
centralized network structure. These resulted from very different national contexts and
biodiversity politics for the decades before these networks formed. However, the
analysis in later chapters will show that neither national contexts nor the institutions
themselves made the most dramatic difference in terms of resilience, but the network
structure itself.
This chapter will first study El Salvador and the developed network that involved
a number of clusters of connections linked across levels by a network that dealt with
coffee issues. The network structure was thus very modular with broad connections
between different actors, but Dominican context, in contrast, had similar networks at
local, national, and international levels. However, this network was largely centralized
with a dense network of state and non-state actors in the Dominican Republic. The
result is that biodiversity politics in the two national contexts developed in two distinct
network structures. Chapter 4 will argue that following shocks in the middle part of the
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first decade of the 21st century, these network structures shaped the processes of
learning in the different governance arrangements.
The creation of modular networks: El Salvador and the Mesoamerican Biological
Corridor
The modular network for biodiversity governance in El Salvador is both surprising
and significant. The biodiversity network that initially developed in the 1980s and 1990s
appeared to be highly centralized in the environmental ministry and with USAID.
However, following the civil war (1980-1992) and with active post-war reconstruction
and peace efforts, this network developed a series of focused clusters at the local,
national, and international levels. This development provides an excellent check on the
institutional aspect in that some of the networks were designed for very different
purposes and the institutional context was quite limited. The modular network design
in El Salvador then provides an excellent opportunity to see how network structure can
influence the responses to shocks.
The network prior to around 2004 was constructed largely with multiple
different networks with tenuous links to one another creating repeated modules of
action with very small overall connection. The ministry of the environment linked key
actors like the NGO SalvaNatura and the international funding through FIAES. Both of
these networks were further connected to elite coffee networks, some other NGOs, and
significantly to USAID. However, there was at the same time a number of local-local
networks which had developed in the aftermath of the civil war and which had clear
clusters of action. This local-local set of networks were only partially connected to the
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ministry of environment and international networks at this point; however, there were
enough connections to produce a connected network structure although the clusters
were more finely distinguished at the local level.
For analytic leverage, the description of the different networks and how they
developed will be separated out by different level: starting with the national level which
forms a core of the network, then moving to the international level and the local levels.
The coffee network serves as a key horizontal connector in the overall network at this
period linking local actors and national actors with international actors. The coffee
network will then be presented separately at the end although it will appear at key
moments in the discussion at the other levels of governance.
Environmental Policy Network
The national environmental policy network included a host of actors tied directly
to the Ministry of the Environment as well as environmental NGOs (typically with
international funding). The network appeared held together through a few key bridging
actors with the Environmental ministers (prominently Miguel Eduardo Araujo Padilla
from 1997-1999 and Walter Jokisch, Environmental Minister starting in 2003) serving
roles connecting with a variety of issues. In addition, short-term projects connected
other networks of actors into the environmental policymaking network. Aside from a
shared focus on environmental issues, broadly defined, and a few cooperative reports
and projects, the network was held together by very little. The best descriptor of the
network may be that it was an issue area network held together predominantly by
shared interest rather than either shared values, approach, or goals.
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The early development of the environmental ministry in El Salvador was a
heavily centralized bureaucracy, similar to the larger bureaucratic context in El Salvador.
This military and agro-elite compacted regime which dominated Salvadorian politics for
most of the 20th century had many different projects, goals, and ideological
components; however, centralized governance was one of the major shared
commitments between the military and the agricultural elite. Véliz argued that
throughout Latin America in the mid-20th Century there developed a strong “centralist
disposition” (Véliz 1980). However, in all of Latin America, El Salvador was one of the
countries that pursued centralization with the greatest effort and at almost any cost
(Guillen 2001). This centralization of politics and policy-making in El Salvador sets the
context for much of the natural resource and biodiversity policy to follow.
In the 1970s, El Salvador focused significant resources on building the most
sophisticated environmental monitoring infrastructure in Latin America in its Direccíon
General de Recuersos Naturales [Director General of Natural Resources] (DGRN)
(PRISMA 1995). The DGRN was one office within the Agricultural ministry which was
aimed primarily at developing an environmental monitoring capacity and investigating
possible laws to manage access to the resources. The government started passing a
series of laws, initiating with the 1974 passage of a forestry law, which sought to
centrally manage resource access. All told, the government of El Salvador was
expending significant time and effort at developing a centralized natural resource
strategy.
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Regional efforts were similarly aimed at centralization of management at the
state or regional level. This process of integration has mostly focused on removing
internal barriers to trade and building the capacity for the countries of Central America
to increase trade internally. ODECA’s economic integration efforts had been stalled
since the 1969 El Salvador-Honduras war (Proyecto Estado de la Región 1991).
However, during the 1970s the one area where regional integration was being relatively
lively was in management of protected areas. This area of integration was generating
extensive regional interaction as a result largely of increasing environmental awareness
and support following the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Central America became a
region of significant interest by new international institutions and international donors.
In 1974, the First Reunion Centroamericana Sobre Manejo de Recursos Naturales y
Culturales, developed the first proposal for a regionally connected protected area
system (PROARCA 2003). Although never pushed with any agreements, this proposal
was one of many centralizing efforts in Central America through the 1970s and 1980s.
Centralization was pushed in order to gain access and funding from the large funders for
the entire region rather than getting smaller funds for national projects.
This legacy of centralization gave way to a different network construction
following the civil war from 1980 until 1992. This was the result of three different
factors. First was a split in the oligarchic elite in the country with a split in the coffee
industry, between Asociación Salvadoreña de Beneficiadores y Exportadores de Café
(ABECAFE) and the older La Cafetalera. For Paige, during this split, ABECAFE began to
pursue more decentralized and smaller projects as part of its approach (Paige 1997).
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Second, international aid and organizations began supporting decentralization as a
peace building process and for presumed economic efficiencies. A region overview of
decentralization pressures explains that “economic reformers and international aid
agencies have touted decentralization as the means of reducing the inefficiencies” of
central control and “has also been championed as the route to greater accountability
and transparency of governance” (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999, 7). In the case of
El Salvador, the UN sponsored peace process pushed decentralization as part of the
peace building process. Various pieces of legislation slowly increased fiscal and
authoritative decentralization (Hecht, Kandel, and Gomez 2006). Finally, in many
communities in the country, the civil war created alternative modes of politics which
broke free from the centralized control by the national government. Many of those
communities engaged actively in opposition to the government designed alternative
governments to deal with necessary issues. Many of these alternative programs
(schools, literacy programs, health clinics, and collective dispute settlement) developed
from within the FMLN structure or from liberation theology organizations which had
become active in the areas in the 1970s (Binford 1997). Elizabeth Jean Wood has
documented the emergent growth of agency in El Salvador. Developing from an
inactive, repressed, and disjoined movement, during the civil war there developed a
general “pleasure of agency” in many communities (Wood 2003, 2000). These three
factors created a situations where the environmental network shifted away from the
state bureaucracy.
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The environmental policy network which developed after the civil war then
moved outside of the environmental ministry, but through some clear connections to
that ministry and some of the centers of power. An increasing number of NGOs and
environmental groups became part of the network and could follow independent policy
at certain points. SalvaNatura and FIAES were two large funding projects, with deep
connections to the environmental ministry of El Salvador. In both instances the
Secretary of the Environment held leadership positions and many other people moved
between the bureaucracy and the organizations. SalvaNatura, as explored in Chapter 3,
is a national-level environmental NGO which directly manages Parque El Imposible in
the Western part of the country and engages in other co-management projects
throughout the country. Although in recent years it has developed a regional strategy
incorporating additional areas into its projects, for the era being discussed here the
organization was largely a nationally focused organization. FIAES is a funding
mechanism formed by cooperation between the Environmental Ministry and USAID.
SalvaNatura and FIAES operate as key bridges from the environmental ministry
to wider organizations related to the environment. For SalvaNatura this expanded the
network to many of the primary business organizations in the country, crucially
including: Fundación Salvadoreña para El Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES) and
the Salvadoran Business Council on Sustainable Development (CEDES). The board of
SalvaNatura includes a number of members of the wealthy coffee families in El Salvador:
De Sola, Yarhi, Bloch, Llort and others. FUSADES was created in 1983 in order to
facilitate the development of private sector in the country and was significantly funded
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and supported by USAID (van der Borgh 2000, Rosa 1993). FUSADES promoted and
spearheaded a number of the privatization projects during Cristiani’s Presidential
administration; Cristiani was a key member of FUSADES before assuming the
Presidency. These particular connections prove crucial in connecting these groups to
some of the coffee networks to be explored below. CEDES is similarly composed
significantly of export-oriented business members throughout its organization and was
founded in 1995. For example in the 1990s, of the 30 SalvaNatura board members in
the 1990s, many with positions lasting multiple years, 7 were also members of the
CEDES board of directors in 1995. These connections were primarily developed by a
variety of different individual members and families who maintained membership in
SalvaNatura and in the business networks.
Similarly, FIAES serves as a crucial forum that provides excellent data regarding
the terrain of environmental politics in the country. Although the core membership
always includes members of USAID and the Environmental Ministry of the Government
of El Salvador, the other membership is made up of a rotating members of NGO groups
in El Salvador: many being environmental groups. Two individuals have held leadership
posts in SalvaNatura and held posts in FIAES, both through becoming Environmental
Ministers of El Salvador: Walter Jokisch and Miguel Eduardo Araujo Padilla (Araujo also
was key in FUSADES). Other than that, the FIAES network is largely separate from the
SalvaNatura network with many people providing no overlapping positions between the
organizations. El Centro de Protección para Desastres (CEPRODE), which becomes
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crucial for conservation efforts later in Bosque San Diego La Barra, is drawn in through
these particular efforts.
Outside of this network, or on the edges of it, are some activist or expert groups
that are active in the influence they can have on the environmental network but which
cannot be said (until recently) to be part of the environmental politics network. The two
most important are the Centro Salvadoreño de Tecnologia Apropiada (CESTA) and
PRISMA. Both were formed during the civil war and became particularly active with the
peace process on a host of environmental efforts. CESTA is associated with the Friends
of the Earth international efforts and participates in a host of activism for the
environment. PRISMA is more of an analysis organization with a number of
international connections to fund original research in the context of El Salvador.
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Figure 4.1- Network Map of El Salvador Environmental Governance Network 1993-2003
with important labels of key actors and clusters.

The resulting network produces a number of modular constructions with FIAES
and SalvaNatura split between them with key environmental ministry leaders linking
these two organizations with FUSADES. Figure 4.1 provides the network map of the
environmental governance network during the key period of development from 1993
until 2003. The Government of El Salvador is the most central actor in all aspects with a
significantly high betweeness score. What this means is that the Government of El
Salvador had significant linkages to many actors and serves as particularly crucial in
keeping the network parts together. The Business sector has significant centrality and
connections but not a significantly different betweeness or eigenvector score from
other actors. The best explanation for this is the large number of connections they
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maintain with one another in FUSADES and CEDES but the limited engagement with
other actors. The U.S. Government has a high centrality score, but a significantly
reduced betweeness and eigenvector scores which may lead to a conclusion that they
primarily use connections by other actors as their crucial importance. National NGOs
maintain some centrality, but it is far less on all indicators than other actors. The
conclusion of this network being that the Government of El Salvador and the Business
Sector were crucial central in the Environmental Policy network and National NGOs
were restrained in their activity.
Average
Centrality

Average
Betweeness
Score
10.06167
3.263182
0
1.0253333
2.531
.509
19.81%

Average
Eigenvector

Government of El Salvador
34.35814
11.42105
Business Sector
29.28744
9.883111
U.S. Government
23.529
3.069
National NGO
21.288
6.270907
Other
30.39189
8.580889
Overall Network Average
27.926
8.825
Network Centralization
19.723%
9.49%
Index
Table 4.1- The Average centrality and betweeness scores of various types of actors in
El Salvador environmental network.
CCAD: Regional environmental coordination
Regional conservation experts share a common vision for a unified protected
area network and found a favorable institutional environment in the Central American
Integration System [Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana] (SICA). The network
saw significant concern regarding ecosystem fragmentation in Central America and
sought to expand and connect conservation areas in order to deal with this problem. A
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number of early proposals found resistant institutional spaces, until SICA expanded its
sustainable development efforts and created the first Mesoamerican Biological Corridor
(MBC).
The problem of habitat and ecosystem fragmentation has been a major theme in
conservation biology for decades and has had a significant impact on conservation
planning around the world. The argument initially developed from island biogeographic
studies which emphasized that species diversity on islands is not simply a result of the
size of the islands but the divisions and space between them (MacArthur and Wilson
1963). This insight was quickly translated into guidance for conservation arguing that if
there are two options for protected areas of equal size, the areas with the most
coherent connectivity will see less species extinction (Wilson and Willis 1975).
Connectivity then is the crucial component that is translatable from a focus on
fragmentation for policy (Bennett 2003). Debates were active for many years about
whether a critical size of protected area is necessary or whether multiple, small, linked
protected areas could deliver similar results (Simberloff and Abele 1982), but these
seem to have translated into practice less than the general argument for connectivity.
The problem of fragmentation can be quite severe on even well-defined
biodiversity strategies (Harris 1984). Outside of island habitats, fragmentation results
from ecosystem boundaries, land utilization patterns (clear-cutting, infrastructure
projects, large scale agriculture, and urban expansion), and also from conservation
strategies which are narrowly tailored to specific jurisdictions. The result is that
biodiversity which does not account for ecosystem movements and boundaries may see
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regular degradation with a scale mismatch or may be unable to deal with ecosystem
shocks. For example, with severe tropical forest fires in the late 1990s, bird species
were able to survive to the extent that they could find other refuge habitats in
agroforestry or other areas (Griffith 2000). Wilcox and Murphy contend that “habitat
fragmentation is the most serious threat to biological diversity and is the primary cause
of the present extinction crisis” (Wilcox and Murphy 1985, see also: Collinge 1996).
The response to the question of fragmentation involves developing a host of
different management strategies to deal with the problem. Increased cohesion of
protected areas, corridors to increase connectivity, awareness of the array of protected
areas, and managed use buffer zones are all crucial aspects in dealing with
fragmentation. Bennett argues that the issue of fragmentation and these various
strategies became popular in the 1980s and 1990s because of intuitive aspects for
managers and its tractable application at multiple levels (Bennett 2003). In terms of its
intuitive aspects, many of the articulations construct heuristic geometric suggestions for
conservation area design. The 1980 IUCN World Conservation Strategy, for example,
constructed a table of better and worse designs emphasizing size, spacing, and
connectivity as crucial for conservation area success (IUCN 1980). In the Latin American
context, buffer zones have provided some of the multiscalar projects providing linkages
between different protected areas (Silvius, Bodmer, and Fragoso 2004). The key point
of this discussion is the scale and level of action is a crucial dynamic in which policies
dealing with fragmentations engage. Changes in these dimensions can be crucial
aspects of resilience in governance arrangements.
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Ecosystem fragmentation has been highlighted in Central America for a number
of years as a crucial problem constraining both biodiversity and ecosystem service
provision. Reports in the 1980s emphasized that fragmentation of ecosystems may be a
crucial pressure on the ability to sustain the environmental health of Central America
(Leonard 1987). More recent reviews have similarly emphasized the problem of
fragmentation. Harvey, et. al. emphasized increasing fragmentation in Central America
driven significantly from export agriculture, increasing urbanization, and divided
jurisdictional issues as the crucial issue in biodiversity pressures in the region (Harvey et
al. 2008). The UNEP 2010 assessment of the environment in Latin America and the
Caribbean emphasized fragmentation as a problem particularly acute in Central America
and parts of the Amazon (UNEP 2010).
The problem of ecosystem fragmentation and the attempt to solve it with
increased connectivity of protected areas in Central America had a long history of
proposals, but the first real developments on the issue started in the early 1990s with
the creation of SICA and its environmental body the Central American Commission on
Environment and Development (CCAD).
Although it became the environmental arm of SICA, CCAD actually preceded the
latter by two years being founded in 1989. The initial 1989 CCAD agreement required
the states in the region to create an environmental office and to organize a National
Environmental Commission [Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente] (CONAMA) made
up of relevant ministers in the government dealing with environmental affairs. The
implementation of this agreement varied across the different cases with some countries
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creating environmental ministries which could organize and direct the activity of
CONAMA: this was the case in Guatemala and Costa Rica. In the contrasting case of El
Salvador, the environmental office was weekly funded, contained in the agricultural
ministry which largely dominated its work, and CONAMA primarily did not function
(PRISMA 1995, 2). The initial support, impetus, and funding for CCAD, and many of the
CONAMAs at the national level, was largely supplied by USAID.
CCAD was supported significantly in 1991 with the creation of SICA and the
ending of the old ODECA system (Chamorro Marin and Najera 1996). However, the
tasks of the organization were significantly different from those of ODECA in two
respects. First, as part of the ‘new regionalism’, SICA aimed less for regional efforts at
infrastructure and inward development and more towards improving the regional
access in global markets (Bull 1999). Second, it augmented this economic agenda with a
host of other issues. As expressed in the Esquipulas Accords, SICA aimed to make
Central America into a region of peace, liberty, democracy, and development (Secretaria
General de SICA 1993). Specific focuses of SICA identified by the ministers were dealing
with reducing extreme poverty and improved environmental protection. CCAD became
the organ of SICA tasked with dealing with the environmental agenda. Spearheading
the development of SICA were the key regional actors: Organization of American States,
Inter-American Development Bank, and the Costa Rican administration of Oscar Arias
(but other states played key roles later), and some significant assistance came from
international actors like the European Union.
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At around the same time in 1990 and 1991, the first sustained efforts at creating
a program for a regional conservation strategy was being crafted. Archie Carr III, a
professor working on conservation issues at the University of Florida, was bringing
together a group of conservationist groups and individuals to develop a plan for the
Paseo Pantera. Carr had a long history of working with the development of
conservation areas in Costa Rica (there is now a wildlife refuge named after him there),
particularly around the issue of sea turtles and had worked significantly with many of
the most active NGOs in the United States dealing with biodiversity in Central America,
namely the Wildlife Conservation Society. The project brought together the Wildlife
Conservation Society, the Caribbean Conservation Corporation, Tropical Research and
Development Inc., USAID, and researchers at the University of Florida to develop a plan
focused primarily on creating a corridor system of conservation areas. The plan found
key support in the conservation NGOs in the United States and in the developing
ecotourism industry. In the 1992 IVth World Congress on National Parks and Protected
Areas, the Paseo Pantera project was promoted as a project for development of more
ecotourism in Central America (Kaiser 2001, Illueca 1997).
Paseo Pantera aimed to create additional conservation zones that linked already
existing conservation areas to one another. The Paseo Pantera would link protected
areas from Southern Mexico down all the way to Colombia, but would not include any
projects in El Salvador (Illueca 1997). The focus of the project on creation of
conservation areas and ecotourism was met with skepticism by indigenous

166

organizations and rural organizations and so the plan never received the support by the
collected governments of Central America through SICA or CCAD.
1994 was a year of “extraordinary effervescence” in terms of regional
environmental efforts in Central America (Ferrer 2000). The development in SICA of its
Alliance for Sustainable Development [Alianza para el Desarrollo Sostenible] (ALIDES)
was aimed at introducing an environmental agenda into the economic integration
efforts and developing some specific environmental aims within the organization.
Although some initial assessments saw ALIDES as the first sign of a truly different
integration effort (Schatan 1998), the integration of the sustainable development
concept into economic integration efforts has been partial and incomplete (Zavala
1999). ALIDES though does direct the work of CCAD and provide some specific goals and
some general approaches to the issue. One of the key proposals specified in the ALIDES
project was for a regional protected areas corridor project (PROARCA 2003).
The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) was agreed to in 1997, with a
substantial focus on the sustainable development guidelines from ALIDES. The aim of
the project was to connect some of the main protected areas in Central America
together through a series of creative, context-specific biodiversity linkage projects in a
regional “mosaic” of biodiversity protection (the ‘mosaic’ metaphor was used
repeatedly in interviews with planners of the original project). The project included all
seven countries in Central America and soon included the southern five states in
Mexico. Some initial funding from GEF and GTZ supported exploratory work and with
major funding from the World Bank and NASA, the MBC opened regional coordinating
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offices in Managua, Nicaragua and began supporting a series of efforts in the countries
involved (Miller, Chang, and Johnson 2001). The Regional Office Coordinating Unit in
Managua organized a host of different efforts in the region in order to push for the
development of the projects in the various different countries. The NASA, World Bank,
CCAD agreement formalizing this arrangement specified that the Regional Office should
act as “a coordination hub within CCAD’s institutional framework to standardize data
and information, provide regional overviews on common resource management
problems and integrate the basic parameters that link socio-economic and
environmental processes” (CCAD Joint Declaration 2002). As a hub, the Regional office
connected projects and tried to provide funds to national projects, but provided few
mandates.
Building from some of the key, large, and established conservation areas in Costa
Rica, the Honduran-Nicaragua border, and Belize/Guatemala/Mexico border region, the
MBC began a process of creating a series of proposed corridors connecting these
projects. However, the created corridor dimensions were largely the result of domestic
political bargaining rather than developed from a regional plan or scientific input. The
significant region-wide census by NASA and the World Bank came after most of the
initial plans for corridors had been drawn up. Kaiser summarized the early development
of the project by finding that “it includes hundreds of strips, many just 2 or 3 kilometers
wide, connecting both big parks and tiny protected areas… it's unclear whether some of
these planned corridors would confer much ecological benefit” (Kaiser 2001, 2197).
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Differentiated zoning (with core zones, buffer zones, corridor zones, and
multiple-use zones) was a key tool in this approach aiming to provide a wider area of
managed use in order to maximize the overall protection of biodiversity within
protected areas. The goal is for an integrated biodiversity strategy involving core
conservation areas, buffer zones of limited human activity, corridors connecting
different areas of conservation areas, and multiple-use zones which take account of the
other zones in their planning but can have significant human activity. Core zones are
the only zones which have clear definitions and are typically clearly spatially defined
(Miller, Chang, and Johnson 2001). The other zone concepts are often vaguely defined
and what constitutes a buffer or corridor zone is not clearly specified in CCAD
guidelines.
As a network, the early phase of the MBC largely included national level
bureaucrats in the relevant countries, some local park managers, CCAD technicians,
NASA in the United States, and the World Bank/GEF. One of the major problems, as will
be shown next chapter, is that this network did not extend very deeply in the countries
and thus was primarily a high-level project without connections to a wider network.
What this meant in practice was that the network largely adhered to the national
networks that existed. Since one of the fundamental growths of the network in the
MBC was into the country of El Salvador, the modular structure of the environmental
policy network is important.
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Local-Local Networks
A final relevant set of networks involves various Local-Local Networks that
developed at the end and after the civil war which linked together a variety of
communities. Three relevant networks to be discussed briefly include the FMLN
municipal network that developed over elections in 1994, 1997, and 2000, the Programa
de Transferencia de Tierras (PTT), and the other municipal networks that developed
through dynamics at the national and international level. None of these networks could
be said to have a particular environmental focus during the years 1993-2003. However,
they provide crucial networks whose later integrations into relevant biodiversity efforts
allow key testing of some of the hypotheses. Although significant network analysis is
not available for each discussion, it is possible to discern possible important effects that
could develop from these networks.
The FMLN municipal network built largely out of a post-war generation of
FMLN civil servants that were not from the party hierarchy but instead operated very
locally. These municipal actors were confronted simultaneously by a central
government dominated by a hostile party, ARENA, and a party structure that largely
limited their input within the FMLN. Alliances between mayors and other municipal
actors were thus crucial during this timeframe. Manning writes, for example, that
“FMLN mayors have demonstrated flexibility and creativity in working at the municipal
level, well beyond even the rhetoric the party has been able to muster for its national
campaign platform. They have courted alliances with other parties; have worked with
donors and civil society organizations to broaden citizen participation in decision
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making” (Manning 2007, 267). It will be highlighted below that through COMURES, the
FMLN, ARENA, and other parties at municipal levels crossed party borders in other
networks; however, here the argument is that local-local FMLN networks may serve as a
unique network relevant for observing results. The network is those communities who
voted in the FMLN as mayors in the municipal elections of 1994, 1997, or 2000. The
FMLN network grew gradually over each year and they were a significant number of the
overall municipal governments and a significant part of the population. Local elections
are notably not necessarily endorsements of the FMLN’s platform and there are clear
cases of municipalities that temporarily rejected the ARENA party and embraced the
FMLN but were probably very restrained within the network. Thus, the repeat
engagements by municipalities should be a crucial aspect highlighted by social network
analysis.
Figure 3.3 presents a network map of the municipal governments which joined
the FMLN network in the municipal elections of 1994, 1997, or 2000. Similar to the
other network maps, the more central an actor represents their general centrality in the
network as a whole. The result is a large mass of very connected across with large parts
of the middle clouded with multiple connections between the nodes. The general
network terrain then is not particularly distinctive, until the specific years of joining the
network are joined. The colors in the network then represent different years of
connections being created with the center part composed of a few municipalities that
joined in 1994 and a number that joined in 1997. This core of the municipal network
may be crucial for hypothesis evaluation and if the network is relevant some key growth
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in biodiversity projects should come from some of those central communities, and it
may even be possible to see some of the movement of the corridor idea through the
network. In this respect Table 4.2 lists some of the communities with significantly high
Freeman Betweenness scores in the network.
List of Communities with High
Betweennees Scores
Las Vueltas
Tecoluca
El Paisnal
Arcatao
Las Flores
Suchitoto
San Antonio Los Ranchos
Jocoatique
Perquin
Torola
Armenia
Nueva San Salvador
Quezaltepeque
La Libertad
Zaragoza
Table 4.2- List of FMLN communities with high betweeness scores.
A second related and partially overlapping network that is particularly relevant is
the networks created through the Programa de Transferencia de Tierras (PTT), the land
reform package agreed to as part of the peace accords. 200,000 acres were purchased
by the government and provided to a number of people, 75% of the land going to exFMLN members throughout the country. Although not a formal network space with
repeated interactions, the PTT and the Instituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agraria
(ISTA) became crucial agencies that linked a variety of actors together with one another.
Both as a result of the implementation of this project and mobilized efforts to express
grievances within ISTA provided networks across the communities. Reliable data about
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networks involved in PTT is not available; however, numerous interviews mentioned the
cooperative networks formed as part of the project as essential. An approximate
understanding of the relevant networks is provided simply by analyzing the states that
saw significant land area transferred under the PTT. Figure 3.4 provides a state-level
map of acres transferred under PTT emphasizing the significant amounts in Usulutan
(65,595 acres), San Vicente (43,282 acres), and Chalatenengo (27,304 acres). If this
network maintains particular relevance in terms of eventual environmental networks,
then we should expect those states to see particular growth in environmental networks
in the post-2003 period. The impact of this network thus can provide significant support
for the crucial aspects of the mechanisms being evaluated.
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Figure 4.2- Map of PTT Projects by state in El Salvador.
The additional network for municipalities was a series of non-partisan municipal
linkages forming in the post-civil war era. Some of these were initially brought together
by UNDP as part of the reconciliation process that devised a series of projects bringing
FMLN communities, ARENA communities, and Christian Democrat communities
together. For example, UNDP’s binding role in the land tenure negotiations encouraged
the PTT to be mixed with additional efforts bringing the different parties together
(Stanley and Holiday 1997). Additionally, municipal networks were fostered by other
post-civil war organizations and the creation of the Corporacion de Municipalidades de
La Republica de El Salvador (COMURES) was created in 1993 as a non-partisan group
bringing together different municipalities in a host of activities. It fostered and created
a network able to push for the 6% of the budget provided to municipalities and also to
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foster linkages between municipalities. It is a particularly active group cutting across
partisan boundaries and requiring representation from all major parties in the state for
any forums, projects, or mobilization efforts. There is no clear social network analysis
indicators for these different networks because both were wide-ranging and included
actors rather than excluded them providing few distinguishing features between actors
in the 1993-2003 period. They instead provide background forums that led to relevant
growth of networks in the post 2003 development.
The Coffee Network
The divisions between the levels, located in distinct institutions and with
separate clusters of actors have some connections between the levels. USAID links with
a number of actors at the various levels as do the environmental ministry and FIAES.
However, the coffee network provides a deeper set of repetitive connections between
the levels and one that bridges the levels in some unique ways. The network is
particularly relevant as it came together to create the first large scale biodiversity
project in the country of El Salvador in 1998 with GEF Project 466 (GEF Grant 466). The
domestic environmental policy network was connected to the regional biodiversity
network largely through GEF 466 and the network that was connected in that project.
GEF Grant 466 aimed to be a pilot project on the promotion of biodiversity in
coffee agriculture and spent over $3.8 million (the bulk from the World Bank but sizable
portions from the government and GEF also) to increase coffee certification in El
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Salvador and to draw the coffee landscape into the MBC.10 The project had three
specific goals: 1. Increasing recognition of shade coffee throughout the country, 2.
Create biodiversity corridors within the coffee growing landscape, and 3. Increase
certification of biodiversity friendly practices in coffee agriculture.
The program was largely set by the government of El Salvador with assistance
from GEF and the World Bank, but the implementation and the primary grantee
organization was the Fundación Salvadoreña para la Investigación del Café (PROCAFE).
PROCAFE is a research and policy forum that is composed of rotating members from the
large coffee exporting organizations: ABECAFE, UCAFES, UCRAPROBEX. USAID in 1990
recommended that the various coffee export organizations create a formal organization
to spearhead and drive policies to help coffee from El Salvador reenter international
markets after the civil war (USAID 1990). Discussions to create PROCAFE began in
earnest in 1991 and it was a formal, recognized organization by 1992. The initial funding
for the organization came substantially from USAID.
PROCAFE, as noted above, is affiliated domestically with the large scale coffee
organizations and the representatives of the organization are directly affiliated with one
of the three large coffee organizations. ABECAFE or the Asociacion Salvadoreña de
Beneficiadores y Exportadores de Café was the lead of the coffee exporting factions that
was key in the creation and solidification of ARENA and excluding some of the extreme
cultivators from the political arena (Paige 1997). It is a very powerful organization
10

The certification to be expanded was the Rainforest Alliance’s Eco-O.K. certification (Philpott
and Dietsch 2003) This proved to be a crucial time period for Rainforest Alliance’s certification
scheme and proved useful in expanding and allowing them to get a foothold in a region
otherwise unlikely to have adopted the Eco-O.K. certification.(Auld 2010)
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within government, exemplified by the fact that Alfredo Cristiani was President of
ABECAFE prior to becoming President of El Salvador. The membership of the board
includes many of the coffee elite families like Llach, Cristiani and others. Combined with
them is the Unión de Cooperativas de Caficultores de El Salvador or UCAFES which
represents 2300 medium and small scale coffee cultivators. This group is predominantly
made up of western coffee growers but expanded into other areas in recent years.
Finally, the Unión de Cooperativas y Beneficiadores de la Reforma Agraria
(UCRAPROBEX) which was founded in 1988 and represents over 50 different
cooperatives spread throughout the country. The organization has been largely wedded
to supporting shade grown, organic, and fair trade coffee exports and there are
requirements of member cooperatives to adhere to such standards. UCRAPROBEX was
one of the major pushers for the founding of Asociación de Pequeños Productores de
Café de El Salvador11 in 1997 which serves as the primary organization for facilitating
certification on a host of issues throughout El Salvador. PROCAFE is thus a research and
facilitation organization representing a large amount of the domestic coffee production
system.
PROCAFE similarly has significant connections with the government of El
Salvador and various ministries take them extremely seriously. ABECAFE and the ARENA
party are of course closely aligned in most aspects. Beyond that, PROCAFE and its

11

Commonly the Asociación de Pequeños Productores de Café de El Salvador is referred to as
APECAFE. However, since it will not play a primary role in the further analysis and because it
may create clarity problems with ABECAFE, it will instead be referred to in whole in any
additional references. Analysis using this work though may find it useful to refer to it as
APECAFE.
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members are crucial in activities by the Consejo Salvadoreño del Café (CSC), an
autonomous government agency tasked with managing exports of coffee. The CSC was
created in 1989 as a favored alternative by ABECAFE to the Christian Democrat efforts
to manage coffee (with INCAFE) in the early 1980s (Paige 1997). However, the influence
extends to the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the
Economy, and the Environmental Ministry. These are not secondary linkages and
instead are primary to the regular engagements of the groups. Individuals move from
working for PROCAFE to working in government and they are a crucial organization
consulted on policies impacting coffee.
In addition, PROCAFE maintains a number of international linkages beyond their
significantly intertwined relationship with USAID. The most significant of these is the
relationship with the regional coffee organization: the Programa Cooperativo Regional
para el Desarrollo Tecnológico y Modernización de la Caficultura (PROMECAFE).
PROMECAFE is a regional organization aiming to coordinate coffee activities in Central
America and is headquartered in Guatemala. PROCAFE is the official representative of
El Salvador within the organization and this links it with a host of international agrarian
organizations: notably from Brazil, the United States, France, Portugal, and Spain. It also
links it to research organizations focusing on agricultural issues such as Inter-American
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), CATIE in Costa Rica, and others. Aside
from PROMECAFE, USAID and GEF provide the most substantial international
connections for PROCAFE.
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The GEF-466 project network does not lend itself to quantification and
quantitative visualization because the connections are sometimes completely
embedded in one another and other connections are important but not direct.
However, the network is absolutely essential in the later manifestation and so it is
valuable to capture the network structure that contributed to GEF-466 for later analysis
and assessment on networks that can be quantified and visualized. The core of the
project was the conjunction between the Government of El Salvador, GEF, and
PROCAFE. However, behind this initial network is relevant suborganizational actors: the
organization members of PROCAFE and the ministries of the government of El Salvador.
Other crucial actors connected to this includes USAID, PROMECAFE and the ARENA
party. Central in the network is certainly the government of El Salvador and the
alliances of PROCAFE. International and national level connections prove crucial in
bolstering the project and the network maintains significant aspects of overlap with
these international and national actors: USAID and ARENA are very connected in the
late 1990s projects.
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Figure 4.3- Visual Representation of the relevant connections in the Coffee Policy
Network.
Centralizing Networks and the Dominican Republic
Centralized networks can be difficult to maintain, especially on the level of
multilevel networks. There are always a host of different actors connected to individual
members of the network who may be integrated and break up the centralized network.
In international environmental politics, centralized networks may need significant
resources and shared identity in order to justify the exclusive nature of the network.
The Dominican Republic biodiversity arena was built in an authoritarian context and
with this background formed a centralized environmental network that was able to be
gatekeepers for future members of the network. This will be illuminated by first
detailing the development of the centralized network in the Dominican Republic and the
international network that interacts with this network but in a limited manner.
The most relevant network in the Dominican Republic in biodiversity governance
is a strong, domestic set of actors focused on conservation. This network was fostered

180

through institutions developed under the government of authoritarian Joaquin Balaguer
and then further strengthened in the post-authoritarian party competition. Associated
with this core domestic network are a ecotourism network connected with the coastal
resorts which developed significantly beginning in the 1980s. In addition, the
international conservation network around Caribbean issues has developed significantly
in the 2000s and has some impact. As will be seen in future chapters, these networks
connected with one another in the Caribbean Challenge; however, because there was
such a strong core part of the network in the domestic environment, it largely
channeled the efforts and prevented adaptive learning. However, before detailing these
processes, this section will establish the history which developed these networks into
the mid-2000s.
Domestic Conservation Network
The domestic conservation network in the Dominican Republic includes a fairly
diverse set of actors including NGOs, scientists, politicians, and bureaucrats; however,
the network was shaped during the conservation policies of the authoritarian Joaquin
Balaguer administration and the post-authoritarian democratic contestation.
To understand the background history and conditions which initially fostered the
network, the history and political background of Joaquin Balaguer and the Los Haitises
protected area are illuminating. A brief introduction to both of these themes will help
explain the impact they had on shaping the domestic environmental network.
The dominating figure in the history of environmental politics and biodiversity
protection in the Dominican Republic is Joaquin Balaguer, the authoritarian President of
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the country on 3 separate occasions and for the most significant periods from 1966 until
1978 (referred to as the first era) and then again from 1986 until 1996 (second era).
Environmental protection took a prominent place in both eras of Balaguer’s government
and he spoke of the need for environmental protection regularly (Diamond 2005).
Balaguer is seen by some as the benevolent father of conservation and environmental
protection in the country with broad environmental views, extensive foresight, and a
developed articulation of sustainable development a decade before Brundtland formally
articulated the concept (Ramirez Pena 2009, see also the less celebratory, but still
somewhat positive, articulation in Diamond 2005). However, as an authoritarian leader
with a developed rural clientalist network in the global context of the Cold War,
Balaguer’s environmentalism can also be seen as part of a system of domination and
control over the country (Rocheleau and Ross 1995, Rocheleau et al. 2001, Diamond's
interviews highlight these aspects as well, Diamond 2005). Regardless, the two eras of
Balaguer had a huge and lasting impact upon conservation in the Dominican Republic.
Even more was that Balaguer continued being a major player in environmental politics
after being forced from office in 1996. Diamond recounts that “His last decisive
intervention into Dominican politics, his rescue of the country’s natural reserve system,
came in the year 2000 at the age of 94, when he was blind, sick, and two years short of
his death” (Diamond 2005).
In addition, one of the key sites throughout the development of conservation
politics in the Dominican Republic is Los Haitises. The area was one of the first
conservation areas created during Balaguer’s first era (1968), saw significant growth of
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human population within the area during the PRD era that separated Balaguer’s two
administrations, and then witnessed significant mobilization of the armed forces to clear
the area of human populations during Balaguer’s second administration, and finally has
been a locus of two significant political mobilizations to prevent large-scale economic
extraction in the area since the end of Balaguer’s presidency. Los Haitises is a
particularly useful site to emphasize key political points about conservation politics in
the Dominican Republic. Although it is an extreme analogy in many respects, with far
more intense action than other protected areas throughout the country, it does
illustrate activity that happened throughout the country and grounds some of the more
general points.
The environmental policy network was initially formed as a response to
deforestation and part of authoritarian attempts to halt deforestation. Balaguer’s
predecessor, Rafael Trujillo, had adopted land policies based primarily on building
support in the rural areas of the country. As a result, those who were loyal to Trujillo’s
dictatorship were given large allowanced to deforest the country while those who were
not completely loyal would be met with restrictions and repression (Turtis 2003).
Managers of the forests were largely figureheads that served Trujillo’s monopoly (Moya
Pons 1998). The result was dramatic deforestation throughout the country and general
disruption of ecosystems during Trujillo’s reign.
When Balaguer came to power in 1966, deforestation had come to be seen as a
significant problem in the country. On March 8, 1967, the Congress of the country,
dominated by Balaguer’s party, passed Resolution 104 on deforestation which
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expressed “The highest patriotic interest in an active and permanent campaign of
reforestation in all the territory of the Republic” (quoted in: Ramirez Pena 2009, 15).
With this lofty pronouncement, Balaguer wrote a number of presidential directives and
passed laws which were extremely punitive of forest use. Directly after Resolution 104,
Balaguer issued a directive which stopped any export of wood from the country
(Ramirez Pena 2009). Most extremely, Law 206, passed in 1967 (shorthand: 206-67),
protected trees in the country; not just specific areas or forests, but every single tree
could only be felled with permission from the government. The military, the body most
closely controlled by Balaguer, retained preeminent position in the policy articulation
and enforcement of these laws and used 206 to establish authority and control in
mountainous territories which were seen as possibly providing areas for the
organization of insurgents (Rocheleau et al. 2001). Those peasants who were seen as
not supportive of the administration would be targeted by the military and have their
crops destroyed and pine trees planted on the land (Light 2008). The military did
extensive monitoring and flyovers of forested areas and engaged in a number of
engagements with peasants and illegal logging enterprises; including a night raid on one
of these enterprises that killed a dozen loggers (Diamond 2005). Decree 3676 in 1969
was explicit that the head of the armed forces was at the head of the table when it
came to matters regarding forestry in the country. The result is that for many in the
rural areas of the country, trees became “green enemies” and elaborate “accidents”
were devised by peasants to remove trees (Rocheleau and Ross 1995). Law 211-67 did
allow felling for construction of houses, however there were not clear ways to
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implement this or make the exception in a nonarbitrary manner and so 206-67
remained the significant piece of forestry legislation.
1967 also saw some of the first laws regarding management of various species
from fish, turtles, and others (Ramirez Pena 2009). It also yielded some of the first
protected areas in the country with the creation of protected areas in Isla Saona and in
1968 in Los Haitises. The creation of these protected areas was almost exclusively done
by presidential decree, a situation that would demonstrate its extreme brittleness in
future administrations that could easily alter these decrees.
The most significant developments regarding the policy network occurred in the
1970s with the creation of institutions under Balaguer whose focus was on
conservation, broadly conveyed. In 1974, Balaguer created the Parks Authority and in
1977 created an Environmental Affairs office. However, neither were involved in an
independent bureaucracy and both were directly centralized in the President’s office.
These were joined with the creations of the Moscoso National Botanical Garden (1976)
and the National Natural History Museum (1974) which provided crucial scientific study
and presentation of findings relevant to biodiversity conservation. Some authors see
these moves as signs of Balaguer’s enlightened environmental ethos (Ramirez Pena
2009) while others find it as simply an excuse for Balaguer to deepen patrimonial ties
and potential clientalist pay-offs in the rural areas (Rocheleau and Ross 1995, Moya
Pons 1998). Holmes’ history of conservation in the Dominican Republic holds both
positions in that even if Balaguer had some environmentalist beliefs, the
implementation of this took the form of centralized, personalist, and clientalist politics.
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Holmes writes that “Whatever the roots of Balaguer’s environmental views, the
protected areas policies of his administrations were the result of a particular
conservation elite, uniquely placed in Balaguer’s style of government…Despite
Balaguer’s strongly held environmental views, he created no environment ministry,
keeping close control over environment issues; the forestry service was military and
thus part of his political inner circle, and the protected areas directorate was part of the
office of the presidency” (Holmes 2010, 633).
During the PRD interlude (1978 until 1986), the institutionalization of Balaguer’s
conservation organizations and PRD weakness meant that few large changes happened
one way or another. Some logging was allowed to be active again and conservation
area enforcement largely lapsed. However, even highly unpopular or difficult to enforce
laws were not overturned by the PRD in this particular era (Diamond 2005). When
Balaguer returned to office in 1986, increased environmental attention internationally,
his focus on large infrastructure projects, the maturation of the scientific institutions,
and some further environmental degradation all resulted in significant environmental
action by his government.
Operation Selva Negra commenced soon after Balaguer had returned to power
and involved the militarized forestry service fining, confiscating, and sometimes
violently attacking peasant use of forestry resources for charcoal or small-scale
woodcutting (Roth 2001, Camara, Martinez, and Diaz del Olmo 2005, Rocheleau et al.
2001). The dramatic increases in the price of charcoal, and falls in the price of other
commodities globally, throughout the country drove many agriculturalists to abandon
186

subsistence or small-scale agriculture and focus on cash crops like cassava or tobacco
(Rocheleau et al. 2001, Camara, Martinez, and Diaz del Olmo 2005). Similarly to the
expansive forestry laws of his first term, Balaguer pushed a number of expansive
environmental directives. A series of directives on October 14, 1986 expanded species
protections throughout the country, not simply limited to threatened or endangered
species, but regulating many uses of a number of species (Ramirez Pena 2009, chapter 3
provides a full list of this series of decrees). While any exceptions to these laws and the
ability to access resources were largely based upon clientalist exchanges in the first era,
in the second era they began to involve side-payments from businesses for the ability to
access resources into private accounts controlled by Balaguer alone (for details of this
activity, see: Hartlyn 1998, chapter 7).
A significantly expanded tool of environmental politics during the second era of
Balaguer was the expansion of conservation areas. Although significant creation of
protected and conservation areas had happened during his first period as president,
they took on a significant importance in the second era. In his first year back in power
he doubled the amount of land under protected areas and this continued with
significant other expansions, including over 4,000 square kilometers of expansion 12
days before leaving office (Holmes 2010).
In addition, enforcement of protected areas took on increased severity during
this time period as demonstrated most directly in Los Haitises. A population already
living within the declared protected area with natural population increase and
populations from surrounding areas displaced by hurricanes meant that in the 1980s
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more than 40,000 people lived within the protected area and largely undefined buffer
zone (Sycos and Duarte 1994). A government report in 1991 found significant
agricultural transformation around the park by the communities which required
significant management to reverse the impact (Direccion Nacional de Parques 1991). In
1992, Balaguer instituted a ban on a host of activity in the protected areas: including
planting additional crops, entry into the area, and building of new structures. The
armed forces were tasked with relocating 20,000 people from the area and enforcing
the prohibited actions. Although there was some initial ambiguity about how this would
happen and which people would be resettled, in 1993 a definitive Presidential directive
announced that everyone in the protected area and the protected zone would be
removed (Sycos and Duarte 1994). Although the army maintained a significant presence
in the area, over a year later little resettlement had actually occurred.
In terms of international environmental law, Balaguer was active in signing onto
international law, but pushed little ratification of the laws. Although accession of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) was one of the early
things that Balaguer undertook, this was the only significant conservation, species or
biodiversity treaty that was ratified during Balaguer’s administration. The Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands, the Convention on Migratory Species, and the Convention on
Biological Diversity all were open for possible ratification during the Balaguer
administration. Indeed, in terms of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
Dominican Republic was the last Caribbean party to join the treaty. This does not
appear to reflect a general reticence about either international law or international
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environmental agreements by Balaguer more generally as ratification of various Ozone
treaties and other agreements were made under Balaguer; however, international
conservation law was one area Balaguer was particularly hesitant to join. One person
who worked in conservation at the time of Balaguer believed this was the result of his
personal interest in conservation and unwillingness to accept significant influence in this
particular project.
The result of these policies was that there formed a network of environmental
officials, connected to one another typically through involvement with one of the bodies
created by Balaguer (either Moscoso or the National Museum) or with a shared idea in
conservation, defined in terms of nature separated from humans. It is important to
note that this does not mean that the individuals involved were part of Balaguer’s
personalist networks or that they were allied politically with him. Indeed, some of the
individuals involved opposed his rule and were key supporters for democratization at
the end of his reign. However, the networks remained closely tied with the institutions
and the frame largely created during his reign.
The network really became an independent network in the post-Balaguer
political environment. In the first period (from approximately 1996-2005) conservation
largely struggled to find a prominent position in the government. Balaguer continued to
exert influence through broad coalitional politics and many institutionalized actors in
the government were able to maintain their influence. In 1997, the forestry service, still
run largely by the military, was able to expand actions in Los Haitises. These actions
were less about resettlement than they were about enforcement and confining activity
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in the country. Later, Fernandez began working on limiting and possibly changing some
of the protected conservation areas in the country. Since the majority of the policies
had been created by presidential decrees, Fernandez was largely able to change the
programs at will. Balaguer was able to work with future President Mejia to create a
firmer legislative basis for the conservation areas (Diamond 2005). Some mobilization
from the environmental elites, namely publications and news articles by Eleuterio
Martinez, did occur during this struggle in 2000; however, largely it was centered in the
big players in Dominican Politics with the heads of all three parties working different
sides of the issues. This network though was largely centered on Balaguer himself and
only narrow expansion of the network existed.
The various NGOs and science bodies began to be a more active network in the
competitive political setting toward the end of the 1990s. The most significant event
was the formation in 1999 of the Consorcio Ambiental Dominicano (CAD). CAD brings
together, formally, many of the prominent environmental NGOs in the country for
coordinated efforts. Located across from the Moscoso National Garden, CAD is merely a
manifestation of larger linkages occurring between different non-state actors in the
Dominican context. Although a complete network map would be difficult to form for
this early period, the key actors would include the formative members of CAD:
Fundación Progressio, Fundación Loma Quita Espuela, Grupo Jaragua Inc., Centro para la
Conservación y Ecodesarrollo de la Bahía de Samaná y su Entorno Inc. (CEBSE), and
Centro de Agricultura Sostenible con Tecnología Apropiada (CASTA). In addition to this
are the key government research centers, Moscoso National Botanical Garden and
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National Natural History Museum. Key international support was primarily from GTZ
and Helvetas.
This network was active in influencing policy when the key interests became
threatened by policy decisions. For example, this group became actively mobilized
when Fernandez proposed a change in the protected areas system which would have
effectively excluded all beached from protected areas and opened them up for tourist
development. The strong membership, long histories of engagement by many
members, and political capital was able to disrupt this attempt.
This network of Dominican environmental policy makers is noted by a number of
accounts; however, they often disagree about the specifics of the network. Jared
Diamond writes that “Dominican measures to protect the environment began from the
bottom up, shifted to top-down control after 1930, and are now a mixture of both.”
And further that, “In contrast to the situation in many developing countries, where
environmental efforts are mainly developed by affiliates of international environmental
organizations, the bottom-up impetus in the Dominican Republic has come from local
NGOs concerned with the environment. Along with universities and with the Dominican
Academy of Sciences, these NGOs have now become the leaders of a homegrown
Dominican environmental movement” (Diamond 2005).
Holmes presents a different picture where there is a domestic environmental
elite which is able to simultaneously prevent international NGOs from entering the
country and in furthering their own goals. Holmes writes that the Dominican Republic
demonstrates how “a well-connected elite can be very successful, creating one of the
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most extensive protected area systems in the world despite the pressures of working in
a densely populated island. This was for many years driven by the personal wishes and
centralising power of a quasi-dictator, shaped by the environmentalist who had unique
access to him. Later, it became dominated by a network of social elites, political elites
and NGO directors, with access and personal contacts as key commodities in the
network” (Holmes 2010). This thus may be a national and Dominican-led process, but is
not necessarily the “bottom-up” approach that Diamond argues exists. Instead, it is a
national elite that can limit access, ideas, and set the agenda in a centralized location.
There is little evidence of bottom-up environmental politics in the country, prior
to the recent popular action regarding Los Haitises which if it persists and moves to
other issues may signal the rise of an active environmental bottom-up movement.
Diamond does not present formal examples or evidence for the bottom-up
environmental management system actually acting and instead simply asserts that the
diversity of actors is a sign of its existence. Although this diversity certainly does exist
and there are a number of active NGOs and actors from a variety of different
perspectives (conservationists, scientific based organizations, ecotourist operations,
etc.), the elite nature of conservation remains an absolutely constraining force in the
development of politics. The environmental ministry, although underfunded and often
marginalized within the government (its offices are the farthest from other government
offices in Santo Domingo), forms a key organizing force in the environmental politics of
the country. The elite largely prioritizes protected areas as the only promotion of
biodiversity, the precise reasons provided in interviews will be discussed below;
192

however, it is clear that protected areas forms a conceptual center in most of the
discussions and debates. The result is that rather than a bottom-up, top-down mix of
environmental policy and politics, the situation is one where debate is centralized
around a core of national elite who can constrain the agenda and policies.
The Tourism Network
The tourism sector became a prominent part of the Dominican economy from
the 1980s onward and received significant governmental support. The sector is
significant, with high levels of competition between different regions and resorts for
customers. However, for the focus of this discussion, the ecotourist network which
developed in the 1990s is the most particularly relevant. This network centered around
a host of attempts to integrate ecological options for tourist activities. The most active
organizations involved in these processes are typically along the coast, with most of the
tourist sector, and the most active were CEBSE and the Punta Cana Ecological
Foundation.
The tourism industry began in the 1970s and expanded significantly in the 1980s
with significant government infrastructure projects. Four main regions participate in the
tourism economy, largely centered around international airports built recently: the
region around Puerto Plata, the Southeast Region, Santo Domingo, and Punta Cana
(Padilla and McElroy 2005). The Dominican tourism context is similar to many others in
that infrastructure is created in very limited manner and the resorts adopt an enclave
model, typically the all-inclusive form of organization.(Roessingh, Duijnhoven, and
Berendse 2008). The tourist sector quickly became a predominant force on the island
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and by 1992 it was the largest export sector, overtaking sugar and tobacco. Throughout
the 1990s, the tourist sector continued to grow and was a large part of the economic
growth experienced in the Dominican Republic during this decade (Padilla and McElroy
2005).
Some members of the tourism sector were relatively quick to integrate
ecological and sustainability programs into their all-inclusive packages. The leader in the
field was the Punta Cana resort which started significant sustainability projects in the
early 1990s. Other resorts have adopted similar projects and ecotourism has grown in
many of the protected areas across the island. While the number of these projects has
increased dramatically, it is unclear if they depart from the tourist sector more generally
and create a biodiversity governance module. The question impacts directly on a core
issue of governance competition. If the tourist efforts are an attempt to compete with
the conservation network for resources and control of property, or even to try and
lessen any perceived need for conservation of the beachfronts, then this may negatively
impact the overall network. If the network is instead an effort to engage with the
conservation activities, then it may be the nascent construction of a modular network
structure.
Except for CEBSE and Punta Cana Ecological Foundation, there is little evidence
of a secondary biodiversity module forming. Both of these organizations have
connections to the rest of the biodiversity network detailed above; however, at least
until 2009 there does not appear to be the growth of a coherent secondary cluster of
actors. While pursuing largely their own projects, CEBSE and Punta Cana appear to fit
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into the more significant centralized network that defines biodiversity governance in the
Dominican Republic. However, other tourist activities regarding biodiversity are not as
connected to the network and may then be a counter-network in competition with the
biodiversity network described above. Table 4.6 shows these two different networks
separated from one another.

Figure 4.4- Labeled Network Map of Dominican Conservation Politics Network 19992009.

Regional environmental network
The regional network is highly institutionalized in the Caribbean Regional Seas
Program. This Regional institutions have typically had a limited relationship with the
Dominican Republic, but shared problems have increasingly drawn them together.
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The Dominican Republic began integration into SICA in 2004 in preparations for
the U.S. and Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).
Their integration to many areas of regional policy making in Central America is limited
and they are considered an associated member of SICA; however, they have been
integrated actively in the customs issues and other economic matters and have been
added to the SICA seal. They have been involved in some regional environmental
discussions and have participated in some regional projects with Central American
states through cooperative GEF grants. CCAD and the Mesoamerican Biological
Corridor, however, have largely not involved the Dominican Republic to any significant
extent.
Although the Dominican Republic has pursued integration into the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) in the 1990s and at the same time it was integrating into the DRCAFTA arrangement, these have so far been fairly limited. CARICOM is an organization
originally of mostly English-speaking countries and territories that has only really
expanded to other countries in the area over the past 15 years. The Dominican Republic
was not originally involved in CARICOM and only became significantly involved in the
1990s when the European Union’s ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) program encouraged
regional integration in the Caribbean as a whole. As Haiti, Suriname and the Dominican
Republic became key members of the ACP program, the EU pushed for their inclusion in
CARICOM. CARICOM then created CARIFORUM as a agreement-making body linking
these other countries with the rest of the organization. As Haiti and Suriname became
members of CARICOM, CARIFORUM became an organ simply linking CARICOM with the
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Dominican Republic. The result has been a free trade arrangement covering goods
between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic since 2001 and efforts at expanded free
trade agreements and other policymaking between the bodies (Byron and Lewis 2007).
Although substantial policymaking happens within CARICOM, a wider regional
organization which includes the Dominican Republic is the Association of Caribbean
States (ACS). This organization aims at policy work which includes all the states which
have a direct stake in the governance of the Caribbean (and thus includes all SICA
members, CARICOM members and other regional states). ACS is fairly limited to some
small-level coordination roles between states and policy capacity is significantly behind
that in CARICOM and SICA. One significant project is the Caribbean Sea program which
has included a host of efforts at coordinating activity and achieving recognition of the
Caribbean as a “Special Area for sustainable development.” Mid-1990s efforts at this
resulted in the passage of a UN General Assembly resolution 54/225 in 1999 which
recognized the Caribbean as a special area and encouraged a regional integrated
approach to protecting that resource. In 2000, ACS suspended the spearheading organ
of this effort, the Environmental Committee, and shifted the work to the Special
Committee on Sustainable Tourism which effectively ended any momentum or action
on the issue (Insanally 2003). Stalled effort until the 2008 creation of the Caribbean Sea
Commission which organized a series of engagements promoting the goals in the UN
General Assembly Resolution; however, by the time of this writing the effort has
produced some organizational structure and the passage of further UN resolutions, but
substantive work has progressed little.
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CARICOM and the ACS differ from SICA in some substantive points. First, the
separation of economic integration from political and social integration are significant in
that it means that programs like ALIDES to make sustainable development a goal of
economic integration is difficult to easily negotiate and implement in CARICOM. All the
problems with ALIDES and the attempts in CARICOM to integrate other regional issues
do not undermine the existence of dual tracks in the Caribbean. Second, the
international pushers of integration are different in the Central American system and
the Caribbean system. In contrast to the United States as the primary international
supporter of integration, CARICOM and CARIFORUM have the European Union and,
more recently, Japan as substantial international pushers. The United States is certainly
not absent and plays a key role at many points: however, the E.U. and Japan’s influence
is notable in the development of the organization.
Within this patchwork of regional governance over the Dominican Republic, the
main environmental actions taken have been through the Caribbean Environment
Programme (CEP). CEP was founded under the aegis of the newly created United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1976 as one of its Regional Seas
Programmes. The CEP is affiliated with CARICOM and ACS; however, UNEP and its own
secretariat provide the primary organization for the agreements. The primary legal
instrument is The Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (the Cartagena Convention) which opened
for signature in 1983 and entered into force in 1986. For much of the early years of the
agreement the CEP was met with general indifference from member states and the
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agreement was severely limited in funding and significance (Barker 2002). However,
since the mid-1990s, CEP has been able to establish fairly regular funding to the
Caribbean Trust Fund (the primary financial mechanism) from members and
contributions from other environmental funders (GEF, UNEP, etc.) and continued to
develop some forums for future use. However, aside from the Oil Spill Protocol adopted
at the initial meeting, the development of significant international environmental law
has been limited within CEP (Miller 1996, Barker 2002).
The most significant regional biodiversity governance in the Caribbean has been
the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) in terms of
states involved and diplomatic efforts. SPAW is a multilateral environmental agreement
throughout the Caribbean that attempts regional cohesion in protected areas and
species protection and expansion of these protections. SPAW encourages the creation
of conservation areas throughout the countries of the region, with an expanded focus
on marine protected areas, and aims to create a permanent fund for the management
of these protected areas. These broad goals will be largely mirrored in the Caribbean
Challenge, although some of the relevant actors will have changed.
The initial background for the SPAW agreement initially developed in 1986 from
an expert panel within CEP and not from any state negotiators (de Fontaubert and
Agardy 1998). The initial impetus to create regionally coordinated protected areas and
species protection, however, hit a number of negotiating roadblocks. Negotiators
agreed on little about the purpose or particular construction of conservation areas,
whether certification by some scientific panel would be necessary to evaluate state
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progress, and even how representation would be established on the science body. For
example, one major point of debate was whether each U.K. territory would get one
representative or would there only be a single U.K. representative for all of the
territories (Vanzella-Khouri 1998). The negotiations consistently pushed back
timetables and at the final round of negotiations there was not enough time to finish
agreement on the necessary annexes to the agreement and so they were left to be
worked out later (Vanzella-Khouri 1998).
Out of these negotiation hurdles developed an agreement with some
substantive foci, but mostly a least common denominator requirement with wide
leeway for national interpretation (de Fontaubert and Agardy 1998). Rather than a
focus on some key or endangered species, SPAW did aim to integrate an ecosystem
perspective and was one of the first multilateral environmental agreements to
specifically integrate this perspective into the agreement. In addition, of all the
different Regional Seas species efforts, SPAW was one of the most far reaching in
working on issues of marine species and terrestrial ecosystems (Vanzella-Khouri 1998).
Thus, the agreement declared protection and the need for conservation of all
mangroves in member states. There was some emphasis of cooperative approaches to
conservation with the need to include various social and economic actors in the
agreement.
The network though is narrowly constrained largely to the institution itself and a
few international partners. In terms of domestic depth of networks, SPAW appears to
be limited to environmental ministries without active subnational projects. This has
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changed recently with the Caribbean Challenge, as will be explored below; however, in
the Dominican case, the centralized national network means that SPAW largely adheres
to that network. The impact appears limited, there are not significant network
connections aside from scientific engagement. In the words of one Dominican authority
“the environmental ministry limits anyone that wants to have an environmental project
in the country” and this appears to extend to the international level. Similarly to the
tourist sector, the international network then is not a separate module for governance
relevant to the main domestic network as much as it fits within that network.
Network Structure Conclusions
As this chapter makes clear, the network structures in both El Salvador and the
Dominican Republic are of fundamentally different types. The biodiversity network in El
Salvador is defined by a number of different clusters of actors linked together through
key individuals and the coffee network. The Dominican Republic network in contrast is
highly centralized in the national environmental ministry. The tourist and international
networks largely fit within this centralized network and there are no rival modules of
organizing the way there is in El Salvador. The result is a clear distinction of the two
different governance arrangements in terms of network structure.
Crucially for hypothesis evaluation is two situations that the analysis above
demonstrates: first that national context is not fully determinate and second that the
network structure transcends institutional design.
It is sometimes argued that domestic context determines network structure and
influences network development and the transfer of ideas (Gourevitch 2002, Kelly 2004,
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Cortell and Davis 2005, Bach and Newman 2010). The limiting case of the Dominican
Republic may be seen as confirming evidence for this argument (Holmes 2010).
However, there are some problems with such an argument. First, networks are of
course sensitive to domestic politics, but biodiversity networks often extend outside of
these confines. What the analysis above shows is that in both instances, networks
extended in ways not completely explainable by domestic political context. For
example, with the local-local collaboration in the El Salvador case which will prove
crucial in the next chapter. In addition, the tourist developed biodiversity network
began developing in the late 1990s offering a potential different organization. Second,
and most important, is that networks are happening at multiple levels simultaneously.
The MBC regional network provides an example of a regional network developing which
need not particularly adhere to the local situation. Although the international network
in the Dominican case proved to not be able to challenge or transform the national
network structure, this should be seen more as weakness of that network and
institution rather than as proof that domestic context matters. Indeed, in an interview
with an international actor, the claim was made that they did not have a secondary
network possible of replacing the national network. While not ignoring the national
context, the analysis above should not be interpreted as justifying the argument that
national context is determining on network structure.
Finally, the relationship between networks and institutions is a complex
relationship and neither reduces to the other. This is important and relevant because
the main rival argument regarding resilience is that institutions and their design
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determine resilience of those organizations. This is the robustness argument which
contends that institutions which are less vulnerable to shocks will also be better able to
adapt to the shocks (Young 2010). The difference for network structure and institutions
is that network structure includes actors that are outside of the institutions (in the El
Salvador case with the PTT and FMLN municipalities during this period). In the
Dominican case also, although the institutions were crucial, the network design extends
beyond these formal levels. Most importantly, as will be seen, is that the formal
institutions in both cases were not the primary system shaping the learning processes.
In El Salvador, it was trial and error experimentation and in the Dominican Republic it
was the forums that shaped the meetings. Neither of these was primarily the result of
the institutional structure but of other dimensions in the network structure. The
analysis above, although it highlights the key role of institutions in the network,
establishes also the core distinction in learning that will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
SHOCKS AND PROCESSES OF LEARNING
Following the rain from Hurricane Ida (2009) which caused significant landslides
throughout El Salvador, I visited a highland community which had been actively engaged
in shade coffee biodiversity projects for a decade. Although the community was
relatively less impacted by the landslides than other communities, the precarious steep
hills throughout the town made them very aware of the situation. The first goal was of
course to repair damage and restore connectivity where landslides had disrupted roads.
However, a secondary goal was to figure out exactly where the landslides had happened
and try and identify some common aspect which could be used for future prevention.
This was done relatively quickly after the storm and although it happened with few
committed resources, it was a decided effort by the community to identify the problem
and try and develop some applicable lessons for the community.
Resilient governance is fundamentally about the ability of a governance
arrangement to adapt and respond to shocks that occur. Disruptions to the political or
environmental system often stimulate learning and assessments of the current
governance arrangement. But the learning that occurs after these shocks can come in
many different forms including learning through sharing experiences, learning through
instruction, inclusion of new perspectives, reassessing causal connections, etc. The
modular network theory of resilient governance contends that diverse, modular
network structures will shape the learning that occurs within governance arrangements.
Rather than occurring through a centralized collection of findings and then the diffusion
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throughout the network, these network structures will result in bottom-up learning.
This chapter explores this contention by exploring three pathways of learning that
happened in the case of the MBC and the Dominican Republic. These pathways include
trial and error experimentation (an important force in the MBC), network expansion
(seen in both cases but through different mechanisms), and broadcasting (absent in the
MBC and important in the Dominican case). Exploring the empirical context of how
these operate provides significant support for the contention that network structure
impacts the learning dynamics within governance arrangements.
Shocks and International Biodiversity Governance
Shocks are defined as events which cause a significant part of a governance
arrangement to question the believed causal connections of the governance rules or to
question the political structure of the organization. They are thus defined here in
largely social terms and are shaped primarily by the social relations between actors (van
der Leeuw and Aschan-Leygonie 2000, Folke 2006). Although it is possible to look at
events which had a significant impact on human and ecological systems and contend
that they should have triggered a reassessment of the governance system, the history of
environmental politics clearly warns against the assumption that large impacts will
necessarily generate learning (European Environment Agency 2013). Shocks are thus
only shocks if they are considered such in the social environment of the governance
arrangement.
Studying governance shocks is difficult because of the intertwined nature of
shocks at multiple levels with one another and because they are rarely exogenous from
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the network structure. The introduction divided shocks into political and environmental
types. In actual governance practice, this distinction does not appear clear and the two
types of shock interact with one another significantly. For example, declining elephant
populations for CITES are simultaneously a political shock reflecting problems with the
governance arrangement (and for a number of years, political intractability) and
problem with the environmental system. In addition, there is an endogeneity problem
in that shocks are themselves highly related to the network structure. For example, in a
centralized network structure, the loss of a member may be relatively minor with
multiple other actors able to play a similar role. In contrast, in modular network
structures the loss of a key bridging actor may irreparably transform the network.
Similarly, problems like groupthink and contagion of political intractability are more
significant for centralized networks than they are for modular networks (see the
discussion of insulation in Goffman 1969, 76-78). Despite these problems, the
discussion and identification of political and environmental shocks makes it easier to
conceptualize the impact of the disruptions and to more effectively deal with alternative
causation which argues that the type of learning is mostly impacted by the type of shock
experienced.12
The way this analysis deals with these problems is not to ignore them but to
locate them so that the endogenity and the interrelationships can be more fully

12

The argument that type of shocks impacts the learning in regimes has not been fully theorized
but would connect with functionalist arguments and discussions of problem structure in the
study of international environmental politics (Mitchell 2006). Although the type of shocks
experienced in the cases differed, it is unclear how they would significantly determine the
resulting learning.
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understood. However, the distinctions between political and ecological shocks and
between slow-moving and sudden shocks can be helpful in understanding the contexts
more fully.
Political shocks come in a number of different forms and can be the result of
slow-moving processes or sudden transformations. Three of the most prominent
include transfers of power, assessments, and political intractability.
Transfers of power can impact governance arrangements whether they happen
in the governance arrangement itself or in other institutions. In the Dominican Republic
case, this is exemplified when Balaguer left office in 1996 and handed power to the
Fernández administration. The result was that the conservation policies which he had
put in place over his many terms were threatened. An example at the international
level is the transfer of power in the Amazon Cooperative Treaty Organization when
Artega left the position. Regional, national, and even local turnover of positions can be
shocking to the governance arrangement leading to a reassessment of the governance
arrangement.
Assessments serve as another political shock that can impact governance
arrangements Any of a host of reflective mechanisms can catalyze learning, but first
they must highlight the limits of current efforts (Siebenhuner 2008, 2002). These can be
slow moving processes, for instance where political intractability gradually grows
increasingly more problematic, or fast moving shocks that were unexpected.
Assessments, particularly outside assessments, were crucial mechanisms in spurring the
learning in many of the governance arrangements in chapter 2. Most notably with the
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Man and Biosphere assessments which proved crucial in spurring the changed focus to
include sustainable development concepts.
One other political shock is that of intractability in the discussions. Although this
is a more gradual shock that often builds until it reaches a threshold, political
intractability can be a significant cause for overhaul of governance arrangements. The
crucial example in this respect from Chapter 2 is CITES where feelings of politicization of
information finally led to the Ft. Lauderdale Criteria and significant transformation of
the governance arrangement itself. The conditions which determine whether political
intractability results in learning as opposed to leading to further political intractability or
collapse is a key area for future analysis from the findings in this research.
Environmental shocks can similarly come from a wide variety of different
contexts. If the problem the governance arrangement is designed to manage suffers a
clearly deteriorating condition or a new impact of the problem arises that was not fully
understood before either of these conditions can cause actors to believe a change in
governance is necessary. Natural disasters serve as a crucial case where environmental
degradation becomes significantly important. As will be seen below, with the multiple
natural disasters in El Salvador in the 1990s and early 2000s, the problem of soil erosion
became important as a result of a number of landslides. Similarly, the loss of a key
species or the sudden decline or disease of a species can be similar environmental
conditions which would cause the problems to become more clearly apparent.
Despite the severity or the lessons which could be drawn from shocks, they are
neither guaranteed to be understood as shocks nor to necessarily lead to adaptation.
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The modular theory argues that the network structure that exists throughout the
governance arrangement explains when shocks lead to certain types of learning. Two
alternative causations would contend that the type of learning is based on the shape of
the shock (Smith 2009) or the accessible scientific knowledge (Lidskog and Sundqvist
2011, The Social Learning Group 2001, Jasanoff 2004, Haas 2004a, Lidskog and
Sundqvist 2002). The analysis below will attempt to dismiss the former and provide an
explanation to the latter. It will be clear that accessible and trusted scientific knowledge
is necessary for leading to adaptation; however, the argument is that the network
structure underlies this process.
Shocks in Central America and the Caribbean
Biodiversity governance in Central America and the Caribbean have experienced
a number of shocks to the governance arrangements. The main focus of this analysis
will be on the post-1995 shocks that happened and the next sections will explore the
pathways of learning that occurred after these shocks.
Political transfers of power have been very important in the biodiversity
governance approaches in both cases. As explained above, the transfer of power in the
Dominican Republic from Balaguer to Fernandez became a shock to the elite network in
the country. While it is not clear when this became a shock to the participants, it is clear
that the network viewed this unfavorably in many instances (this despite the fact that
many supported the transition and the Fernandez administration). Similarly, in Central
America, the closure of the MBC Coordinating office in 2006 was a key political transfer
of power. The coordinating functions moved to the CCAD office in San Salvador, but the
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networks and the major international supporters (World Bank and NASA) did not appear
to move to this new arrangement. This was not viewed as a shock throughout the
network, but a number of actors in the network did began to entertain ways to restart
the corridor project after this closure. Domestically, in El Salvador the rise of the FMLN
as a significant political party meant that there had to be some transformation of the
policy environment to account for this change. Although this transfer of power from the
ARENA to FMLN happened relatively late in the development, it will be crucial in the
next chapter.
Political intractability was a similarly important driving force in the contexts. In
Central America, the Paseo Pantera was largely abandoned as a project when the state
leaders refused to push the program forward. Similarly the 1997 MBC saw the creation
of some large conservation areas, but some surprising political intractability. In Costa
Rica, with the most developed biodiversity system in the region, local park managers
found the expansion and incorporation of buffer zones to be a difficult proposal in
implementation (Kaiser 2001). The intractability increased with the program following
the 1997-2001 period with much of the enthusiasm being replaced by local resistance to
the project in Nicaragua and elsewhere. The recognition of this intractability differed
based upon the actor but the closure of the office in 2006 can be best understood as the
culmination of this intractability resulting in the organization abandoning the office.
In terms of environmental shocks, one of the most common in the regions is the
regular occurrence of natural disasters. While causing significant disruption to the
political and economic systems, these similarly highlighted problems of environmental
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degradation and the vulnerability of ecological systems. They often serve as key
markers in discussion with biodiversity policy makers in the different countries with
references to the natural disasters serving as critical junctures, as will be discussed
below. In the Dominican context, Hurricane Jeane (2004), Georges (1998) and Hortense
(1996) all impacted the country and caused significant disruption. In addition, the 2010
Haitian earthquake resulted in significant refugee problem and a wide perception of
pressure and destruction of the protected areas of the country as a result. It is certainly
being considered a shock to the system and appeared universally in interviews as the
most significant problem the Dominican Republic conservation is facing. El Salvador
similarly has Hurricane Mitch (1998), Hurricane Stan (2005) combined with the 2001
twin earthquakes as pivotal natural disasters. As will be explored below, one of the
crucial aspects of these natural disasters is that they were viewed as causing significant
landslides requiring some land use transformation.
Species loss and deforestation appear to be key driving features amongst some
part of governance arrangements. Although reports of deforestation and a species
declining in health were mentioned repeatedly in interviews in both cases, they were
rarely provided or considered as key catalyzing forces for governance arrangement
transformation. The amount of domestic and professional studies of beach erosion in
the Dominican Republic, for instance, has produced little focus on the issue. Although
these reports and understandings are important following other shocks, in the cases
here they appear to not generate perceptions of shock throughout the governance
arrangement as a whole.
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The most important shock in the Central American context were the natural
disasters. As will be shown below, these started a host of different learning in the
governance arrangements because of how they brought in new actors and brought
existing actors to think differently about problems. Biodiversity and the corridor idea
arose through a series of trial and error experimentations at the local and international
levels. In the Dominican Republic, the most important shock was political transition of
power. This changed the domestic political situation and resulted in learning largely
through competition and restricted membership. When considering alternative
causations, the important aspects of these shocks is that they both occur largely
separate from the biodiversity networks that. Although certainly connected with the
network structure of the governance arrangements, neither was a shock primarily
internal to that structure.
Learning proceeded in the cases through three main pathways of learning: Trial
and error experimentation, network expansion, and broadcasting. These are not
exclusive pathways to learning, but are simply the most relevant for the cases of study
in these empirical cases. Other potential pathways will be discussed briefly in the
conclusion.
Learning through trial and error
Trial and error experimentation in governance involves actors learning
generalizable lessons from early experiences. The key aspect that separates trial and
error experimentation from centralized instruction or broadcasting is that it involves
actors trying to solve small tractable problems but then using the lesson from those
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attempts to generalize heuristic guides for future events. Trial and error
experimentation can include lessons about causal connections between governance
rules and outcomes (Stein 1994, Levitt and March 1988), lessons about coordination
strategies and institutional design (Sugiyama 2008, Meseguer 2004), or even lessons on
forum shopping (regarding what actors are potential partners for future interactions)
(Steinberg 2001, Sabatier 1988).
Polycentric governance studies have worked significantly with the concept of
trial and error experimentation as one of the main advantages of polycentric
arrangements (Ostrom 2005, Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier 2010). The main advantage
highlighted in this literature is that trial and error experimentation for learning allows
quick and relatively tight lessons to be quickly applied by the actors. Ostrom explains
that one of the advantages of polycentric systems is that “feedback about how the
resource system responds to changes in actions of appropriators is provided in a
disaggregated way. Fishers are quite aware, for example, if the size and species
distribution of their catch is changing over time. Irrigators learn whether a particular
rotation system allows most farmers to grow the crops they most prefer by examining
the resulting productivity of specific fields” (Ostrom 2005). However, the main
limitation of this learning is that it relies relatively little on sustained comparison and the
generation of lessons applicable throughout the governance arrangement. The
relevance of these findings to multilevel and international settings will be explored
below.
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Trial and error experimentation in El Salvador started primarily after Hurricane
Mitch in 1998 and involved trials with different biodiversity projects in local
communities and trials to find alliances and projects which could find sustainability from
outside the community, mainly with funding from external sources.
Prior to 1998, the biodiversity projects in El Salvador included the SalvaNatura
protected area El Imposible and the other protected area in the northwest corner of the
country. There is little evidence of communities engaged in practices towards the end
of the civil war or in the immediate years following. Local development organizations,
ADESCOs, had been largely assisted in their early development by UNDP as part of the
end of the civil war process. These communities had very limited financial resources
and thus had begun work with one another on some environmental issues at the end of
the civil war (1992 until 1998) largely on solid waste management and freshwater
resources. There is limited evidence of biodiversity trials by local communities before
1997, but some claimed to have started projects prior to Hurricane Mitch in 1998 with
some initial, small-scale efforts.
This situation changed with a rapid increase in the number of trial and error
experimentations in local communities with different biodiversity projects after 1998
with Hurricane Mitch. Mitch delivered significant destruction in Honduras and
Nicaragua and caused widespread but less destruction in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The slow moving storm provided significant destruction in terms rainfall causing
flooding and landslides. Landslides do not appear to be triggering events for learning in
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the region (Restrepo and Alvarez 2006), but in the situation of El Salvador they were
crucial in bringing a host of projects to the fore.
The initial experimentations varied significantly based upon the particular
context of the community involved. In communities with some connection to the
SalvaNatura shade coffee project, these projects involved small conservation areas
connected within shade coffee plantations (these were mostly located in Ahuachapan).
In communities resettled as part of the land reform during and after the civil war, these
included some small conservation areas on areas which had become significantly
degraded or which were crucial to water resources (many examples around Suchitlan
reservoir). In the eastern part of the country, biodiversity strategies were largely
integrated into fishing and agricultural practices. No medium or large conservation
areas were created and the shade coffee or small mangrove protections worked into
larger land use decisions, often as part of the land reform administration of the PTT.
An example of this early trial could be the city of Cinquera in Cabañas. The city
saw significant violence during the civil war and environmental destruction as people
fled the violence into the hills. Surrounding the town is a very steep hillside. With
resettlement of the town following the civil war, largely from ex-FMLN supporters, the
local ADESCO (ARDM) soon began experimenting with biodiversity efforts in order to
conserve the land and the forest on the hill. They started with a small scale effort to
protect the forest on the mountain and included community efforts to ensure the
protection of the area (Valencia et al. 2011). This was done experimentally with little
guidance from outside of the community in the early period.
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The trial and error also extended to experiments with other communities,
national NGOs, and other actors to maximize support for the project during the period
after Mitch. The government of El Salvador still lacked clear guidance for communities
regarding land erosion or biodiversity protection and the environmental ministry largely
lacked capability to implement multi-site biodiversity projects. In the words of one
ADESCO leader: “We were not getting any assistance, and so we just had to try
something.” ADESCOs then began the process of forum and ally shopping to find
support for their biodiversity policy experiments. Many of these early efforts were with
one another in a series of trial and error experiments. These built from some of the
mancommunidades alliances that linked various communities together to deal with solid
waste management and freshwater resources. But also built along the FMLN linked
communities and the PTT linked communities to bring communities together.
Not all of these early alliances worked or worked effectively. The first few years
see a number of cooperative biodiversity efforts that split apart after a few years. The
documents and memory of these early projects is largely incomplete, but the alliances
which worked appear to be proximity based and worked by getting some shared funding
early on in the project. The crucial example here is the Usulutan and Lake Suchitlan
projects. When there is separation between different communities and the linkage is
based on future ecotourism earning potential, then the collaboration is often times of
limited duration. One person who knew about the history of an ADESCO project
explained the early operations with another community, not proximate, through shared
connection with a national NGO. The national development NGO had worked with both
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communities and connected them because they believed there was a shared problem
faced by both communities. The ADESCO started hesitantly and worked in workshops
and attempts to increase collaboration, but would not formally join with the other
community for significant projects. This trial and error shopping accelerated
significantly with the international funders that began more significant local biodiversity
support gradually until 2005.
International funders similarly engaged in a series of trial and error
experimentation following Hurricane Mitch. After initial humanitarian assistance
following the hurricane, international funders were organized by UNDP in November
1998 to discuss plans for projects in the region to be funded by the international
funders. Environmental degradation played a prominent role in the discussions; the
UNDP report on mobilizing relief begins “The impact of Hurricane Mitch on Honduras,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Belize is of an unprecedented magnitude. The
impact was compounded by large-scale deforestation and the cultivation of marginal
lands without soil conservation” (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
1998).
This UN coordinated effort was followed with a set of meetings organized by the
Inter-American Development Bank, started in December 1998 but formally finished in
March 1999, and included the UN offices, countries of the region, and large
international funders from the EU and United States. At the meetings, the states of
Central America made clear that they intended to “rebuild” after the disaster of Mitch
and further the reforms made early in the 1990s regarding “peace, freely elected
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Governments, rule of law, poverty alleviation, modernization of the state, and steadily
improving economic growth, as well as regional integration needs to be deepened and
accelerated” (Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central
America 1999). The Donors pressed and got agreement for a reconstruction plan that
included inclusion of civil society, transparency in funding, decentralization provision of
services, and reduction of ecological vulnerabilities. El Salvador’s government plan for
reconstruction did not emphasize ecological vulnerabilities or environmental
conservation as a cornerstone of their strategy. The plan resulted in $9 billion was
mobilized for reconstructive efforts in Central America.
This arrangement and many of the early efforts worked through the government
of El Salvador. Mitch did introduce a number of new European funding agencies,
organizations who had been largely absent in El Salvador during the civil war. During
the civil war, USAID was the primary funder in the country and, as seen last chapter, was
very deeply connected throughout the different networks. USAID had a long history of
working with the government of El Salvador and thus was not in any significant alliance
shopping during this period. New funders, in contrast, were largely working in a new
environment following Mitch. New funders included many of the large European aid
foundations, such as: GTZ (Germany), Heinrich Boll Foundation (German Green Party
Foundation), AECI (Spain), JICA (Japan), CIDA (Canada), SIDA (Swedish), and others.
The government of El Salvador, at this point under the control of the ARENA
party quickly proved to be an unlikely ally for many of the international funders.
Initially, although they had agreed to decentralize policies and provide more funding to
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local communities in the UNDP post-Mitch agreement, ARENA blocked the
implementation or passing of these efforts (Wisner 2001). Second, although land
degradation and biodiversity were pushed in the UNDP process and were a major global
focus of some of the newer aid foundations (notably GTZ), the government did not meet
this emphasis and kept biodiversity on a low level of priority. One international funder
noted that this was the inability to pursue the projects they wanted to pursue was a
major reason for a major issue of dissatisfaction with the government. Finally, and
possibly most significant, there were repeated reports that ARENA misused the funds,
sometimes for political gain. There were reports of ARENA only sending aid to
communities which supported them, attaching party logos to disaster relief supplies,
and directly using the funding to rig elections. This led to a series of official and
unofficial reassessments of channeling aid primarily through the government, most
notably this even extended to USAID (United States General Accounting Office 2003).
These somewhat separate experimentations largely coalesced after the 2001
earthquakes and dramatically so after the 2005 Hurricane Stan. The major lesson
learned by both international funders and local actors was that the strategy to pursue
was the biological corridor connected with local projects. This came about as a result of
trial and error learning following Mitch by the different actors. Both tried to work
through the government of El Salvador, but found that approach to be largely
unsatisfactory. Alliances which worked best were those with geographical proximity or
which had additional network connections. The modular network that had developed in
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El Salvador prior to 2005 shaped this learning significantly in the adoption of corridor
projects in the period around 2001
Trial and error experimentation in multiple communities and international
funders accomplishes little without some linkage between the different experiments.
Although there was some shared ideas between the various members of the network
(notably through already existing networks like the PTT program or the FMLN
municipalities), this initial generation of multiple experiments connected little with the
corridor project and did not extend beyond largely local efforts. To understand the
extension it is necessary to turn toward a second pathway of learning: network
expansion.
Network Expansion
Actors often learn through expanding networks and fitting policy to support the
new actors or simply being exposed to new ideas and information. Studies from
organization theory have generally found that entities learn most from the organizations
they are proximate to in networks (Kraatz 1998, Uzzi 1997). Similarly both polycentric
governance studies and resilience studies have emphasized that expanding networks
can increase the feedbacks for actors in a governance arrangement (Bodin and Crona
2009, Crona and Bodin 2006). The development of the Man and Biosphere network
shows how this expansion of a network can contribute to the adoption and learning of
new approaches to a governance project. Network expansion can thus be one pathway
for learning for actors.
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In El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, both networks saw some network
expansion. Learning resulted in the El Salvadorian case and did not in the Dominican
Republic. This distinction provides significant support to the argument that network
structure matters in shaping the learning.
In the El Salvador case, network expansion started before 2005 but became
largely a self-reinforcing process as international funding increased after this. The MBC
network had done very little in El Salvador prior to 2005 and the country was largely
absent in the considerations of that network in its early development. By the 2010
relaunch of the MBC, the country was included in multiple facets of the project and
included many of the local experiments which had begun in the 1998-2005 period
across El Salvador. This brought together communities linked in many of the other
important national networks (such as the PTT and FMLN municipalities) with other
communities linked in the environmental politics network and with those communities
which had small scale activities but nothing particularly connected. There are three
mechanisms of network expansion that occurred in the El Salvador case: recruitment,
shared benefits, and network transmission.
All the different actors learned to apply the corridor idea throughout the country
based upon small projects, but they each came to that point differently. Communities
learned that they could secure stable funding for corridor projects and that they may
lessen the landslide danger. The national government and MBC project both learned to
shift the focus of the corridor from large scale conservation projects to small-scale
projects with varied forms of protection. Finally, international funders learned
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processes of linking multiple communities together to develop regional and crossnational projects in multiple countries. Deciding to focus on these small projects was
crucial to the improved effectiveness of the MBC project as will be seen next chapter.
The process of network expansion was crucial throughout this process as the
various actors began to interact with one another and adjust their projects in response.
Recruitment and expanded benefits of policies worked closely with one another in the
empirical context of El Salvador. Recruitment involves the deliberate linking of one
network with another network (Fung 2006). In contrast, expanded benefits involves
processes like demonstration effects and capacity building which increase the benefits
to network partners as a result of your policies (Huber and Stephens 2001, 23-24). In El
Salvador, international donors recruited local communities who had been
experimenting with biodiversity and increased the benefits available to them.
International funders had experimented with the national government and had
found the results disappointing and so they began to work with a number of local
communities. However, one problem is that the ADESCOs has some very limited
capacity at the beginning. Many were tied to small-scale NGOs who provided most of
the bureaucratic aspects necessary for international funding. The result was that there
were some problems with working with ADESCOs despite preference for doing so. One
international funder explained “Our central office requires some oversight to make sure
the money is used to help the people. After the hurricane, none of the local
organizations had the experience working with us to meet these requirements. Few had
an organization, lots have stopped existing since then. They were there one day and
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then no longer there the next day.” As a result, both international funders and national
funders like FIAES began to develop small scale projects with minimal necessary
paperwork in order to get more communities involved. The result was a gradual
increase of the size of grants that communities could get.
In addition to recruitment, expanding benefits of projects became a key way to
include more communities into biodiversity policy generally. FIAES, GEF Small Grants
Program, and expanding international funder interest in corridors all coalesced in 20052010 to provide significant funding for local projects throughout the country. To return
to the example of Cinquera, small grants from GEF and FIAES grew to larger and larger
amounts to support the protected area they had created. Small grants grew to larger
and larger grants as a result of local activism and expanding resources (Valencia et al.
2011). In addition, these were able to link communities together to larger projects
connected with one another. The trial and error experiments and alliance testing from
the earlier period were met with expanded benefits to produce expanded networks of
actors.
Further evidence is indicated in the large number of PTT communities which
began being active in the MBC project. Usulutan being one of the most significant areas
for PTT projects also became a crucial state for MBC projects. What is significant is that
these corridor projects are not easily explained without seeing it as a connection
between the PTT and MBC activity. National NGOs were focused significantly in the
west of the country, international funders had begun efforts in the east of the country,
but Usulutan was largely learning through trial and error with communities sharing
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examples through the PTT network. The inclusion of this is one of many ways in which
the different clusters of the network developed different linkages.
While local governments were connecting with international actors and seeing
expanded benefits, the government of El Salvador and the MBC arrangement began
getting involved in the projects. The environmental ministry began its efforts in 2005
with a large-scale effort to redesign the biodiversity strategy of the country. The 2005
GEF project for USD $13,000,000 (the largest biodiversity project in El Salvador’s history)
specifically aimed at deepening and expanding the protected areas of the country in
order to fit with the MBC corridor idea. Unlike GEF 466, the coffee network project, this
project included a much wider network of actors including many ADESCOs and smaller
NGOs than were included in the 466 project (GEF 2011, #2635). This was the beginning
of a shift in learning by the ministry of the environment which would continue over the
next few years and lead to significant change. The government of El Salvador thus
began work in expanding their network in 2005.
It is difficult to precisely analyze the development of the MBC during this period
because the Coordinating office closed in 2006. Although the corridor project was not
being centrally coordinated, the actual projects linking with the corridor show a slow
incline in local government projects throughout the network. Evidence for network
expansion being core to the project though is seen in the 2010 relaunch of the project
which crucially included significant more projects and extended into El Salvador. This
change meant a reprioritization of the project from state-led management to
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community led management and the inclusion in the project of a host of different
biodiversity projects.
The 1997 MBC did include the Lago Guija-San Diego-La Barra protected area in
the Northwest corner of the country in the project; however, little change in its
management or connections in the country of El Salvador were planned. By 2010, El
Salvador represented one of the most significant areas for expansion of the project.
This point became clear during field work when I had been staring at a map of the MBC
for weeks in documents and the offices of the CCAD. The map included little in El
Salvador at all and so it was quite shocking to see the map of the same project hanging
in the Environmental Ministry of El Salvador that included significant projects in El
Salvador. There does not appear to be significant international pressure to encourage
the project to include outside of the areas already included in 1997 so this expansion
should be seen as a result of bottom-up learning. Second, the inclusion of local
communities, as opposed to just national NGOs, should be seen as a clear sign of
bottom-up learning. The forum shopping combined with recruitment and the policy
ratchet mechanisms to create a situation where local communities became the most
preferred actor. In El Salvador, this impact is quite clear. National protected areas,
which primarily were started in the 1990s in El Salvador are primarily led by the state
(49%) and large national NGOs (32%). ADESCOs only provide governance of 7% of
protected areas. When the view expands to include corridor efforts, buffer zones, and
other biodiversity projects, ADESCOs provide 39% of the governance agents and the
state only provides 26%.
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Network expansion can also result in centralized learning when it works through
gatekeeping by a centralized set of actors. In the Dominican context, the incorporation
of The Nature Conservancy in the national elite network shows this process of network
expansion. Holmes has explained that prior to 2008, the domestic elite network
detailed in the last chapter was able to restrain TNC from entering significantly into the
network (Holmes 2010). Indeed, it participated in very little of the network despite
significant efforts to do so. This changed with the development of the Caribbean
Challenge, a project of TNC that brought them in closer connection with the
environmental ministry and broke down some of the limitations on them. However, this
inclusion was a very limited and the result was that they did not fundamentally
transform he network but more fit in with the network that already existed. Learning
was limited in this situation and the network did not need to transform its focus on
conservation. Instead, TNC brought tremendous resources and experience to the
network and provided an additional alliance for support in the efforts of the central
network in regards to conservation. Similarly, while the network has extended to
include some ecotourism operations in the project, this is limited largely to the
ecotourist operations with the clearest connection with conservation. The result is that
network expansion is much more limited and contributes to less learning in the
Dominican context.
Network expansion can be a powerful learning pathway when connected with
expanding networks and expanding benefits to all parties. The El Salvador case shows
that when these mechanisms are active, the result can be the spread of new strategies
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and efforts to further expand these processes. Gatekeeping, or the process of limited
expansion to actors that offer benefits to a central organization, tends to result in little
learning and often for very limited political gains.
Learning through broadcasting
Broadcasting is a key part of learning in international environmental politics that
involves the gathering of comparative and systematic ideas in a single area of the
network which then transmit the information to other actors. It is distinct from trial and
error experimentation because of its focus on systemic and comparative lessons. The
Dominican case shows that broadcasting can result in very centralized learning;
however, the conclusion will reflect on the conditions under which this pathway can
lead to bottom-up learning. However, there is a risk in the context that learning
becomes very limited in its approach as a result of proceeding through this pathway.
The Dominican case responded to the continuing and slowly developing problem
of failed earlier efforts. The regional governance arrangement, SPAW, created a
number of paper parks but with limited impact or management. In the Dominican case,
the significant protected area system had become increasingly pressured by the
increasing tourism sector. The problem was a weak regional biodiversity platform and a
competitive domestic sphere and the result was centralized learning.
SPAW had started with a plan for action, but quickly got weighed down by the
problem of political intractability pretty much from the start. The agreement took
significant time to be approved by member states and largely came into force without
significant changes to any member governments’ policies. Initial enthusiasm about the
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protocol was lost as efforts shifted to ratification and implementation of the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) after 1992 and the weak CEP secretariat was unable to
support the protocol (Barker 2002). According to the CEP ratification website, only two
members, St. Vincent/Grenadines and the Netherlands, had ratified the agreement in
SPAW’s first five years being open for ratification. With an energized secretariat in the
mid-1990s, there were 6 more ratifications in the 1996-1999 period. This included the
Dominican Republic which acceded to the agreement in 1998 (at the same time that it
ratified the CEP and the Oil Spill Protocol). After a decade of being open, the agreement
was one member shy of entry into force which came later that year with the ratification
by St. Lucia.
In addition to having little authority, SPAW also required very little action from
states. Although there is not exact overlap between SPAW and the CBD, states seem to
find SPAW requirements relatively easy after they have developed a national strategy
for biodiversity under the CBD and can access the funding mechanisms available under
SPAW to help them with CBD efforts. During its long time entering into force, activity
was conducted under interim committees which could not implement decisions but
which met and developed some updates on the annexes and other procedures. When
the agreement came into force significant updating of the agreement began to occur
(Barker 2002); however, most of this updating was devising procedures for amending
the annexes and did not change the protocol significantly. Other than sea turtle
management, which does appear to be relatively well implemented with some
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significant regional coordination, SPAW has seen little effort beyond the creation of
some limited protected areas in the countries of the Caribbean.
Most significantly, SPAW has not altered its 1990s goals or procedures
significantly to account for changed research in conservation biology over the past two
decades which encourage increased public participation, a richer ecosystem
perspective, and accounting for, not halting, human modification of the environment
(Chazdon et al. 2009). On the ground efforts under SPAW have pushed for the creation
of conservation areas and protected reserves, but not developed more advanced
management strategies regarding the inclusion of surrounding communities or areas.
One review of the efforts in St. Lucia concluded that “In many respects, then, the SPAW
Protocol is the product of a bygone era when conservation was approached in a very
narrow way, with little consideration for livelihood and development issues”
(Krishnarayan, Renard, and John 2006). SPAW’s efforts to push an ecosystem
perspective in conservation management have not materialized in post entry
adaptations which have largely focused solely on individual species, nor in the on the
ground efforts which have instead been limited exclusively to the creation of
conservation areas.
This problem of ineffective regional effort gradually became a more important
problem highlighted by the USAID-TNC project “parks in peril” that began studying the
problem in the 1990s and expanded in the 2000s. This program aimed to understand
the level of management in the region and began a plan of operations to deal with the
problem of weak conservation. This culminated in the 2008 development of the
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Caribbean Challenge, a TNC-spearheaded effort to get improved conservation
throughout the region. It is the second largest biodiversity governance arrangement
ever in the region, next to SPAW, and commits the countries of the group to creating
protected areas over 20-25% of their territory. Most importantly, it targets both
terrestrial and marine biodiversity.
The immediate background for the project was the development of a similar
project in the Pacific. The Micronesian Challenge started in 2005 and was one of the
most significant regional marine biodiversity programs ever in scope. Five countries
joined together to protect upwards of 20% of their territory and over 30% of key coastal
zones. Although significantly influenced by regional TNC organizers, the program
became largely spearheaded by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) who
pushed the program further. Although significant funding has been pledged toward The
Micronesian Challenge, not all of it has materialized, particularly for some of the
sustainable development components of the project (The Micronesia Challenge 2011,
2010).
In 2008, at COP 9 of the CBD, the Caribbean Challenge was announced and five
countries in the region agreed to the challenge immediately, including the Dominican
Republic. According to the program their three core goals are: 1. creating networks of
marine protected areas expanding across 21 million acres of territorial coasts and
waters, 2. establishing protected area trust funds to generate permanent, dedicated and
sustainable funding sources for the effective management, expansion and scientific
monitoring of all parks and protected areas, 3. developing national level demonstrations
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projects for climate change adaptation. Regionally, efforts on the first two have been
extremely active, while the third has lagged somewhat.
The Caribbean Challenge has been able to secure substantial financial
contributions. Following on the Parks in Peril program between TNC and USAID in Latin
America and the Caribbean, the program aimed to address lack of adequate funding at a
number of protected areas in the hemisphere. Struggling with the problem of what
Parks in Peril called “Paper Parks”, where boundaries of protected areas and
management strategies established but not with any significant impact, stable funding
that would be beyond the budgetary whims of governments was seen as vital. Multiple
individual reported chronic shortfalls in funding. For example, interview with a national
NGO head explained that members of the environmental ministry have to pay for any
site visits out of their own pockets. In 2008, this resulted in pledges of $20 million from
TNC, $9 million from GEF, and $12 million from KfW banking group as part of German
government sponsored development assistance. As part of the coordination aspect,
TCC fostered a series of GEF Grants in each of the original members to alter their
protected area systems to achieve financial sustainability and increase in marine
protection. Over $20 million was provided by GEF in these different grants to the
countries to fulfill these reassessments of their protected area systems.
The Dominican Republic’s GEF grant, although it begun years prior to TCC, does
specifically aim at creating a diverse, financial source for its protected areas. Their GEF
Grant explains that “The first barrier to the effectiveness of the NPAS [National
Protected Area System] is the inability of SEMARENA [Secretariat of Environment] to
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generate and channel adequate financial flows in support of their management. Funding
needs for the NPAS over the period 2006-2015 are estimated at US$42,876,571 (an
average of US$4.3 million per year), while the budgetary allocation for 2008 is only 70%
of that figure ($3.02 million), leaving a shortfall of almost US$1.3 million per year”
(Global Environment Facility 2008). The grant proposes to help the government develop
a protected area system that relies upon communities, NGOs and other actors to
complement the management of the protected area system and get additional funding
from NGOs, granting organizations, and visitors to protected areas.
One year after the launch of the Caribbean Challenge, the Dominican Republic
agreed to expand their protected area system significantly. As the TNC’s press release
reads: “The Nature Conservancy applauds a recent Presidential decree in the Dominican
Republic, which will add 31 new protected areas into its national protected areas
system. The new protected areas encompass a total of 1,321,024 hectares—just over
3.2 million acres—of terrestrial and marine habitat. The decree acknowledged the need
to reinforce the Dominican Republic’s existing National System of Protected Areas” (The
Nature Conservancy 2009). The Dominican Republic then became the first country in
the challenge to meet the requirement of having 20% of their marine territory
protected and protected significant amount of territory. However, these declarations
followed closely the pattern of conservation politics in the Dominican Republic
previously: Expansion of old protected areas, creation of new protected areas without
full management plans for those sites, done by Presidential decree.
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In terms of financial sustainability, interviews with NGO representatives,
managers of protected areas, and environmental ministry officials in August 2010 all
expressed that the gap in funding remains and that the environmental ministry is
chronically underfunded. Although the GEF project is still ongoing and much of the
money has not been delivered, the initial strategy to charge visitors a nominal fee at
protected areas appears not to have improved financial situation in the early years of
the program. Some co-management happens in the Dominican Republic, key examples
including management in the Bay of Samana and Parque Nacional Jaragua; however,
much of the efforts since 2008 have emphasized solely ecotourism operations as comanagement partners and largely ignored other possible actors. However, ecotourism
funding may not be as sustainable as expected and relying upon tourism to fill the
funding gap for protected areas may not create financial sustainability as desired as it
does not fully diversify funding.
As new actors were brought into the domestic Dominican conservation network,
the influencing forces were largely that that centralized network that channeled much
of the efforts towards its conservation efforts. As a result, new actors are brought into
forums by these actors for centralized planning and engagement. The reason is because
of two different issues: domestic-elite bargaining as a primary means of politics and
forum membership as the main way to get the elite organized.
Domestic-elite bargaining is a major form of environmental politics in the
country largely as a result of competition between the tourist sector and the
conservation elite. The government plays a key role mediating these different forces.
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Many individuals from outside the Dominican government could list the different
proposals they made to the government to improve the management within parks: from
education of local communities, to not using foreign species for replanting after
hurricanes, to more ecosystem wide perspectives that were not taken seriously by the
ministry. The blame was widely spread around specific members in the government.
Leonel Fernandez was seen by some as particularly closed to conservation options that
conflicted with the tourism ministry. Particular high ranking members in the
environmental ministry were also seen as committed to very closed paths toward
conservation areas. The environmental ministry as a whole was seen as wellintentioned but lacking in the funding and support to develop different visions. As one
NGO head explained, the Environmental Ministry “needs to evolve much more to make
it an effective branch of government.” International funders and governance actors
similarly found the ministry, and its lack of financial stability and standing in the
government, as limiting in its ability to create and implement new programs.
However, more than simply the ministry, the constraints do seem to be spread
throughout the coalition of key conservation actors more generally. Holmes writes that
“Amongst the civil servants, NGOs, oligarchs and experts in Dominican conservation,
there is an undisputed acceptance that protected areas should be at the heart of
environmental policy, while other issues such as pollution and urban ecology have been
neglected by both government and the environmental movement” (Holmes 2010, 637).
Indeed, interviews with NGO heads and other elite conservation members revealed that
much of their work is spent on supporting the protected area system that exists in the
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country against other actors, usually the tourist sector. The contentious politics
between tourist sector and conservationists has been partially mediated through
ecotourist operations; however, this has further supported the existence of
conservation areas as a key policy foundation, while any deepening of conservation is
not seen as particularly necessary to either side.
Domestic elite bargaining occurs between the government, various NGOs, and
other members of the elite as earlier defined. Governance structures are built to a large
extent in the bargaining between these units: as exemplified in the 1997 Los Haitises
military action. When this elite can coalesce on a policy, typically the default position of
protecting conservation areas, they can effectively impact the government, as
exemplified in the mid-2000 mobilization against privatization of beaches in
conservation areas. The mechanism then typically privileges default positions, not
necessarily least common denominator positions, but the position shared by all actors,
which in this cases is the status quo.
Institutional embedding is key in governance to the extent that actors are able to
embed policies throughout the infrastructure and then operate from that position.
Declared creation of protected areas is particularly useful here in that it creates a
negotiating point that is quite stable. In terms of national politics, one NGO head noted
that “starting in the 1990s we started agreeing on a lot. In the 1980s it was not clear
what was happening, but in the 1990s, agreement between a lot of us were stable.” In
contrast, deepening protected areas or developing extensive management schemes
does not push particular institutional embedding in contexts of underfunding or possible
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political shifts, instead these are potential costs that can be overturned. One nationallevel NGO manager explained that the attempts to integrate social or economic
responsibilities into conservation plans is difficult because of the limited realm of
discussions. One ecotourism operator commented that although there is significant
potential in the protected area system, the struggles with pure economic extraction
limits that potential. An NGO head expressed that the competitive situation in the postBalaguer era made it so that everyone wanted to secure clear control over institutional
pieces. Institutional embedding was thus a mechanism that developed in a postauthoritarian conservation politics that preferred conservation but not deepening of
that policy.
Finally, forum membership is a key means of governance in the Dominican case.
Forums have arisen as a key component of biodiversity governance worldwide and are
seen as a key in many governance arrangements in bringing various stakeholders
together. However, in the Dominican Republic, forum membership is often a key
procedure in governance which brings in certain actors and excludes others. A key
example is the distancing and limitations of TNC (Holmes 2010) before recent events
have increased their profile. Forums organized by Helvetas, GTZ, and USAID have all
proved key to governance making in the country. These forums, however, result in
limiting options and ideas that are deemed already out of the agenda. Since most
forums have their goal in strengthening conservation area politically and in their
standing, other issues fail to get on the agenda.
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The centralized network structure in the Dominican Republic case had a
significant impact on limiting the possibilities for external learning in the network. The
competitive domestic political situation resulted in domestic-elite bargaining and forum
membership as crucial means of channeling the lessons to a set of centralized learning.
Hypothesis Analysis
Hypothesis 1 expects that if a governance arrangement has a modular structure
then they will see bottom-up learning following a shock. This hypothesis in the cases
compared here expects that El Salvador will see bottom-up learning following shocks.
Following the natural disasters that occurred from 1997 until 2005 in the country, trial
and error experimentation began by both communities and international funders.
These started in a host of different communities and beyond the initial trials were
shaped significantly by the network connections described in the last chapter. Findings
from communities involved in these initial efforts were largely shared along network
connections that preexists the experiment: namely the PTT network, the FMLN
municipal network, and communities that worked on earlier projects with one another.
The modular network structure in this case directly shaped the process of learning. This
was similarly shown with the network expansion that happened largely between 20022006 following the political shock in the MBC with the political problems of the early
project. In this case, the modular structure offered the possibility for multiple
connections to be formed with new networks. However, in order to do this, the
approach had to change to tie in the new networks. As the approach changed from
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conservation areas and buffer zones to a complex patchwork of biodiversity actions, this
was directly the result of the network expansion.
Although the next chapter will more fully show the changed perspective by
actors at the international level, a single example can illustrate this process fully.
Although biodiversity in an agricultural landscape had been started with the coffee pilot
project in 1997 in El Salvador, there was no significant planning that operated based
upon integrating biodiversity into agriculture in the early development of the MBC. In
the initial MBC project, agriculture played a small role and the idea was often to create
buffer zones to reduce agricultural pressure on protected areas. This approach led one
NGO member in El Salvador to dismiss the project as “completely wrong.” The 2011
World Bank analysis of their part of the project similarly evaluated the project largely
based upon how much it restrained agricultural use in areas. However, this approach
offered little ability to connect with the heavily farmed country of El Salvador. The
result was trial and error learning by communities that allowed some inventive linking in
with the project for agriculture. The MBC relaunch in 2010 thus included agriculture
and agricultural zones as a significant aspect of the project, the El Salvadorian
environmental ministry had switched significantly to this changed focus by 2009, and all
of the corridor projects in the period after 2007 involved agricultural interactions as
crucial parts of the project.
Hypothesis 2 expects that centralized networks will result primarily in top-down
learning processes. In the Dominican Republic case, this would be expected to largely
involve learning from the domestic elite network. Aside from the absence of any
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evidence of bottom-up learning, it is also clear that the network structure largely
ensured that learning through broadcasting would be the most dominant in this
situation. Learning was largely limited to political learning in the new competitive
environment created with the end of authoritarian support for conservation. The result
is that actors were brought into the network, but that they were included in ways which
limited the incorporation of new ideas. Most importantly is that there does not appear
to be original change of ideas throughout the network, but that the limited context
constrains the ability of these to have an impact. The priority becomes about
consolidating networks rather than changing governance. As one environmental NGO
leader explained ““It isn’t just what we are doing…it is about consolidating different
parties. In terms of NGOs, we need to consolidate and keep them involved. Not all
NGOs are involved—not all are in the alignment.”
A counterfactual consideration may provide additional evidence for rejecting the
null condition of Hypothesis 2. If the conservation network would have retained its
prominence in the early 2000s with the government and not entered into competition
with the tourist sector, would the learning have still been limited in this case? In this
counterfactual situation, if the answer is affirmed then this supports rejection of the null
because it supports the impact of network structure on the learning context. It seems
plausible that even without the competitive domestic political context, the learning
would have been limited to political learning. The best evidence of this is in the forum
organizing between members of the environmental body. These started in the 1990s
when the competitive context had not fully formed and involved a number of the key
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actors who would remain lead the forums later on. The network linking the government
scientific bodies with the active NGOs also provides additional evidence for provisionally
supporting this counterfactual condition.
Network Structure Conclusion
Network structure has an impact on the learning dynamics that exist in the
different governance arrangements. The modular structure mediates against
broadcasting because of different conceptions of authority and biodiversity governance
that exist in the different structures. Trial and error experimentation and network
expansion are two methods by which actors can acquire new ideas about biodiversity
governance or methods of cooperation.
To assess learning in the two agreements, it is useful to divide learning between
policy learning (lessons about the processes of political implementation), environmental
learning (lessons about the causal processes that policies have on environmental
outcomes), and social learning (learning how to learn in the future) (Argyris and Schon
1978, Levitt and March 1988, May 1992, Hall 1993, Haas and Haas 1995, The Social
Learning Group 2001). Policy learning during this period was highest in the case of El
Salvador because of the new actors interacting in a new environment. Trial and error
contributed to network expansion and the result was broadened understandings of
policy options. In contrast the Dominican environmental network had some initial
problems discerning the post-authoritarian competitive political environment. Policy
learning thus deviated in only small amounts from the earlier policies attempted.
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Environmental learning in the two cases saw similar dynamics play out. Crucial
in the case of El Salvador is that the local biodiversity experimentation resulted in
significant attention to it from key intellectual entrepreneurs. In El Salvador this role
was played by PRISMA and in the entire region the main leader was CATIE. Both
organizations began publishing findings which supported the local efforts of the various
communities and thus improved the environmental learning of the governance
arrangements. In addition, because many of the local communities saw biodiversity
issues as rooted in a larger resource system, including water and agricultural use,
significant learning was done in regards to developing these multi-focal efforts. The
Dominican Republic experienced much more limited learning that largely sought to
augment the conservation system in place. This should not be interpreted as meaning
that there was no environmental learning during this period, because it was significant
in the Dominican Republic. However, the learning was more focused on supporting the
status quo approach rather than any altered approach. Environmental learning was
thus not of different degrees, but different focuses with the learning in El Salvador being
defined largely by exploration and the learning in the Dominican Republic being done to
support the approaches decided upon earlier.
Finally, social learning is the most difficult assessment in the different
approaches and there are not clear indicators for either governance arrangement.
What may be most significant is to analyze the learning that is done in informal but
sustained manner. For the Dominican case, there appears to be significant learning
within forums. Forums organized at the national level or at the international level
241

provide the most significant times for learning in the arrangement. In the El Salvador
case, in contrast, forums are important but learning appears to occur outside of these
activities as well. The way that learning occurred in non-biodiversity networks, like the
PTT and FMLN municipalities, demonstrates some social learning extending outside of
official forums.
In conclusion, network structure directly and significantly had an impact on the
learning dynamics in the different governance arrangements. However, what both
cases also show is that this impact is not constant but dynamically related to shocks and
earlier learning efforts. The impact of network structure on learning processes is thus a
dynamic relationship. This may explain some aberrant cases where network structure
produced a different outcome at this stage. It would be expected from the discussion
above that if early lessons fail to address problems or generate benefits for actors that
the impact of network structure will grow increasingly fragile. These cases thus
highlight both that network structure is significantly important and the possible
limitations that this importance has on learning dynamics.
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CHAPTER 6
RESILIENT GOVERNANCE
Network structure, mediated through the post-shock learning dynamics, shapes
the eventual outcomes of governance arrangements in terms of resilience. Modular
network structures will likely result in resilient governance because they have a wider
range of information about how to respond to shocks and because the governance
adaptations are more applicable to the various clusters of actors. Centralized networks,
in contrast, are likely to result in governance which does not adapt to the situation
because idea generation is channeled by one cluster in the network or where the ideas
have low applicability.
In El Salvador, the modular network structure resulted in decentralized learning
through trial and error experimentation, exchange of information, and network
expansion. In the Dominican Republic, the centralized national level elite networks
channeled learning to continue their preference in a competitive context. However, the
lessons in Chapter 2 have shown that generation of ideas and bottom-up learning is
insufficient to foster resilient governance. In many cases of biodiversity governance the
generation of ideas leads to outcomes of arrested development where the information
is unable to be implemented (as was the case of Ramsar). Conversely, early learning
through bottom-up methods could fail to ever form into a coherent whole resulting in
equilibrium outcome (as was the case of CBD).
To test the crucial Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, this chapter studies the
resulting impacts in terms of adaptive capacity and authoritative capability in the two
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key cases of El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. Hypothesis 4 expects that if there
the bottom-up learning in El Salvador will result in resilient governance. Hypothesis 5
contends the opposite result for the top-down learning in the Dominican Republic. To
evaluate these considerations, this chapter will focus on transformations to the network
structure, the governance approach, and the impact on the environment.
Network Transformations
If the metaphor of the adaptive cycle from resilient ecosystem studies has
significant salience, it is in the development and transformation of networks through
the stages. Network connections are formed, sometimes they become stale or of
limited use to actors, then they go through a cycle of reorganization before once again
forming in a network structure. A crucial basis for Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 5, and
Hypothesis 6 is that network structures tend to replicate their forms. If network
structures were to change dramatically through the process, then the system has moved
to another state and, most importantly, probably had a limited causal impact on the
outcome. In contrast, the evidence below will demonstrate quite clearly that network
structures tend to reorganize in similar structure to the preexisting one.
In the El Salvador situation, the modular network experienced significant
bottom-up learning during and after the shocks experienced around 2005. The primary
approach adopted by a number of actors at various levels emphasizes small biodiversity
projects and focusing on projects that integrated with lived environments. This
approach was crucial in contributing to future network evolution. The result is that the
network became increasingly dense, but retained a number of modular structures.
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When understanding the different modules of the network, the coordination for
the project at the regional level largely subsided after the initial enthusiasm and
permanently ended largely with the 2006 closure of the coordinating office. However,
corridor activities during this period increased significantly on the local level, and
particularly so in El Salvador, as described in the last section. In 2010, the relaunch of
the project thus did not initiate local initiatives as much it recognized the changed
situation.
Looking at the 2006-2010 corridor projects in El Salvador demonstrates this
transformation and the network effects that it had. First, FIAES plays a key mediating
role for many of the local level actors and NGOs. While GEF and FIAES make up a large
bulk of the cases for the network, it is interesting that while FIAES plays a role as a
bridge, the GEF attached projects tend to be less isolated and more connected with
other actors. This partially may be a result of FIAES providing easier granting criteria
and processes that allows more one shot projects; but it may also be a point of larger
relevance about what local level actors and national NGOs improve their centrality.
Second key aspect about the network is that the dense area of the network has a host of
different actors in the most dense area. Local level actors, business sector actors,
national NGOs and the U.S. government are all active. However, the highest number of
actors in the core are various international funders. In the dense area still there are two
clusters to the top and bottom of various national NGOs and local level actors.
Regardless, it is apparent from the visualization of the networks that international
funders have significantly increased their relevance in the Corridor network from the
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earlier manifestations. One final key aspect about the dense section of the graph is that
it is highly redundant in terms of linkages. There is not a single unit that would break
the graph apart and separate out the different areas: at least five organizations would
have to be removed in order for the network to be split from its current set of
connections.

Figure 6.1- Labeled Social Network Graph of El Salvador Corridor projects.
Some of the crucial nodes are the key actors that would be expected to be
prominent: FIAES, GEF, the Environmental Ministry, etc. However, within the network,
other actors are similarly important in connection with these actors. The visualization
appears to support contentions that while the centrality of the state may have
sustained, its role as a linking actor in the network seems to have given way to a denser
set of connections for most of the actors involved in the network.
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Quantitative indicators of the network support this general conclusion with
FIAES and GEF retaining significant centrality and, in the case of FIAES, betweeness.
FIAES, a combined effort between USAID and the El Salvador Ministry of the
Environment, is the key linking organization for a host of actors. GEF is the center of the
more dense web of connections with a number of linkages to multiple other actors.
Although important, the centrality of these actors should not be overemphasized
because the sheer number of projects by both organizations when compared to other
actors elevates them up to a higher level of centrality. The conclusion to draw is that
FIAES and GEF are the key central actors in the network, but that this may not be as
great as depicted in centrality scores.
In terms of type of actors, U.S. government actors (USAID and the Peace Corp),
the government of El Salvador, and international funders are those with the most
significant centrality in the network. Since there are only two ‘Other’ actors, that score
is exceedingly inflated by FIAES’ very high score. National NGOs, local actors, and
businesses are far less central in the network in terms of Centrality and Betweeness.
Some conditions have to be added to the discussion in order to fully understand the
situation. Local governments did not exist at all in the network earlier and so any
increase is significant. In addition, when focusing on the dense area of the network
only, the centrality, betweeness and eigenvector scores of local governments increase
significantly. Similar conclusion can be seen with international funders, other than
USAID, that have significantly increased their centrality. However, National NGOs
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appear to have not significantly improved their centrality in the Corridor network from
earlier articulations.

Average

Average

Average

Centrality

Betweeness Score

Eigenvector

Business Sector

1.11

0

3.3416

Government of El Salvador

13.0535

1.4505

20.3635

U.S. Actors

17.222

3.814

22.4385

National NGO

4.6703

.0206

7.9442

Other

38.33

36.2705

25.9625

Local Level Actor

4.2033

.04853

7.1846

International Funder

14.25

1.7954

19.0081

Overall Network Average

7.692

1.323

11.04

Network Centralization Index

23.269%

72.01%

8.56%

Table 6.1- Social Network Analysis Measures of El Salvador Corridor Network.
This evidence shows significant clustering in the network with groups connected
together and then having less strong connections to other actors. The shock did change
significantly the members of the network and of the 92 actors included in the network
map above, fewer than a third were engaged in the clear biodiversity networks
discussed in Chapter 4. However, the network structure stayed consistent with a
number of clusters of actors interacting primarily with one another.
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In contrast, in the Dominican Republic, the network retained a largely centralized
structure through the transformation did include integrating in the tourist network and
some actors who were marginal before (namely TNC). More actors though did not
change the general structure of the governance arrangement. In other national
contexts the Caribbean Challenge may have responded differently, but in the Dominican
case the result was largely in supporting the centralized network before.
Figure 6.2 shows the Caribbean Challenge network, which did include new actors
but which kept a largely consistent network structure. Business and international
funders get integrated into the network with the Caribbean Challenge; however, they
were integrated into the network that retained the centrality of other actors. While
they were dispersed and not connected greatly with the core of the network in the
earlier network depictions, business actors have taken over prominent positions and are
significantly embedded in the dense part of the network. In addition, the central
positions for the network is provided by three fairly redundant organizations: the
Dominican Ministry of the Environment, USAID, and The Nature Conservancy.
Particularly the Ministry of the Environment has a prominent location as a bridging node
providing the most significant connections between the actors below the dense part of
the network with the dense part. The visualization supports that the Ministry of the
Environment, USAID, and TNC all have seen the greatest increase in their prominence in
the network and business organizations have connected far more centrally in the
network.
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Measures of the network similarly bolster this with clear increased centrality for
business and the state actors in this network. Business actors, in particular, moved from
being largely outside of the network to prominent positions. Although their betweeness
score did not become highly relevant within the network, their centrality and
eigenvector scores became crucially important. Similarly, the state did not improve
dramatically any of the particular scores, but did see increases on all measures of
prominence in networks collected here. International Funders and the U.S.
government, centered now around USAID and not bringing in the Fish and Wildlife
Service significantly, also increased their prominence in the network significantly. In
terms of betweeness though the impact on the network is clear as the United States
government entities and the government of the Dominican Republic became crucial
actors in terms of betweeness and no other group of actors did. Table 6.2 shows the
changes in eigenvector averages between groups in the original network construction
from 1999-2009 and the Challenge network construction.

250

Figure 6.2- Labeled Social Network Graph of Dominican Republic Caribbean Challenge
Network.
Average
Centrality
49.75371

Average
Betweeness
0.422571

Average
Eigenvector
30.69686

Business
Government of the Dominican
Republic
53.44825
8.2275
27.4305
International Funder
29.655
1.1299
15.4852
Local
National NGO
35.1726
1.4508
19.0904
Other
36.2065
0.388
20.365
U.S. Govt
63.793
5.4065
34.8555
Average Network Score
41.149
2.2
22.512
Network Centrality Index
23.01%
31.21%
26.73%
Table 6.2- Social Network Analysis indicators for Dominican Republic Caribbean
Challenge Network.
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Figure 6.3- Difference in Eigenvector scores by Sector in Dominican Republic Networks.
Governance Transformation
The MBC saw significantly transformed network strategy and the 2010 project
differs from significantly from the 1997 project. In contrast, the significant updating
which was planned for in the Caribbean Challenge was largely scuttled and instead
resulted in the same style of governance as had existed before in the Dominican
Republic. While there was some learning in the Caribbean Challenge, this was not
possible to integrate into the governance arrangement. Exploring these differences will
clarify the core aspects of the transformation.
The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) has changed significantly from the
early years until the later stages of the project. The 1997 launching of the project,
funded primarily by the World Bank and NASA, aimed to regionally organize and
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connect protected areas throughout the region and monitor progress using aerial
mapping. Efforts for the project from 2000 until 2006 were organized out of an office in
Managua, Nicaragua separated from other organs of the regional integration
institutions. Some new creation of protected areas did occur and there was some initial
monetary and technical assistance. The project was a centralized project with funding
from a few sources and projects were largely undertaken through national coordination
of policies.
In contrast, the 2010 relaunch of the Corridor project (Comision
Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD) 2009) was distinct in a number of
key respects. The scope of the project was largely about integration of a variety of
issues as part of the corridor project (including clean energy, water, and adaptation to
climate change), participation of local communities was embedded as the core actors of
the project, exchange of information throughout the project was of utmost priority, and
the coordination was to be a series of regular exchanges rather than central
organization. The focus had shifted in a variety of ways from large scale coordination
efforts to a number of small scale efforts. Participation of local governments was a core
focus of the project and monitoring was to be done with various approaches.
One dramatic difference between 2000 and 2010 was that the Corridor had
moved to the country of El Salvador. A lengthy history of extensive cultivation
throughout the country (the extensive settlement and landuse in the country was
present long prior to Spanish settlement Dull 2007), the long civil war in the 1980s, the
lack of any significant protected areas in the country, and perception of irreversible land
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degradation in the country had largely kept El Salvador out of the initial MBC project.
The 2000 strategy for the MBC did include the Lago Guija-San Diego-La Barra protected
area in the Northwest corner of the country in the project; however, little change in its
management or connection in the country of El Salvador was planned. By the latter half
of the decade, El Salvador had a number of projects linking in with the regional corridor
concept and began to be a significant part of the extension of the MBC and much of its
activity. The maps of project aspects changed, the approach of the project had adapted,
and the support for the Corridor was enough to drive for its continuation even after the
formal institution had faded.
In direct comparison with this, the Caribbean system largely generated the same
response as had happened in prior agreements. In 1990, the Caribbean Environment
Programme (CEP) negotiated and opened for ratification the Protocol Concerning
Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW). The most significant regional
biodiversity governance attempt in terms of membership and scope at the time, SPAW’s
broad goals were to increase protected areas in the Caribbean region, particularly
marine protected areas, utilize an ecosystem perspective and not to focus solely on
individual species, and create a permanent fund to support these efforts. To comply
with SPAW, the Dominican Republic created some new protected areas in the country
and expanded previous areas. In 2008, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) announced five
countries had agreed to the Caribbean Challenge (TCC). It was the most significant
regional biodiversity governance project led by an NGO and its broad goals were to
increase protected areas in the Caribbean region, particularly marine protected areas,
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utilize an ecosystem perspective which focuses on wider environmental issues, and
create a permanent fund to support these efforts.
One year after the launch of the Caribbean Challenge, the Dominican Republic
agreed to expand their protected area system significantly. As the TNC’s press release
reads: “The Nature Conservancy applauds a recent Presidential decree in the Dominican
Republic, which will add 31 new protected areas into its national protected areas
system. The new protected areas encompass a total of 1,321,024 hectares—just over
3.2 million acres—of terrestrial and marine habitat. The decree acknowledged the need
to reinforce the Dominican Republic’s existing National System of Protected Areas” (The
Nature Conservancy 2009). The Dominican Republic then became the first country in
the challenge to meet the requirement of having 20% of their marine territory
protected and protected significant amount of territory. However, these declarations
followed closely the pattern of conservation politics in the Dominican Republic
previously: Expansion of old protected areas, creation of new protected areas without
full management plans for those sites, done by Presidential decree.
In terms of financial sustainability, interviews with NGO representatives,
managers of protected areas, and environmental ministry officials in August 2010 all
expressed that the gap in funding remains and that the environmental ministry is
chronically underfunded. Although the GEF project is still ongoing and much of the
money has not been delivered, the initial strategy to charge visitors a nominal fee at
protected areas appears not to have improved financial situation in the early years of
the program. Some co-management happens in the Dominican Republic, key examples
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including management in the Bay of Samana and Parque Nacional Jaragua; however,
much of the efforts since 2008 have emphasized solely ecotourism operations as comanagement partners and largely ignored other possible actors. However, ecotourism
funding may not be as sustainable as expected and relying upon tourism to fill the
funding gap for protected areas may not create financial sustainability as desired as it
does not fully diversify funding.
The Caribbean Challenge in the Dominican Republic then has largely repeated
policies tried earlier which have failed to substantially improve the biodiversity of the
country. Although it is popular to compare to Haiti as the other half of the island shared
(Diamond 2005) and such disparity is starkly evident. Although there has been some
significant slowing of loss, deforestation around parks continues, there are not
management plans at 60% of protected areas in the country, and endangered species
numbers continue to fall (EarthTrends 2003, Global Environment Facility 2008,
International Resources Group 2001). According to one NGO head, “the protected area
system in the Dominican Republic is not very good, it is just that they keep people out”
so the rapid decline does not occur. Ecosystem perspectives, although the goal in both
SPAW and TCC, have not been introduced into the governance of biodiversity in the
country significantly.
Environmental Resilience
The crucial question remains about whether this has any impact on the
environment or on the ecosystem services provided to the population. There is
sufficient evidence for some initial answers to this question. El Salvador has shown
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some significantly positive outcomes in terms of biodiversity, some of which can be
linked to the corridor projects in the country. In contrast, the Dominican Republic has
shown limited improvement and there are no clear signs of improving biodiversity in the
country.
In terms of ecosystem fragmentation, various indicators suggest that the
governance agreement is assisting in dealing with fragmentation. First, Hecht and
Saatchi show that between 1990 and 2000 there was significant growth of forest cover
throughout El Salvador and that significant reforestation had occurred (Hecht and
Saatchi 2007). Other contributing factors are the primary cause for this aspect of the
findings, such as depopulation of the rural countryside, disruption of large export
agriculture, etc. However, crucial in the discussion is local communities taking control
over the resources. Cinquera, the key example highlighted above, is a crucial case in this
respect. Their efforts at management of their natural environment has resulted in
significantly improved forest cover and habitat coverage (Valencia et al. 2011). This is
an illustrative but not an extreme example, and other communities elsewhere have
seen significant progress in terms of ecosystem fragmentation. The MBC is thus part of
other processes, but deserves to be seen as a governance intervention that appears to
be improving forest fragmentation.
In terms of ecosystem service vulnerability, it is relevant that the natural
disasters in El Salvador did not end and one of the best cases for analysis is comparing
Hurricane Mitch with Hurricane Ida in 2009. Hurricane Ida produced dramatic rains for
a number of days throughout El Salvador dumping rain comparable with Hurricane
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Mitch in 1998. There were once again significant landslides throughout the country;
however, the level was significantly less than Hurricane Mitch, the earthquakes, or
Hurricane Stan. In addition, the same processes highlighted as contributing to
biodiversity governance above, the local-local network primarily, was seen as a crucial
means of responses to Hurricane Ida (Tellman 2010). The networks and efforts in El
Salvador have shown significant reduction in vulnerability to natural disasters and
improved community resilience to such disasters.
The environmental impact of these expansions will not be seen clearly for years;
however, the early evidence shows significant ability to reduce fragmentation and to
reduce vulnerability. Some initial projects have become permanent programs run by
local communities or the national government itself so the political effectiveness is very
high in the case of El Salvador. This is most surprising considering the significant
political barriers to the program in the early parts in other countries. In addition, the
evidence shows that these local-local efforts have reduced fragmentation and improved
some key aspects of ecosystem health. In general then the study finds that there has
been significant effectiveness as a result of the governance arrangement.
The Dominican Republic has not produced a resilient ecosystem. Initially, there
are no studies that demonstrate sustained improvement in species health or
ecosystems throughout the country. More dramatically for the assessment of socioecological resilience is the continued negative recovery after natural disasters. Tropical
storm Noel in 2007 generated significant rainfall in the Dominican Republic with
numerous impacts. The regeneration after this storm has been significantly limited
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largely as a result of any management outside of protected areas. Izzo, et. al.
summarize the results of Noel and the evidence it provides about the resilience of the
socio-ecological system:
On October 29th 2007, the Dominican Republic was hit by the Tropical Storm
Noel, which caused huge precipitation all over the country and strong winds in the
South West of the national territory. The storm can be considered as an exceptional
event as to the persistence of rainfall in the considered 6-day period, for which
recurrence periods of 50 to over 200 years could be calculated in various provinces. The
collected data evidence that the main impacts on the population were provoked by
landslides and flooding, which accompanied the storm event. The hugest socioeconomic consequences involved rural communities, which were affected very strongly
by the interruption or destruction of communication infrastructures and by the loss of a
lot of foodstuffs and agricultural products…Zones where recuperation appears the most
critic are those affected by landslides. In particular, the complete removal of the
vegetation cover makes very difficult, at least in the short to medium-term period, the
rehabilitation of agricultural parcels. (Izzo et al. 2009, 156)
Indeed, demands for speedier recovery after these hurricanes in protected areas
has led to introduction of foreign species which will grow faster than native plants
further degrading the resilience of the ecological system. Despite a significant protected
area network that is used as a model for other countries (Diamond 2005), the top down,
nonadaptive governance system has not produced resilient socio-ecological system.
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In general then, the Dominican Republic provides a core limiting case in the
argument. The competitive domestic system with a coordinated elite conservation
group limits the ability for adaptation or other resilient moves. There are no signs of
emergent processes operating and the result is an ecosystem that seems to mirror the
governance in neither improving nor devolving. This may have changed recently as a
result of increasing democratization in the country, a broad based environmental
movement, and additional changes; however, it has not significantly transformed the
structure of the governance order so far. The limited resilient governance in the
Dominican Republic highlights crucially some of the mechanisms which work against
adaptation and improved authority of the arrangement.
Resilience Hypothesis Analysis
The learning procedures appear to have significantly shaped the governance
outcomes of the arrangements discussed here. El Salvador has seen policy adaptation
and implementation of the new approaches. Although there are some creative actors in
the Dominican context, policy adaptation and implementation have been negligible.
The Caribbean Challenge at the regional level is a different approach to the earlier
efforts attempted in the Dominican Republic, but still did not contribute to significant
adaptation.
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 expect that the learning dynamics will directly
contribute to the resilience or lack of the arrangements. Bottom-up learning from
modular structures is expected to result in adaptation throughout the governance
arrangement. In contrast, top-down learning from centralized structures is expected to
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lead to status quo implementation and lack of adaptation. These hypotheses find
significant support in the case studies.
The El Salvador case, with the broad learning produced in the post-natural
disaster phase, resulted in significantly changed governance outcomes. Adaptation
happened in two different ways. First, policy adaptation happened and the corridor
project changed significantly. The evidence is clear in the inclusion of El Salvador in the
project. As noted many times, the initial project included El Salvador in only a limited
fashion; however, the project gradually began to include the country in efforts largely
recognizing projects which had already been built by local communities and
international funders. This expansion is not random or simple policy drift, but rather is
the result of learning happening at multiple stages during the 2000s. As local actors
became more important and international funders began to support their activity, the
result was that governance arrangements finally caught up. The modular network
structure shaped the learning dynamics of the governance arrangement which then had
a direct impact on the governance and networks of the later governance program.
Most significantly is that this has created a system which appear to have
significant adaptive capacity and authoritative capability going forward. Projects have
not remained as merely projects but have reached a more stable form of governance
with regular and long-term funding from international sources. For one example,
despite political change in 2009 in El Salvador, projects have continued to a large extent
and with support from the environmental ministry have expanded. Similarly, the MBC,
the national environmental ministries, and other actors appear to be willing to support
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the multifaceted process. These are becoming a more prominent driver of governance
strategy at a number of levels as time goes on.
The Dominican Republic presents an alternative case where the top-down
learning secured the interests of the centralized network but which did not support
adaptation at all. One thing apparent in multiple interviews is that ideas for adaptation
are rampant but are shelved in most cases because of a feeling of a persistent challenge
to the governance arrangement. Political consolidation, strengthening the core
network, and protecting the key policies are considered the key objectives and
adaptation is sidelined. The evidence of the connection between learning and policy is
quite clear in the Dominican Republic. New actors brought new ideas into the
conservation network, but that network used its strength to channel these activities to
status quo governance solutions which served their political interests. As argued in
Chapter 3, this should not be read as the complete dominance of national political
context, but rather as the lack of coherent rival networks in that case. The network
structure shapes the interaction from the initial formation through to the outcome.
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 find support in the political development in these
cases. Resilience resulted from a generation of ideas from multiple actors and a
governance arrangement with the capacity to support this transformation. In contrast,
arrested development resulted largely from a centralized network that could shape idea
generation and transfusion. The theoretical finding then sees significant support across
the cases.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: TAKING DYNAMIC GOVERNANCE SERIOUSLY
The main finding from the study of international biodiversity governance is that
network structure matters for adaptation. Modular network structures generate a
number of diverse ideas which provide adaptive response for governance arrangements
following shocks. Centralized networks, in contrast tend to have limited adaptation and
respond by supporting status quo governance rules. Those governance arrangements
with limited networks tend to see little to no response to shocks. Network structure,
mediated by learning dynamics, is crucial for effectiveness to continue.
The argument is dynamic to the extent that early transformations can have
lasting and cumulative impacts, but surprise remains possible. Governance shocks can
trigger creative destruction, doubling down on the current governance approach, or
collapse and abandonment of the project. If early trial and error learning in El Salvador
was disrupted in the process, it is quite plausible that the process would have been
disrupted entirely. Similarly, those early political shopping trials proved absolutely
pivotal in paving the future efforts. Similarly, the forum formations in the Dominican
Republic shaped future efforts much larger than they shaped policy at the time. The
network structure theory thus introduces a dynamic argument into studies of
effectiveness. In addition, the cases have demonstrated that although there is general
impact by network structure, the process has complex causal pathways detailed by
different mechanisms. While identifying general conditions and learning pathways, the
network structure theory works through a variety of different mechanisms.
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The dynamism in this theory goes beyond the limited dynamics in theory of fit in
explaining institution development (Young 2010) or institutional interplay in explaining
effectiveness (Oberthur and Gehring 2006, Raustiala and Victor 2004, Young 2002, Kim
2004, Jinnah 2011). Both approaches are dynamic in that they include complex causal
pathways, but this approach differs in that it includes lasting effects from earlier
developments (path dependency) and shock and surprise directly in the development
processes. Adding the issue of emergence into international environmental politics has
significant impacts on the study and future work in the field. This conclusion will reflect
on the impacts this can have on methodologies, institutions, science, and national
context.
Methodological concerns
A primary methodological concern is how to study and capture emergent
processes. As shown in the case studies, network structure are simultaneously actorcreated and have downward pressure on actors (Sawyer 2004, 2005). These emergent
phenomenon require a different epistemological approach than linear dynamics and
have impacts on the methodologies used to study international environmental politics.
The challenge confronting research is how to maintain a coherent argument for
empirical evaluation that is simultaneously mainly about agents and structures
(Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998).
Direct or linear causal stories, of the type X causes Y or an increase in X increases
the probability of Y, focus primarily upon simultaneous changes in variable conditions.
Aggregate causation, where X does not cause Y until the level of X reaches a certain
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point, similarly focuses upon changes in variable conditions, albeit with time and tipping
points playing crucial roles. However, if it is contended that an outcome results from
emergent processes, such relationships between variable conditions may be misleading.
The problem of confounders becomes highly problematic if it is possible that there is an
emergent process at work. For example, although supporting national constituencies or
strong international institutions may correlate greatly with resilient governance, it could
be caused by other dynamics that are not captured in the correlation story.
Emergent causation involves two different processes working in close real
connection. First, there is an uncoordinated action by units that are analytically
independent from one another. This is the bottom-up aspect of emergent causation.
Second, the decisions made by these agents creates a structure that impacts future
actions by those individuals. This can be conceptualized either as the feedback loop (in
unstructured forms) or as the structural effects (Sawyer 2005, Davies 2006). The selffulfilling prophecy of bank collapse is a clear example of this. Many individuals, possibly
for very different reasons, form a belief in the weakness of a bank and express the belief
that it might fail. These individual level actions can form a result where people begin
withdrawing their funds, weakening the bank, and possibly leading to the prophesized
end (Merton 1948). The bottom-up aspect and the feedback loop need not be of the
same form and all that is necessary for emergent causation is that both the bottom-up,
uncoordinated processes and the feedback loop operate actively and often
simultaneously. Emergent causal stories need to have both aspects or it is different
type of causation happening; so if the bank is making poor investments and that is what
265

impacts its health rather than individual perceptions, that would undermine any
emergent causal story.
There are some unique challenges to empirically evaluating emergent causation.
A first problem is the difference between strong and weak emergence which relates to
the amount of coordination between units at the lower levels (Chalmers 2006). Weak
emergence can involve unstructured interactions between social agents that is not
purposefully guiding the outcome. Back to the bank example, if account holders talk to
one another about their belief in the strength or weakness of the bank they are not
intending to produce the outcome of bank collapse but nor is the process completely
uncoordinated. Strong emergence involves exactly those situations in which
uncoordinated interactions where individuals make their own small decisions which are
not communicated directly to other actors. For example, if account holders in the bank
reduce their investment in the bank on their own, this will restrain the bank’s ability to
lend which may then cause other individuals to make their own beliefs about the
weakness of the bank further restraining the bank’s activities. Weak emergence is far
more likely in the social world (Clemens 2007), but the distinction between it and
directed action may not always be clear.
This leads to the second problem which is how to identify and assess the
strength of emergent processes in complex social environments. One popular approach
is agent based modeling or the use of computer programs to test the ability for limited
logic agents to create complex environments (Johnson 2001, Axelrod 1997, Holland
1992). These computer aided approaches are unique in their ability to test if units
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operating with simple logics can create social patterns of interest without directing their
behavior. Like all laboratory findings, the limitation is on connecting these findings to
real world settings in useful ways. It is also possible to do direct empirical assessment of
the emergent propositions, but it is important to refine the analysis to the actual
processes of production rather than variables or structures.
The focus on mechanisms then allows clear empirical support or disconfirmation
of emergent causation and allows comparison with other possible systems.
Mechanisms are the direct generative processes that produce key outcomes or steps in
the eventual outcome of interest. They allow excellent views for evaluation of
outcomes in that they can quickly disconfirm emergent arguments. If processes were
generated through directed, hierarchical action, or if the feedback loops are not
operative in a meaningful sense, then the empirical argument is fundamentally
weakened. However, at the same time, if the bottom-up processes occur through
undirected action and if there is an effective feedback mechanism for all agents, then
there is good evidence of the emergent argument.
Agent based modeling and other tools can be used to provide evaluation of the
logical impact of emergent mechanisms (Axelrod 1997, Janssen and Ostrom 2006).
Coupled with empirical analysis of network structures and the processes that produce,
hold together, and make those networks important, these methods can be used to focus
more significantly on emergent phenomena. Multilevel ethnographic analysis may also
offer unique perspectives that need to engage in the work at multiple levels (Ong and
Collier 2008, Tsing 2005, Gille and Riain 2002). Focusing on environmental politics at
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any single level would appear to miss crucial aspects of governance that are relevant.
How agents understand these processes and organize emergent patterns is a crucial
question in further capturing dynamic processes.
Creative Destruction
One of the key issues to consider based upon the case is the existence in international
governance institutions of a process of creative destruction: whereby severe political shocks
serve to create political openings and opportunities which did not exist prior to the shock
(Gunderson, Folke, and Lee 2010). Although, in governance terms, destruction is often seen as a
severe situation of collective action failure, does it allow progressive political opportunities? To
focus on the case studies and the particular political development in the two countries, did the
civil war and the radical democratization which followed create a situation where the MBC could
see significant local expansion into the country? In contrast, in the Dominican Republic, the
authoritarian leadership was able to maintain power and authority and guide the transition to
democracy. Without ever prescribing civil war in order to change governance contexts, does
this significant disruption it caused to political alignments allow us to reexamine cases of limited
and failed statehood (Risse 2011).
The history of biodiversity politics certainly requires additional thought into the
dynamics of creative destruction in governance politics. One of the key questions revolves
around how to maintain authoritative capability and the legitimacy of the arrangement while
simultaneously going back to the drawing board. The MAB World Network of Biosphere
Reserves, CITES, and even the MBC example in El Salvador show that this is difficult to achieve in
practice. MAB and CITES both maintained many of the key parties as they refined procedures
and selection of members in order to get the most out of these actors. The MBC, in contrast,
shows large replacement of networks in the adaptive process. The risks are apparent and seen
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in a number of the limiting cases in biodiversity politics. The Amazonian biodiversity efforts
show that changing constituencies and networks can end creating no deep network structure at
all. Conversely, ITTO and many of the other cases show that keeping the access procedures the
same can lock governance arrangements in place despite any disruptions. Creative destruction
then may be found to be one particularly path towards resilience, but a particularly risky
procedure which is shaped by international institutions, the role of scientists, and national
context. The El Salvador case of course includes guidance from UNDP, a national context which
facilitated the gradual work toward democracy, and a changing scientific basis (emphasized with
key actors like Prisma at the local level and CATIE at the regional level). These issues are central
in the study of global environmental politics and it is to them which this conclusion now turns.

Institutions
The findings from this study do not call into question the finding in international
environmental politics that international institutions matter. However, according to the
argument in Chapter 3, the conditions that give rise to resilience may be distinguished
from the features that create effectiveness. Strong institutions have been shown
consistently to be crucial in positive environmental outcome, but this study shows that
those strong institutions need to have a broad and modular structure in order to have
an impact. Issues of institutional strength (Keohane and Martin 1995, Simmons and
Martin 2002, Young 2002, Young, King, and Schroeder 2008) and leadership (Ivanova
2010, Skodvin and Andresen 2006, Young 1991) are not supported as being relevant
factors for the resilience of organizations.
Regime complex studies are a definite step in this direction in trying to capture
the networks around a governance arrangement. However, the expansion of analysis
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should continue to include a range of relevant network connections for regimes and
institutions. Importantly, in many governance arrangements this will include a diverse
set of actors at various levels. Local level actors are increasingly connecting in regular
networks with international and global actors. These network connections can have
significant effects on the institutional design and adaptation processes. Developing
deeper understandings for understanding network connections of institutions in a
systemic manner should be a primary focus for future work.
Additionally, more work on governance shocks and problem type on institutions
can be a focus for future work. An important agenda for future research is to see if the
problem type or structure matters in this finding (Mitchell 2006). Complex problems
may be particularly unresponsive, or even negatively responsive, to attempts at
managing them while simpler, decomposable problems may be easier to manage in a
variety of ways. Discerning this aspect may be crucial for environmental governance in
the future and the various ongoing institution-building approaches.
The Role of Scientists
The network structure theory of resilient governance adds an important
corollary hypothesis to both the epistemic community argument (Haas 1992, 2001) and
the reflexive mechanism argument (Siebenhuner 2002, 2008). The network structure
theory largely confirms these arguments, but explains some important aspects about
the operation of transnational scientific groups or environmental assessment. The
corollary is that these organizations are expected to have the most significant impact on
adaptation and social learning when they are a coherent cluster of actors augmenting
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political clusters. When there is a centralized network and scientists are either too
separate from the central network or have no insulation, these communities have less
impact.
The argument of the dissertation is particularly significant with the current
proliferation of assessments around a host of environmental problems (Farrell,
VanDeveer, and Jager 2001, Hasselman and Barker 2008, Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2005, Mooney, Cropper, and Reid 2004, Siebenhuner 2003, Sutton et al.
2011, Global International Waters Assessment 2006). Assessments are key reflective
mechanisms, as exemplified in many of the cases, that can be crucial in producing
adaptation or improve the procedures of the governance arrangement. However, they
are highly conditional upon the overall networks of connections that exist in an
arrangement and how these are aligned. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, has
spurred changes in the weak institutional context of the Ramsar Convention but has
been fairly limited in terms of impact in the Convention on Biological Diversity. The
spread of the epistemic community and their connections with other communities, as
exemplified by the MAB ratcheting up, is additionally important in the ability to create
positive conditions for resilient governance.
The implications on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are crucial
in that its efforts to clarify the findings and broaden the base of contributors with
thousands of authors and readers seem unlikely to improve the connections of the
network with other sub-networks. Efforts of the panel on a coherent set of findings and
then connections with other actors in an independent and translatable effort may be far
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more valuable than is including hundreds of listed authors and attempting to create an
acceptable consensus. This is very speculative at this point, but the findings from
biodiversity governance and resilience seem to suggest that attention on the
connections between expert communities may be more valuable than the scope of
inclusion of any single expert community. Future work could examine assessments like
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and environmental reporting like the IPCC in
terms of expert community interactions.
National context
While the network structure theory complements theories about institutions and
scientific communities, it draws contrasts with theories that emphasize the shaping role
of national context on international inputs. The study finds significant reason for
questioning this simplified argument. Aside from increased resources, there appear to
be little reason that centralized networks at the national level would have any more
significant an impact on governance than centralized networks at other levels. This
condition would be necessary broadly for support of the national context argument.
However, there are some avenues for future research which develop out of this
study. Comparative studies between the differences between states with different
capacity and economic resources could help augment studies of the network structure
theory. In addition, party change in El Salvador appears to have been important in
ensuring the increased recognition of the projects which had developed within the
country. Political change introduced the competitive dynamics in the Dominican
Republic that resulted in limiting adaptation in the conservation strategy of the country.
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Understanding political change will be a crucial part of future research understanding
the dynamic impacts and how sudden shifts of network structures will change the
regime.
For Future Research
Global biodiversity governance has a host of precarious projects and programs
which are going to need resilience to prevent the global collapse of wildlife biodiversity.
Some biodiversity governance arrangements have been able to deal with the problems
of shocks and develop into highly resilient arrangements and this study has emphasized
the mechanisms which have produced that outcome.
This lesson offers some unique aspects for extensions of the research and
future study. It is possible to extend work to other areas of global environmental
governance like climate change, deforestation, desertification, etc. Empirical work
should assess whether the findings in this work apply to areas with more basic
transboundary pollution problems like acid rain, shared water resources, and others.
More significant for future study is exploring the conditions in areas the operate
differently than biodiversity governance.
One key example would be climate change which for many years involved
negotiations and decisions in a centralized process, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This arrangement is far more centralized than
the big tent of the CBD and the governance arrangements that developed long before
the CBD even came into force. Until possibly recently with the collapse of the Kyoto
process and the start of alternative processes, it would be difficult to describe the
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arrangement as disaggregated. The emergent argument could be used to evaluate the
climate structure by starting with an understanding of what emergent processes may
exist in systems that are not disaggregated. The mechanisms of decision-making and
learning though could be studied to see if they are emergent or operate in a different
manner. The major scientific body of the arrangement, the IPCC, has developed a series
of smaller groups to deal with specific problems. Whether this is leading to emergent
learning or whether aspects like politicization lead to different outcomes could be a
productive way to assess the emergent argument in different situations. Other aspects
of the governance arrangement could be analyzed in this aspect and yield fruitful study
to understand why climate change has not seen significant increase in authoritative
capability or adaptive capacity.
In addition, the findings touch on many ongoing discussions and debates in
global environmental politics to allow additional study. The contribution to the issues of
effectiveness have been explained significantly above. In addition, understanding
resilience offers unique insights to the study of interactions between institutions and
the role of national governments. The emergent process of governance, as highlighted
above in the discussion of institutional strength, offers a unique understanding of
interaction between institutions. For future study, interaction can be analyzed not
simply in terms of nesting or coordination but in terms of how decisions and ideas move
between the institutions. This offers an exciting trajectory to study complex
interactions between institutions. The role of national governments in environmental
governance remains a persistent question in global environmental politics. Whether
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national bureaucrats constrain, guide, direct, interpret strategically, or embody norms is
crucial for understanding how environmental governance is shaped. Resilience
contributes to this debate by adding in local level actors who can, in certain
circumstances, circumvent the state but also in emphasizing state-level decision making
and learning as opportunities for resilience. The emergent argument does not see the
state as an unimportant factor in global environmental politics, but emphasizes the
ways in which the states interact in processes of emergence or hierarchical control. The
argument of this study then offers unique understandings for future study in global
environmental politics.
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APPENDIX I
METHODOLOGY
Studying multilevel processes of governance is not an easy task because
decisions can be made at multiple levels and this complicates the ability to understand
dynamics. There are a number of different approaches to understanding multilevel
dynamics, but each comes with a number of tradeoffs. To deal with these problems,
this dissertation focuses on the junctions between levels for the most detailed analysis.
This appendix will discuss how resilience was measured, the case study procedure, and
the basic social network indicators.
Measuring Resilience
There are a number of problems with measuring resilience in governance
arrangements and the dynamic nature of the relationships makes it often difficult to
identify. As noted above, resilience of governance is not always an apparent or readily
available outcome for study. The problem is that lasting governance arrangements are
not necessarily resilient governance arrangements; institutions may be quite brittle and
last simply from a lack of appropriate shocks to the governance system. The major
indicators for resilience differ from context-specific assessments to holistic processes.
In contrast, this dissertation uses a different measure of resilience which allows it to
capture many of the features of resilience, comparison across cases, and a holistic view
of the issues.
As noted above, the two main indicators appear to be context-specific
assessment of resilient governance or a holistic approach which includes a significant
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number of features. The context-specific assessment of resilience has been used in a
number of case studies in order to develop heuristic guides for understanding what
contributes to resilience (Pahl-Wostl 2009a, Booher and Innes 2010, Gunderson and
Light 2006, Olsson et al. 2006, Anderies, Walker, and Kinzig 2006). The strength of these
approaches is that they identify specific conditions and have been very able to identify
the complex dynamics that produce resilient governance. The limitation is that these
approaches may be limited in terms of comparative insights. In contrast, some have
begun to use multi-component indicators for measuring resilience. The most clear
example is the adaptive capacity wheel (Gupta et al. 2010) which develops multiple
indicators to understand resilience of institutions. While holistic indicators are useful in
observing ideal types, I did not find it particularly useful in explaining the imperfect
institutions that are discussed in this dissertation.
Combining both approaches allows an indicator that maximizes analytic leverage
and comparative ability. The result is a multi-indicator system which analyzes the
responses to shock of governance arrangements and the preceding conditions which
indicate capability for response. Governance arrangements with many of the similar
regular procedures of other resilient governance arrangements (i.e. regular ecosystem
monitoring, use of multiple indicators, diverse funding streams, etc.) can be seen to be
high in adaptive capacity and authoritative capability. Table Appendix.1 collects the
findings from a series of comparative case studies about resilient governance
arrangements into clear procedures integrated into those with high adaptive capacity
and authoritative capability and those with low dimensions on those levels.
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Low Adaptive
Capacity
If environmental
systems begin
shifting, the
governance
arrangement does
not adjust
management
procedures.

High Adaptive
Capacity
If environmental
systems begin
shifting, the
governance
arrangement
adjusts
management
procedures.

Low Authoritative
Capability
If the political
context becomes
more difficult, the
governance
arrangement does
not develop new
rules.

High Authoritative
Capability
If the political
context becomes
more difficult, the
governance
arrangement
develops new rules.

Without this shock,
low adaptive
capacity is seen
with:

Without this shock,
high adaptive
capacity is seen
with:

Without this shock,
low authoritative
capability is seen
with:

Without this shock,
high authoritative
capability is seen
with:

Minor shocks do
not result in
development of
new rules
Management
becomes an issue
dividing large
political parties

Minor shocks result
in development of
new rules.

Minor shocks do not Minor shocks adjust
adjust management management
procedures
procedures
No regular
ecosystem
monitoring

Regular ecosystem
monitoring

Ecosystem
monitoring on
single indicators

Ecosystem
monitoring on
multiple indicators

Low public
involvement

Extensive public
involvement

No integration of
ecosystem
monitoring into
management

Regular
assessments on
management
lessons

Main contributors
to the problem do
not participate

Main contributors
to the problem and
scientists
participate in
forums

No connections
between scientific
communities and
policymakers

Understanding of
nested systems of
environmental
problems

Rules are imposed
upon stakeholders

Rules are developed
collectively by
stakeholders

Significant
expansion of veto

Management
redundencies

278

Formal agreements
with local managers

points outside of
the governance
system
Scale of governance
is appropriate to
defined problem
Diverse funding
streams
Table Appendix.1- Collection of Indicators Highlighted from Case Studies of
Governance Arrangements on Adaptive Capacity and Authoritative Capability. Based
largely upon cases in: (Lebel et al. 2006, Abel, Cumming, and Anderies 2006, Walker
and Salt 2006)
This approach then can provide a very careful assessment of the existence or
lack of resilience within a governance arrangement. Combining evaluations of the
governance procedures based upon response to major shocks, response to minor
shocks, and regular actions allows a fuller assessment of the resilience of the
arrangement than if relying only on response to major shocks. The operationalization of
resilience as high adaptive capacity and high authoritative capability as evaluated in
Table Appendix.1 provides a conservative measure of resilience that is unlikely to
provide a false positive.
Case Study Research
One of the key issues in both the Dominican Republic and El Salvador cases is
that action happened at multiple levels and with a variety of different actors. To deal
with this problem, the case studies focused on identifying a number of conditions at the
various levels and interviews with people at the key junctions. This offers an insightful
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set of indicators for understanding the contexts in the cases and with social network
indicators and archival work it provides an approach for developing understanding.
In both cases, archive data was gathered in the national environmental
ministries. In El Salvador, the agricultural ministry and election ministry were also
visited for select data retrieval. In the Dominican Republic, the tourism ministry
document service was used for similar access to key select data. Other documents were
requested from specific organizations and used in the analysis, but unless noted archival
work was not conducted. In both cases, interview participants were selected as crucial
individuals in the multilevel governance system. In both countries, this includes local
governance planners, national level NGOs and members of the Environmental ministry,
international funders, and technicians of CCAD and TNC depending on the case.
Participants were selected based on elite sampling techniques aiming for individuals
active in multiple levels of governance. These interviews yielded 14 interviews in El
Salvador and 17 in the Dominican Republic using this selection technique. However, in
order to get a fuller view of the situations in both countries, other individuals were
interviewed informally in both countries for insights about particular issues. This
included practitioners like ecotourist operators or protected area guards (included in
multiple site visits in both contexts) and also interviews with National level NGOs that
were not part of the multilevel governance arrangement to include alternative
perspectives. These additional interviews will not be quoted or used for key analysis but
will be referred to as necessary.
The following people were interviewed for the project:
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El Salvador
Nelson Cuellar, PRISMA
Susan Kandal, PRISMA
Hector Navarro, CESTA
Álvaro Moisés Calderón, SalvaNATURA
Jorge Alberto Oviedo, FIAES
Dr. Jorge Ernesto Quezada, Ministry of the Environment
Patricia de Reinosa, GTZ
Mary Rodriguez, USAID
Dr. Herman Rosa, Ministry of the Environment
Anonymously: 3 ADESCO leaders, 1 NGO member, 2 CCAD Officials.

Dominican Republic
Yvonne Arias, Grupo Jaragua
Yuri Duran, RENAEPA
Juan José Espinal, CEDA
Dr. Duty Green, USAID
Jake Kheel, Grupo Punta Cana
Francisco Nunez, TNC
Sesar Rodriguez , Consorcio Ambiental Dominicano
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Anonymously: 3 workers Ministry of the Environment, 4 NGO workers, 2 local
government leaders.

In addition to the formal interviews, conversations and data were gathered in an
ad hoc manner from a variety of people involved in environmental politics. This
included workers at the environmental ministries, NGO workers, students, ecotourism
guides, park guards, and others. Because of the longer time spend in El Salvador for
field work (7 months compared to 3 months), the number of these informal interactions
is far higher for El Salvador. In that case, 72 different people contributed to the project
while in the Dominican Republic the number was only 24. Finally, some people listed
above provided additional email clarifications after field work and contacts at the Man
and Biosphere project and CITES also clarified key points over email.
Finally, in each case, communities involved in the project were directly visited
and interviews as well as informal data collection took place. In El Salvador, this
included four communities, three of which are involved in the corridor projects and
another not involved. In the Dominican Republic, this involved three different
communities all involved in biodiversity politics directly.
Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis (SNA) is one of many methods of developing and
deploying unit and system indicators. All indicators have a problem regarding the
possibility of false positive indicators that ascribe the existence of some factor where it
does not actually exist. The false positive problem can be dealt with through
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triangulation and validity checks that build confidence in the indicators of use (Wolf
2010). In contrast, the false negative problem is a more severe problem where indicator
triangulation may not provide an appropriate validity check. The false negative problem
is a problem where a indicator’s absence is falsely ascribed it distorts other measures in
the dataset. While other indicators have this problem also, the problem is particular
pernicious in social network analysis and can seriously weaken the ability to draw
inferences from the indicators. This appendix is going to briefly detail the precise
procedures and inferences that can be drawn from social network analysis. It will then
highlight the particular problem of false negatives in the analysis and discuss how the
dissertation study deals with this problem.
Social Network Analysis provides measures of two different aspects: 1. The
connections that a unit has and the importance of those connections and 2. The sum of
connections within the entire population of units. The distinction from qualitative
network analysis is that it aims to provide quantitative representations of the
connections. This section aims to provide a brief background about how these data are
collected and used to generate these indicators.
The basis of SNA is that the connections between units is the primary focus for
analysis. Unit-level characteristics (income level, gender, political affiliation, etc.) are
not a primary focus for the development of social network indicators (Knoke and Yang
2008). Instead, the sum and strength of connections between different actors is the
crucial aspect to developing indicators. For the development of SNA indicators then all
units are treated as a similar type of actors with no initial distinctions based upon the
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characteristics of the units. Later analysis can integrate these characteristics to compare
with network position; however, for the initial development it is important to not
include these factors.
With this goal for analysis, social network analysis develops a measure of
connections between different units. These connections should be clear indications of
interactions between units and relevant to the actual network. Although there are lots
of connections in the social world, not every connection should be assumed to be a
network connection (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011). However, when relevant indicators
are available it is possible to develop sustained evidence of linkages that are standard
across the set of actors. For a quick example, if there is a relevant universe of 5
different actors and they have regular interactions with one another (in 1 on 1 meetings,
for instance), we can produce a rough network articulation. In this basic example, we
might find the creation of this network matrix:

A
A
B
C
D
E

1
1
1
0

B
1
1
1
1

C
1
1

D
1
1
1

1
0

E
0
1
0
0

0

Using simple 0 and 1 coding, with 1 signifying a connection and zero signifying
the lack of a connection, the matrix shows the existence of connections between the
different actors. All the units are connected to one another except for ‘E’ which is only
connected with ‘B’.
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With the simple relationship matrix it is possible to develop both graphical and
quantitative representations of the network. A simple, non-length graphical
representation of the network would appear like this:

In addition, it would be quite easy to develop a range of quantitative measures
of the network members and their centrality in the network. For a simple network like
the one above, the scores are fairly simple and clearly show the high centrality and
betweenness of Agent B, an equal centrality and betweenness for Agent A, C, and D and
a low centrality and betweeness for Agent E.

Unit
A
B
C
D
E

Centrality
1
1.250
1
1
.5

Eigenvector
.682
.741
.682
.682
.240

Betweenness
0
.5
0
0
0

BonPwr
2.409
2.619
2.409
2.409
.851

ARD
.875
1
.875
.875
.625

Farness
5
4
5
5
7

All measurements have the risk of a false positive, but the risk of a false negative
is significantly larger for Social Network Measurements because it impacts multiple
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other units. To demonstrate this problem, we can look at the basic 0-1, 5 unit matrix
from above. However, this time we are going to show the impact of A-E having a
connection.

A
A
B
C
D
E

1
1
1
1

B
1
1
1
1

C
1
1

D
1
1
1

1
0

E
1
1
0
0

0

If we assume that was a false negative in the earlier articulation, how does it
change the articulation of the social network scores. Although some measures only
show changes on the relevant agents (A & E), Eigenvector, BonPwr, and ARD all show
how a false negative between two units has wide ranging impacts on the network as a
whole. A missing link in social network analysis then can greatly impact a measure and
transform its entire arrangement. The result is that missing linkages can have largescale impacts on the scores of relationships which are definitively established and
measured. This simplistic example of a basic network shows how one small false
negative can drastically change the measures of all cases within the network.

Unit
A
B
C
D
E

Centrality
1.250
1.250
1
1
.750

Eigenvector
.721
.721
.621
.621
.434

Betweenness
.167
.167
0
0
0
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BonPwr
2.551
2.551
2.195
2.195
1.535

ARD
1
1
.875
.875
.750

Farness
4
4
5
5
6

#
Scores
Change
from
Above

2

5

1

5

2

2

This problem of social network analysis is precisely why Ward, Stovel, and Sacks
caution against application of social network analysis to datasets without the sufficient
conditions to prevent false negatives (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011). One solution is to
use very small networks with multiple, non-interacting linkages between units. Another
strategy involves interviews with all members of the network and theoretical bounding
of the limits of the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). However, both of these
solutions are ill-fit to governance dynamics which typically have large networks with
multiple singular linkages and without clear boundaries of the network. For questions
about network interactions, it may be possible to do such limited studies, but to use
social network analysis to understand overall governance dynamics needs to understand
the wider network.
There are a number of different measures of modularity, a central concept in the
analysis. Three of the most useful are the clustering coefficient, Freeman’s Segregation
measure and Newman and Girvan’s Q measure. These provide excellent support for
visual representations of network graphs to establish more formal measures of
modularity (Newman 2006). All three measures were used to provide additional data
for assertions of modularity or centrality about the networks. Clustering coefficient
measures simply the clustering of the nodes in the network without expectation on any
shape of connections. 0-1 scale with 1 being high clustering and 0 being low
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connections between different units. Newman and Girvan’s Q measures the clustering
that happens compared to if network connections were random. Positive measures
here show centralizing networks, negative measures show fractured networks.
Freeman’s S measure analyzes the number of redundant connections that nodes
throughout the network have to one another. The scale is 0-1 with zero being a
completely random network and 1 being full segregation of all clusters. The figure
below uses these measures to describe the different networks showing multiple
indicators of modularity in the El Salvador networks and centrality or less modularity in
the Dominican Republic networks.

Name

Nodes

Links

Connecti
on range

Figure ES4.1
Environme
ntal Policy
Network
Figure DR4.6
Domestic
Conservati
on
Network
Figure ES6.1
Corridor
Network

Individuals

Participatio 1-16
n in forums

Organizati
ons

Cooperativ
e Grants

Organizati
ons

Figure DR6.3
Challenge
Network

Organizati
ons

Cooperativ
e Grants
and other
projects
Project
involveme
nt
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Clusterin
g
Coefficie
nt
.868

NG-Q Freem
an’s S

-.007

.942

1-6

.881

.012

.624

1-14

.464

-.001

.994

1-3

.844

.008

.550

Table Appendix.2- Various modularity measures of the networks in the dissertation.
Network data has a significant risk of false negatives which can significantly
distort all measures for all agents. The two methods deployed in this dissertation to
deal with this problem are: 1. Qualitative leads from the case studies and 2. Clearly
defined networks. False negatives does not prove insurmountable for network analysis
but it is a risk that requires significant attention. The persistent limitation on analysis is
that the risk of a false negative means that the data should be considered most
significant in deepening the case study analysis and not providing an independent basis
for drawing conclusions. However, as a secondary measure to support the process
tracing in the case studies, the social network data of repeated engagement by
organizations in projects provides an outstanding opportunity to further understand
processes giving rise to resilience.
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APPENDIX II
COOKING WITH MECHANISMS
Causal mechanisms are necessary in any explanation; however, in practice they
are often treated as secondary features to be filled-in with plausible explanations and
not subjected to full analytic weight. When the focus is on linear relationships between
variables, such focus on variables and secondary emphasis on mechanisms can be
sufficient for understanding political and social processes; however, when the focus is
on dynamic processes which involve surprising conditions a stronger focus on
mechanisms is necessary for evaluation and analysis. For example, in Darwin’s
argument in The Origin of Species for an emergent process of biodiversity, much of the
focus is not on different environmental conditions but instead on the mechanism of
natural selection. This study has focused significantly on the mechanisms in order to
produce a more complete understanding of the features of resilience. This brief
appendix will analyze the epistemological ground for the particular treatment of
mechanisms in the study.
The study of global environmental politics has generally emphasized the broad
relationship between variables with progressive research agendas developed around
the causal impacts that groups of scientists (Haas 1990b, 1992, 2004b, Litfin 1994b,
Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002, Sundqvist 2003, Gough and Shackley 2001), international
regimes and institutions (Young 1997, 1989a, b, 1999b, Bragdon 1996, Haas 2000, Levy,
Haas, and Keohane 1992, Paavola 2007), nongovernmental organizations and politically
mobilized citizens (Wapner 1995, Arts and Mack 2002, Breitmeier and Rittberger 2000,
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Humphreys 2004, Princen 1994, Sell and Prakash 2004, Lipschutz 1996), national elites
(Holmes 2010), and leaders, both individuals and institutions (Ivanova 2010, Skodvin and
Andresen 2006, Young 1991, Young and Osherenko 1993). These various studies have
often proceeded in a similar manner: identification of an X-Y relationship through key
case studies or small-n analysis and then discussion of mechanisms is given short
attention.
The approach of this study aims to pursue an analytically eclectic approach to
causal processes with a focus on the mechanisms tested in comparative and
counterfactual analysis. To use a metaphor which will be used a few times, the study
focuses on cooking techniques primarily and explores whether finished dishes would
come out differently with different cooking methods. Paul Pierson argues that
throughout political science and political sociology “traditional cooks have stressed how
important the cooking process itself is, including the sequence, pace, and specific
manner in which ingredients are combined,” while many current practitioners act like
“as long as you have the correct ingredients and they are properly measured…, in what
order, and for how long they are combined makes no difference” (Pierson 2004, 1).
Refocusing on the cooking techniques may serve as particularly essential in
understanding many of the diverse outcomes experienced in global environmental
politics.
The variable-prioritized approach has provided significant insights into the
processes in global environmental politics; however, its approach to mechanisms will be
unsatisfactory and will have sustained problems regarding its limited nature, the
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possibility for infinite regress of concepts, and its exhaustiveness in explanation (Gerring
2010). Although these problems can never be fully addressed, a mechanism-prioritized
approach controls for these problems in a more sustained manner.
There have been more definitions and conceptualizations of mechanisms than
there have been authors writing explicitly on the topic (Mahoney 2001). The first
section will then provide an articulation of mechanisms which is particularly tractable in
social science contexts as was developed by Faletti and Lynch (Falleti and Lynch 2009).
The conceptualization emphasizes mechanisms as social, generative concepts that can
be portable across contexts. The analogy of cooking techniques emphasizes these key
aspects of mechanisms. The problems of its limited nature, infinite regress, and
exhaustiveness will be demonstrated to be key problems in efforts to understand
mechanisms. The next section will highlight the two approaches to studying
mechanisms, the variable-prioritized and mechanism-prioritized approaches. It will be
shown that the problems of mechanisms are dramatically acute in variable-prioritized
approaches that attempt to have full causal relationships between independent
variables and dependent variables hypothesized, and even confirmed by evidence,
before engaging in mechanism analysis. Finally, the section will use the approach to
emphasize the problem that has seen significant attention in the recent years regarding
the differences between the ozone efforts and climate change.
Cooking with Mechanisms
I was fortunate enough to receive a simple tortilla cooking class while conducting
fieldwork that highlights this aspect. Our outcome of interest for understanding is the
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finished tortilla. Ingredients simply involve ground corn, salt, and water to make a
simple dough. Balls of the dough are collected and flattened by switching it between
hands. The flattened dough is then cooked on a hot, flat surface until the tortilla can be
turned by hand to the other side and then cooked briefly on that side producing the
perfect tortilla. The initial variables involve the particular type of ingredients and their
amounts (and the existence of a knowledgeable cook and hot surface). Two relevant
intervening variables involve the simple dough produced and the flattened dough to be
cooked on the stove. Even the knowledge and measurement of these variables does
not fully explain the outcome of interest: instead the hand-switching patting of the ball
of dough and the cooking process are essential for it. Without either of these the
outcome will not be generated in the same way. These mechanisms which involve some
social aspect between different levels of variables (the knowledgeable cook and the
ingredients) and directly generates, in at least certain stages, the outcome of interest.
However, the processes are also portable and, for example, following the same
procedures with ground beef is pretty much the manner in which my great grandmother
made hamburgers (a little additional cooking). The cooking processes then tell us
something important in the specific outcome in which we are interested, involves
aspects that cannot be captured in a variable sense, and is portable to other contexts.
Similarly, social mechanisms are here defined as socially relative concepts, that
are portable across contexts, which produce certain outcomes of interest. This definition
from Faletti and Lynch is distinct from other articulations in its ease of
operationalization and its distinction from intervening variables (Falleti and Lynch 2009,
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and for the philosophy of science distinction between mechanisms and intervening
variables see, Mayntz 2004). The distinction from intervening variables is not shared by
all conceptions of mechanisms (see: Opp 2005, Gerring 2010); however, it seems
essential for the unique, potential theoretical impact of mechanisms and for their
empirical tractability to be maximized. The cooking analogy serves to clarify the
importance of the distinction. In a recipe, the ingredients are the variables to be
combined to produce the dish desired. The mechanisms are the cooking processes
applied to those ingredients, but which could be applied to other ingredients, that
actually generate the dish desired. Intervening variables would be secondary
combinations of the ingredients (for example, dough), but is not a process that
generates an outcome. The definition has three components essential for
understanding the practical and epistemic impacts of studying mechanisms: 1. Socially
relative, 2. Portability, 3. Generation.
Socially relative is a unique component of social mechanisms but which provides
it the tractable practical lens. Falleti and Lynch argue that mechanisms are distinct from
variables in that they are primarily about social relations while variables are primarily
about the qualities of the units of study (Falleti and Lynch 2009). They write:
Whereas variables are observable attributes of the units of analysis—with values
(nominal, ordinal, or numerical) and with sample and population distributions—
mechanisms are relational concepts. They reside above and outside the units in
question, and they explain the link between inputs and outputs. Mechanisms
describe the relationships or the actions among the units of analysis or in the
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cases of study. Mechanisms tell us how things happen: how actors relate, how
individuals come to believe what they do or what they draw from past
experiences, how policies and institutions endure or change, how outcomes that
are inefficient become hard to reverse, and so on. (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1147)
The socially relative aspect then highlights that mechanisms are primarily about
processes of interaction between the units. Policy diffusion literature, for one example,
highlights completion between actors, persuasion between actors, coercion from one
actor to another, and emulation of one actor to another (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett
2006). Similarly, Falleti and Lynch highlight rational utility maximization, brokerage,
coordinated action, framing, increasing returns, etc. as key mechanisms highlighted in
recent literature (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1150).
As processes of interaction between different units, mechanisms present specific
difficulty in measuring them on anything but a binary system (0 for its absence, 1 for its
presence). Even fuzzy set coding presents a host of intractable problems for measuring
the existence of the mechanism (Ragin 2008). This has caused some to criticize much
mechanism talk as simply a way for researchers to account for intractable variables in
their studies (Gerring 2010). Although this is certainly the way it manifests itself at
many points, this criticism fails to understand what makes social mechanisms
intractable: their socially relative aspect.
Second, mechanisms must be portable across different contexts. Highlighting
the socially relative processes that occur in the political world is sometimes accused of
getting bogged down in historical details without producing information applicable to
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other contexts (Clemens 2007). Mechanisms serve as a way of crossing contexts to
understand similar processes and hone analysis to processes that can be portable. This
entails organization of the mechanism into its basic features, differentiation from other
mechanisms, and rigorous understanding of its hypotheses and component parts.
Hedström and Ylikoski explain that “What separates proper mechanism-based
explanations from mere mechanism-based storytelling is this kind of rigorous checking
of the assumptions upon which the mechanism schemes rest” (Hedström and Ylikoski
2010). Although the details will of course be specific, attempts to make mechanisms
portable are key to its explanatory utility. This is also one of the main problems with
mechanisms, little attention to their portability.
Finally, mechanisms are the path that directly generate the outcome of interest
(Bunge 2004b). They may not generate the full process, but they at least push toward
the completed outcome that is of interest. As descriptions of the process, mechanisms
can deal with the problems of confounding and equifinality. Confounders are when
observed correlational relationships between variables do not involve causation as a
result of other forces which causes the correlation to happen. Rigorous mechanism
analysis deals with confounders by describing the process of generation itself (Hedström
and Ylikoski 2010). Similarly, equifinality is a problem in many political situations where
a set of similar initial starting points in two cases can result in different end situations.
Probabilistic statistical loosening of Hempel’s covering law-type positivism can adjust for
these occurrences; however, it still poses a problem for variable-prioritized analysis.
Mechanisms as pathways that generate outcomes can detail the processes by which
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cases with similar initial conditions become radically different (George and Bennett
2004). This need not necessarily be linear in their progression, but should plausibly
generate the outcome.
Aside from these three general points, there is significant disagreement about
the composition of mechanisms. For one example, there is an active disagreement
among both scholars focused on empirical use of mechanisms and those concerned with
its epistemological issues about the observability or unobservability of mechanisms.
While some find the unobservability to be a critical component of mechanisms
(Mahoney 2001, Weber 2007), others find this to be not necessarily the case (Hedström
and Ylikoski 2010, Mayntz 2004). Similarly, some, primarily emphasizing rational choice
theorizing, argue that mechanisms are micro-level phenomenon (Elster 1989, Hedstrom
and Swedberg 1998), while other authors would find this limitation problematic (Sawyer
2004, Falleti and Lynch 2009). On these and the other key issues of disagreement
between different authors, a pragmatic, empirical-based approach seems the most
adequate to the task (Gross 2009). Some key mechanisms may be directly observable in
the social sciences (for example, violent coercion) while others may be only observable
by their impact (persuasion, etc.). The three components above, socially relative,
portable, and generative, provide an adequate conceptualization of social mechanisms
which distinguishes them from variables and other causal components in a tractable
manner.
From this conceptualization, it should be clear that mechanisms are an essential
component to explanation and understanding. Without paying attention to
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mechanisms, relationships could very well be random or caused by other forces (Bunge
2004b). To return to the analogy, a list of ingredients and intervening variables provides
little in the way of understanding what produced the final product. Mechanisms can
provide three progressive additions. First, a full understanding is provided when the
mechanisms are provided. Bunge provides one of the best examples, “the hypothesis of
continental drift, proposed by Alfred Wegener in 1915, was resisted for nearly half a
century because no mechanism for that movement was known. The plate-tectonic
theory vindicated that hypothesis and explained earthquakes, mainly as an effect of the
collision of plates” (Bunge 2004b, 186). Mechanism study can be essential to providing
full understanding. Second, mechanisms can highlight new variables that are not fully
established or further confirm those variables that are supported in other studies.
Mechanistic confirmation, especially when coupled with lack of confirmation for rival
mechanisms, offers significant support to a theory of an outcome. Finally, starting with
a focused study of mechanisms can provide guidance to set up the independent
variables in the first place. The fact remains that many outcomes do not have
correlated independent variables that have been operationalized, studied, and
supported with significant evidence. Causal reconstruction with mechanisms can help
lead to the discovery of independent variables.
However, there are some pernicious risks when studying mechanism which limit
its ability to help us understand and explain phenomenon and which may lead to limited
inferences. Initially, it should be always kept in mind that mechanisms do not offer an
easy panacea in explaining or understanding phenomena and that the rigor needed for
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mechanistic analysis is similar to that of variables (Bunge 2004b, Bullock, Green, and Ha
2010). However, three particular risks of mechanism analysis are: 1. Its limited scope, 2.
Infinite regression, and 3. Exhaustiveness.
Studying mechanisms may often highlight relatively little of the overall situation
and highly important mechanisms may be very limited in the overall causal story. Reiss,
for example, criticizes the search for mechanisms because although it may fill in causal
analysis, it serves limited purposes in description, control and prediction (Reiss 2007). In
addition, operationalization problems in conceptualizing and differentiating such small
components of the causal story may make them of limited value in falsification of
hypotheses (Bullock, Green, and Ha 2010, Gerring 2010). Certainly, when mechanisms
are added to correlaitonal studies, they are often of a limited nature and not fully
theorized, without counterfactuals and unique hypotheses.
Infinite regress of mechanisms is a similar problem that results from A) the
fractured study of mechanisms without a common vocabulary and B) the second-order
use of mechanisms in many studies. Infinite regress is a problem of mechanisms
continually being taken apart, both temporally and in terms of unit disaggregation, and
multiplication of mechanisms in each new study (Opp 2005, Gerring 2010, McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2008). Social-level processes, become group-level processes, then
intergroup-level processes, then individual-level processes, and then psychological-level
processes, and a host of other combinations and recombinations around this. The result
is that pragmatic or specific empirical standards may be the only ones applicable. As
Hedström and Ylikoski write “Only by knowing the nature of the explanatory task at
299

hand can one determine which details of a mechanism are relevant to include and the
appropriate degree of abstraction” (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Gerring does mention
that the infinite regress problem might be a problem of the sociology of scientific
development and that sustained engagement with mechanisms may help to address this
issue (Gerring 2010); however, for our purposes the question is whether there is one
approach which best controls for this.
The criticism of exclusiveness is the most serious limitation of any study of
mechanisms and finds that since there is no epistemological process to A) tease apart
different mechanisms and B) identify what interrelationships between mechanisms are
causally sufficient and which are simply additional parts of the relationship (Gerring
2010). Mechanistic analysis thus has difficulty establishing when it has produced an
exhaustive analysis understanding the outcome of interest. It remains a key limitation
of the mechanism approach that clear ability to separate and identify vital
interrelationships. This limitation is not absolutely constraining and a sustained, robust
argument can overcome it. Once again, though, the question is whether the variableprioritized approach or the mechanism-prioritized approach can control this limitation
in a more adequate manner.
Focused study on the mechanisms
The effervescent epistemological debate about mechanisms in various venues
has been notably limited in identifying the implications of their arguments on how to
proceed with study. There are a number of different ways to approach the study of
mechanisms and attempting to identify their impacts. Three common different
300

approaches to studying mechanisms are modeling, variable-prioritized and mechanismprioritized. Modeling, particularly agent-based modeling, may offer an approach with
different specific procedures from either of the other approaches (Hedström and
Ylikoski 2010, Sawyer 2004, 2005, Axelrod 1997). Although modeling allows insights
into the procedures of mechanisms and whether specific small-scale interactions can
produce society-wide impacts, the focus of this section is on procedures of
understanding empirical processes of generating outcomes and thus will not focus on
modeling significantly. For lack of a better term, variable-prioritized approaches focus
the largest part of their analysis on the variable conditions and then piece together
possible mechanisms from the correlations observed. Mechanism-prioritized
approaches, in contrast, pursue an eclectic relationship to identifying, disentangling, and
identifying the primary mechanisms. Mechanism-prioritized approaches do not require
such relationships to be firmly established but instead engage in causal reconstruction
from outcomes of interest backward.
Variable-prioritized Approaches
Variable-prioritized approached involve some preexisting knowledge about a
causal relationship between variables and then believes mechanisms can provide the
key generative steps between the relationship. Establishing the correlation between
variables is the first step in the research process followed by adding additional research
into mechanisms to detail the relationship (Opp 2005). When done rigorously, the
variable-prioritized approach can highlight key processes and control for confounders.
Gerring provided an excellent example with the tobacco smoking-cancer linkage:
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Suppose we wish to test the hypothesis that smoking causes cancer—until
recently, a much debated proposition. Although the correlation between these
two factors is high, there are of course many possible confounders. Perhaps
people who smoke are also prone to other risky actions that expose them to a
greater risk of cancer, perhaps the same genetic predisposition that leads them
into addiction also causes them to contract cancer at a later age, and so forth. As
such, the question is unproven, and perhaps unprovable, because we are at
present unable to measure these genetic predispositions or the health-averse
behavior patterns that might serve to enhance the risk of cancer (independent of
smoking). And, for obvious reasons, we are unable to randomize the treatment
(smoking). Yet if it is the case that smoking causes a buildup of tar in the lungs
and tar is a proximate cause of cancer (insofar as cancer might be caused by
tobacco), we may be able to estimate the enhanced risk of cancer that comes
with smoking by targeting this causal mechanism. This would be a simple twostage analysis, allowing us to disregard any confounding effects (Gerring 2010,
15-16)
Starting with a strong correlational relationship, turning to mechanisms highlighted the
process in a significant manner. Study added to correlational variable relationships can
add deeper understandings: deal with confounding forces, equifinality, and even causal
direction. However, the risk is that starting with correlational relationships or
theoretically hypothesized relationships and then proceeding to mechanism analysis is a
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good approach; however, in terms of the limitations of mechanisms identified above, it
does not adequately address them.
There are two general procedures used in variable-prioritized approaches: mixed
methods which based mechanisms analysis from empirically observed correlational
analysis and pattern matching which adds mechanism analysis into clearly theorized
variable relationships. Both are powerful procedures and can yield robust results;
however, neither addresses the limitations and may have limited applicability in the
study of global environmental politics. Putting mechanisms second in both procedures
means keeping mechanisms limited.
Mixed methods is one of the main procedures recommended for identifying
mechanisms. Correlational information between different variables, typically
quantitative, is combined with other methods to fill-in the processes that lead to that
correlation, hopefully causation. Gross writes that the project of discovering
mechanisms will “necessarily be multi methodological.” While, “Quantitative research
is required to establish the variable associations that lead us to inquire into cause effect
relationships in the first place” and then afterward “Qualitative research—ethnographic,
interview-based, and historical—is necessary to identify mechanisms, the habits they
are composed of, and the kinds of problem situations in which those habits tend to be
deployed” (Gross 2009). This approach can be particularly insightful when correlations
between variables are supported in multiple different studies and the mechanisms can
be easily separated and studied; however, in newer research trajectories or more
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complex situations, the approach may add-in mechanisms without providing exhaustive
and engaged analysis.
Global environmental politics has developed in a manner that makes mixed
methods limited for a full understanding of mechanisms. First, the complex nature of
independent variables means that the type of clear correlational analysis which is key
may not be available. For one clear example, in the epistemic community-effective
regimes relationship that has been empirically supported in a number of different
contexts. However, in the European acid rain context, the variable of epistemic
communities has vacillated widely based upon different agreements, the type of
pollution dealt with, and even sometimes the time. Other key variables in the study of
global environmental politics also lend themselves to this variation which may make the
focused quantitative first approach problematic. Second, mixed methods approaches
do not address adequately the confounding problem that mechanisms are ideal to
confront. Having a variable association in hand and then filling it in with mechanisms
does not control for possible confounding variables. For example, the institutional
strength-effective regime relationship (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993) may have a
confounding variable of organized political coalitions that simultaneously creates strong
international institutions and positive environmental outcomes. Mixed method analysis
with firm variable beliefs has no intrinsic or internal assurance of identifying the
existence of confounding variables. Finally, the mixed method solution fails to
fundamentally address the problems of infinite regress and exhaustiveness that were
highlighted earlier. Mixed methods approaches to mechanisms may actually make
304

these problems more acute as mechanisms are searched for to connect variable
relationships in a manner consistent with empirical data, but not in a complete manner.
This certainly seems to be a prominent approach to mechanisms when a relationship
between variables is found to exist, mechanisms that are partially supported (by either
empirics or theory) are postulated as an addendum rather than as a coherent argument
of their own.
Pattern matching is an alternative, albeit not exclusive, procedure to mixed
methods which similarly prioritizes variables and then moves to mechanisms. Pattern
matching is primarily a deductive approach which begins with parsimonious, clear
theoretical conjectures and then searches for the best available evidence to disconfirm
the theory (Bitektine 2007). The theoretical relationship between variables creates a
theoretical pattern of things that would hold if the theory were correct and then
matches this up with the actually existing pattern (Trochim 1989). Stated simply be
Gerring, this approach proceeds by starting with the question “If Theory A is true (false),
what about the world ought to be true (false)?” (Gerring 2010, 1512). The first step
then is to develop a theorized relationship between variables and then trace the
possible real-world implications if this theory held. Importantly, this method does allow
researchers to use best possible data and information, rather than not delving deeper
into relationships because of poor data opportunities. Pattern matching can be a useful
tool in terms of both theory development and establishing causal relationships when
other, direct methods of studying are not available (Gerring 2010).
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Pattern matching can often involve mechanism study in that mechanisms can
provide key pattern details that can then be matched. If, for example, theory A expects
mechanism M to be essential in the causal process and theory B expects mechanism N
to be the essential mechanism, studying of these mechanisms can provide matching
support for one theory and matching disconfirmation of the other. The existence of a
mechanism may not disconfirm a theoretical relationship as the complex social world
often has many different types of mechanisms operating; however, it can provide some
key support to theories if done in a rigorous manner.
However, similarly to mixed methods, pattern matching study of mechanisms
puts mechanisms second and as a result deals only partially with confounding and
exhaustiveness problems. In terms of confounders, with strong theories that can only
produce a set of mechanisms (and distinct from other theoretical set of mechanisms),
pattern matching may be able to provide crucial support and rule out confounders.
However, these conditions are rarely met in the political world, as Gerring explains that
“In the absence of a strong set of theoretical expectations it is impossible to ascertain
whether the theory is true or not simply by observing causal mechanisms. As it happens,
many social science theories are rather flaccid, that is, open to multiple interpretations,
and highly probabilistic” (Gerring 2010, 1515). Similarly, Trochim argues that without
the ability to rule out alternative theories from one another, pattern matching may be
an unhelpful method (Trochim 1989). It is difficult to imagine any but the most extreme
violent coercive mechanisms in global environmental politics of being exclusive to some
theories and not others. For example, if persuasion from nongovernmental
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organizations to state leaders leads those leaders to negotiate a more significant
agreement, this could support a number of theories in international environmental
politics and it would be surprising if it disconfirmed any. Pattern matching is also
extremely insensitive to the exhaustiveness problem highlighted above. Missing
mechanisms that do not confirm or disconfirm any rival explanations may be highlighted
only briefly or may not be studied at all. Pattern matching as an approach to studying
mechanisms will be of limited use to studies of global environmental politics.
Variable-prioritized approaches are very capable of detailing mechanisms, they
are less adequate to the task of discerning what mechanisms, and what
interrelationships, are causally sufficient or necessary. In addition, study of mechanisms
may not address the problems the researcher is attempting to solve by mobilizing them:
namely direction of causation and confounders problems. Both of these problems may
remain pernicious despite the researcher turning secondarily to mechanisms. As stated
in the introduction, this is not a criticism of the variable-prioritized approach in favor of
an alternative approach at all times. Variable-prioritized approaches can highlight
general relationships, can provide instructive macro-level processes, can highlight new
actors and contexts, etc. However, when these approaches turn to mechanisms, the
results are often going to be less than robust and the problem of confounders,
exhaustiveness, and infinite regress will prove severely constraining. Shifting the focus
may provide extensive ability to analyze mechanisms much more fully and develop
significant findings on this level of analysis.
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Mechanism-Priority
The mechanism-prioritized approach treats the generative mechanisms as first
order phenomena and does not start from a presumed understanding of a variable
relationship. Instead, it begins from an outcome of interest and then proceeds through
a process of “causal reconstruction” (Mayntz 2004) that identifies the processes that
generated that outcome. Although the inferential impacts of the work may be limited
from scaling down the approach (Merton 1957), the process can yield important insights
and, most importantly, most adequate approach to getting an engaged view of the
mechanism level.
This approach does not get rid of variable relationships, indeed they may end
being some of the most significant findings of the study. However, the approach does
mean that independent variable situations may be kept complex and multivariate while
the generative processes are investigated significantly. Faletti and Lynch explain “that a
causal explanation requires the analyst to specify the operative causal mechanism and
to delineate the relevant aspects of the surroundings—that is, those that allow the
mechanism to produce the outcome” (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1152). Mario Bunge’s
system-ontology basis for understanding mechanism highlights a similar point about the
importance of understanding the context and preceding conditions that allow
mechanisms to operate (Bunge 2004b, a). A full causal argument should include some
discussion of independent variables, the mechanism-prioritized approach simply
proceeds backward toward independent variables.
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It also follows that such an approach does not proceed without theories or prior
understandings. Mechanism-prioritization should be as rigorous and built around good
practices as variable-prioritized studies are (Bunge 2004b). Hall, for example, in his
systematized process analysis does explain that the first two steps in the procedure are
1. Developing theories and 2. Deriving expectation from those theories (Hall 2006). The
distinction is that the theories and expectations will be about the generative
mechanisms for study first. Although this can take part of an overall hypothesized X
causes Y relationship, one hypothesis to take prominence will by that M generates
outcome Y. Prior empirical work, leads from informants, and theories can all aid in
generating these mechanism hypotheses. Although the nets may be the same for both
variable-prioritized and mechanism-prioritized approaches, they are cast at different
depths and for different purposes.
Finally, the cases relevant to the approach may be distinct from cases relevant to
the variable-prioritized approach. Variable-prioritized approaches may emphasize
selection of cases around Millean types of similarity and difference (Skocpol 1984). This
is because the search for mechanisms should fit in the larger search for variable
relationships. In contrast, mechanism-prioritized approaches will emphasize outcome
as the primary selection criteria (Riley 2005); while it should also emphasize cases where
the outcome occurs and where it does not (Hall 2006). In addition, to understand the
interrelationship between different mechanisms and their portability, attention to wider
populations can provide richer understandings of the situation.
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Causal reconstruction is an ideal procedure to follow in order to control for some
of the pernicious problems of mechanisms. Confounding causes can be controlled
through process tracing with emphasis on the mechanisms that generate the specific
outcome of interest (George and Bennett 2004, Gross 2009, Pierson 2004). In-depth
case study with robust study can detail the causes and control for other possible causes
when done effectively.
The other three problems of mechanisms can also be best addressed through a
mechanism-prioritized approach. The limited nature of mechanisms and getting lost in
historical details is a problem of the sociology of scholarship, the neglect of mechanisms
and prioritization of variables, and the lack of developed mechanism hypotheses in
significant amount of work. Putting mechanisms first can both alter the academic
reasons that mechanism analysis can overemphasize unique nature of case aspects and
can force researchers to develop sustained hypotheses about the mechanisms prior to
case evaluation. The infinite regress problem can similarly be best approached by
prioritizing mechanisms to a primary level. Although there will always be the challenge
of infinite regress and division, prioritizing mechanisms in analysis can allow academic
debates about mechanisms to develop certain levels of analysis for certain mechanisms
that are seen to be the most relevant.
Finally, the exhaustiveness problem with mechanistic analysis can be dealt with
much better in a mechanism-prioritized approach. The problem in a variable-prioritized
approach is that there is no control or procedure that can ensure exhaustiveness of
mechanisms; interrelationship of mechanisms may be the essential causal process and
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there is little way of separating this. A mechanism-prioritized approach, in contrast,
goes searching for exhaustiveness and the interrelationships that exist. The process
gets refined continually as some mechanisms are excluded and relationships are
considered valuable findings. Working back in time and either emphasizing critical
junctures or general processes can be key in creating exhaustive understanding of the
mechanisms that generate a particular outcome (Pierson 2004, Falleti and Lynch 2009).
Exhaustiveness is of course a result of each individual piece of research; however, a
mechanism-prioritized approach offers a far more tractable approach than a variableprioritized approach.
Resilience and the study of mechanisms
Resilience, as specified in Chapter 1, is a dynamic outcome which can proceed in
a process of sudden changes in the outcome rather than a gradual increase. Generative
mechanisms for a dynamic outcome require taking seriously the epistemological basis of
the study of mechanisms in the analysis. This study of resilience pursued and focused
on the different mechanisms which specifically gave rise to resilient governance utilized
comparative analysis and process-tracing in the case of the two case studies.
Simple existence of a mechanism in any causal process does not necessarily
establish the causal power of the mechanism. Instead, it is necessary to pull apart and
provide robust tests of the different mechanisms. This study relies upon two different
methods to identify whether the mechanisms are necessary in the causal process of
specific mechanisms: small number of case comparison and process tracing within
cases. These procedures rely upon an epistemology which focuses primarily on middle
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level knowledge rather than theoretical parsimony or lab-based reconstruction. While
the latter can capture complex dynamics, the former is unsuited to this task but instead
aims to distill knowledge in a formal manner.
Chapter 3 pursues a comparison of ten different biodiversity cases to provide a
wide ranging comparison of cases. While this sample is not the entire population of
biodiversity governance arrangements, the cases were selected based largely upon the
cases with sufficient evidence for analysis and consideration. While this excludes one
major governance effort (the Convention on Migratory Species which is too fractured to
be considered a single effort), the cases selected provide a significant look into the issue
of international biodiversity governance focusing on a large proportion of the efforts
which have had any effect on policymaking around the world. The comparison involves
brief histories of the different cases attuned to the proxy measures of resilience
(significant rule change and integration of the ecosystem perspective) and the relevant
political contexts which gave rise to those conditions. The limitation of this procedure is
that because it selects cases based upon general accessibility, there may be other
mechanisms and mechanism relationships which are pivotal in the cases with large gaps
in information for compiling a history. However, this limitation does not fully constrain
the analysis which relies upon a number of cases to attempt and identify the relevant
mechanism relationships which are key in the process. The second method which is
used to focus on the mechanisms specifically is in-depth process tracing of the cases in
Central America and the Caribbean. This method attempts to identify the exact
mechanisms which generated part or the end result of resilient governance.
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Complementing the comparative analysis, these in-depth studies provide a surgical view
of the mechanisms that exist and allow the rejection of potential irrelevant mechanisms
which are key to ascertaining the network structure theory versus the other potential
arguments.
Putting mechanism central in the analysis is an issue which requires attention to
the specific methods being used to ascertain the context and relevance of the
mechanisms at play. Some may have specific triggering situations, some may only
generate the observed outcome when combined with other mechanisms in a particular
way, and others may appear to be theoretically coherent mechanisms but may play little
role in the actual political practices. Using an eclectic approach, without having
theoretical parsimony as an overriding goal, introduces additional problems in that
there is not a clear answer for deciding these various issues. However, combining
comparative analysis with in-depth case studies provides one potentially useful method
for understanding mechanisms and studying their impacts on the political world.

313

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abel, Nick, David H.M. Cumming, and John Anderies. 2006. "Collapse and Reorganization in
Social-Ecological Systems: Questions, Some Ideas, and Policy Implications." Ecology and
Society no. 11 (1).
Adams, Gordon. 1982. The Politics of defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle. New York: Council
on Economic Priorities.
Aggarwal, Vinod K., ed. 1998. Institutional Design for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages,
and Nesting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Anderies, John M., and Marco A. Janssen. 2011. "The Fragility of Robust Social-Ecological
Systems." Global Environmental Change no. 21 (4):1153-1156.
Anderies, John M., Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom. 2003. Design Principles for Robustness
of Institutions in Social-Ecological Systems. In Robustness of Coupled Natural and Human
Systems. Santa Fe Institute.
Anderies, John, Brian Walker, and Ann P. Kinzig. 2006. "Fifteen Weddings and a Funeral: Case
Studies and Resilience-based Management." Ecology and Society no. 11 (1).
Andersson, Krister, and Frank von Laerhoven. 2007. "From Local Strongman to Facilitator:
Institutional Incentives for Participatory Municipal Governance in Latin America."
Comparative Political Studies no. 40 (9):1085-1111.
Andonova, Liliana B., and Marc A. Levy. 2003/2004. "Francising Global Governance: Making
Sense of the Johannesburg Type II Partnerships." Yearbook of International CoOperation on Environment and Development:19-32.
Andonova, Liliana B., and Ronald B. Mitchell. 2010. "The Rescaling of Global Environmental
Politics." Annual Review of Environment and Resources no. 35:255-282.
Andree, Peter. 2005. "The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and Shifts in the Discourse of
Precaution." Global Environmental Politics no. 5 (4):25-47.
Andree, Peter. 2007. Genetically Modified Diplomacy: The Global Politics of Agricultural
Biotechnology and the Environment. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Argyris, Chris, and Donald A. Schon. 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action
Perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
Arts, Bas, and Sandra Mack. 2002. "Environmental NGOs and the Biosafety Protocol: A Case
Study of Political Influence." European Environment no. 13:19-33.
Auld, G. 2010. "Assessing certification as governance: effects and broader consequences for
coffee." The Journal of Environment & Development no. 19 (2):215-241.

314

Axelrod, Robert. 1986. "The Evolution of Norms." American Political Science Review no. 80
(4):1095-1113.
Axelrod, Robert. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and
Collaboration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bach, David, and Abraham L. Newman. 2010. "Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic
Policy Convergence: Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation." International
Organization no. 64:505-528.
Baier, Colin M., Amy Lauren Lovecraft, and F. Stewart Chapin III. 2009. "Growth and Collapse of
a Resource System: an Adaptive Cycle of Change in Public Lands Governance and Forest
Management in Alaska." Ecology and Society no. 14 (2):5-26.
Barker, David Reed. 2002. "Biodiversity Conservation in the Wider Caribbean Region." RECIEL
no. 11 (1):74-81.
Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Batisse, Michael. 1969. "Can we Keep our Planet Habitable?" The UNESCO Courier no. 22:4-5.
Batisse, Michael. 1997. "Biosphere Reserves: A Challenge For Biodiversity Conservation and
Regional Development." Environment no. 39 (5):7-33.
Bennett, Andrew F. 2003. Linkages in the Landscape: The Role of Corridors and Connectivity in
Wildlife Conservation. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
Bernstein, Shane. 2004. "Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance." International Law &
International Relations no. 1 (1-2):139-166.
Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. 2004. "Transnational Networks and Global
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program." International
Studies Quarterly no. 48:471-493.
Biermann, Frank, and Philipp Pattberg. 2008. "Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock,
Moving Forward." Annual Review of Environment and Resources no. 33 (1):277-294. doi:
10.1146/annurev.environ.33.050707.085733.
Binford, Leigh. 1997. "Grassroots Development in Conflict Zones of Northeastern El Salvador."
Latin American Perspectives no. 24 (2):56-79.
Bitektine, Alex. 2007. "Prospective Case Study Design: Qualitative Method for Deductive Theory
Testing." Organizational Reserach Methods no. 20 (1):1-21.
Bodin, Orjan, and Beatrice Crona. 2009. "The Role of Social Networks in Natural Resource
Governance: What Relational Patterns Make a Difference?" Global Environmental
Change no. 19 (3):366-374.

315

Booher, David E., and Judith E. Innes. 2010. "Governance for Resilience: CALFED as a Complex
Adaptive Network for Resource Management." Ecology and Society no. 15 (3):35-51.
Börzel, Tanja A. 1998. "Organizing Babylon-On the different Conceptions of Policy Networks."
Public Administration no. 76:253-273.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2012. "Experimentalist Governance in the EU: The emperor's new clothes?"
Regulation and Governance no. 6 (3):378-384.
Botto, Manuel Picasso. 1999. "The Amazon Cooperation Treaty: A Mechanism for Cooperation
and Sustainable Development." In Management of Latin American River Basins:
Amazon, Plata, and Sao Francisco, edited by Asit K. Biswas, Newton V. Cordeiro,
Benedito P.F. Braga and Cecilia Tortajada, 69-101. New York: United Nations University
Press.
Bragdon, Susan. 1996. "Institutions for Global Environmental Change." Global Environmental
Change no. 6 (2):177-179.
Breitmeier, Helmut, and Volker Rittberger. 2000. "Environmental NGOs in an Emerging Global
Civil Society." In The Global Environment in the Twenty-First Century: Prospects for
International Cooperation, edited by Pamela S. Chrasek. Tokyo: The United Nations
University Press.
Breitmeier, Helmut, Arild Underdal, and Oran R. Young. 2011. "The Effectiveness of International
Environmental Regimes: Comparing and Contrasting Findings from Quantitative
Research." International Studies Review no. 13 (3):1-27.
Bridgewater, Peter. 2008. "A New Context for the Ramsar Convention: Wetlands in a Changing
World." RECIEL no. 17 (1):100-106.
Bugdahn, Sonja. 2008. "Travelling to Brussels via Aarhus: Can Transnational NGO Networks
Impact EU Policy." Journal of European Public Policy no. 15 (4):588-606.
Bull, Benedicte. 1999. "'New Regionalism' in Central America." Third World Quarterly no. 20
(5):957-970.
Bullock, John G., Donald P. Green, and Shang E. Ha. 2010. "Yes, But What’s the Mechanism?
(Don’t Expect an Easy Answer)." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology no. 98
(4):550-558. doi: 10.1037/a0018933.supp.
Bunge, Mario. 2004a. "Clarifying some Misunderstandings about Social Systems and their
Mechanisms." Philosophy of the Social Sciences no. 34:371-381. doi:
10.1177/0048393104266860.
Bunge, Mario. 2004b. "How Does It Work?: The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms." Philosophy
of the Social Sciences no. 34 (2):182-210. doi: 10.1177/0048393103262550.

316

Byron, Jessica, and Patsy Lewis. 2007. Formulating Sustainable Development Benchmarks for an
EU-CARIFORUM EPA: Caribbean Perspectives. Mona, Jamaica: International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).
Caballero-Anthony, Mely. 2004. "Non-State Regional Governance Mechanism for Economic
Security: The Case of the ASEAN Peoples' Assembly." The Pacific Review no. 17 (4):567585.
Camara, Rafael, Jose Ramon Martinez, and Fernando Diaz del Olmo. 2005. Desarrollo Sostenible
y medio ambiente en Republica Dominicana: Medios Naturales, Manejo Historico,
Conservacion y Proteccion. Sevilla, Spain: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, Escuela de Estudios Hispano.
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo. 2004. "Norms from Outside and from Inside: An Experimental Analysis
on the Governance of Local Ecosystems." Forest Policy and Economics no. 6:229-241.
Carp, Eric. 1980. A Directory of Western Palearctic Wetlands. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN-UNEP.
Carpenter, Stephen R., William A. Brock, and Donald Ludwig. 2002. "Collapse Learning and
Renewal." In Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems,
edited by Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling, 173-194. Washington D.C.: Island Press.
Carpenter, Stephen R., and Monica G. Turner. 2001. "Editorial: Panarchy 101." Ecosystems no. 4
(5):389.
Carpenter, Stephen R., Brian Walker, John Anderies, and Nick Abel. 2001. "From Metaphor to
Measurement: Resilience of What to What?" Ecosystems no. 4 (8):765-781.
Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. 2004. Governing Through Markets:
Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Cater, Nick. 1989. "Call for Sacking of Conservation Convention Chiev." The Independent.
CCAD Joint Declaration. 2002. Joint Declaration between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration of the United States of America, the Central American Commission on
Environment and Development and the World Bank for Cooperation in Support of
Providing Strategic Information on The Environment and Development's Management
of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.
Chalmers, David J. 2006. "Strong and Weak Emergence." In The Re-Emergence of Emergence:
The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, edited by Paul Davies and Philip
Clayton, 244-255. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chamorro Marin, Edgar J., and Ruben E. Najera. 1996. "Origenes Evolucion y Perspectivas de la
Integracion Centroamericana." Panorama Centroamericano:27-104.

317

Chazdon, Robin, Celia A. Harvey, Oliver Komar, Daniel M. Griffith, Bruce G. Ferguson, Miguel
Martinez-Ramos, Helda Morales, Ronald Nigh, Lorena Soto-Pintos, Michiel van Breugel,
and Stacy M. Philpott. 2009. "Beyond Reserves: A Research Agenda for Conserving
Biodiversity in Human-modified Tropical Landscapes." Biotropica no. 41 (2):142-153.
CITES. 1989. Proposal: Transfer of Loxodonta africana from Appendix II to Appendix I. Lausanne,
Switzerland.
Clark, William C., and Giandomenico Majone. 1985. "The Critical Appraisal of Scientific Inquiries
with Policy Implications." Science, Technology, and Human Values no. 10 (3):6-19.
Clemens, Elisabeth S. 2007. "Toward a Historicized Sociology: Theorizing Events, Processes, and
Emergence." Annual Review of Sociology no. 33:527-549. doi:
10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131700.
Colchester, Marcus. 1990. "The International Tropical Timber Organization: Kill or Cure for the
Rainforests?" The Ecologist no. 20 (5):166-174.
Collinge, Sharon K. 1996. "Ecological Consequences of Habitat Fragmentation: Implications for
Landscape Architecture and Planning." Landscape and Urban Planning no. 36:59-77.
Comision Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD). 2009. Plan Ambiental de la Región
Centroamericana (PARCA) 2010 - 2014. San Salvador: CCAD.
Conca, Ken. 2006. Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution
Building. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America. 1999.
Summary Report of Proceedings, Meeting for the Reconstruction and Transformation of
Central America. Sweden, Stockholm: Inter-American Development Bank.
Convention on Biological Diversity. 2010. Aichi-Targets Technical Rationale. Prepared for COP
10- Nagoya, Japan: Strategic Plan 2011-2020.
Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis. 2005. "When norms clash: international norms,
domestic practices, and Japan's internalisation of the GATT/WTO." Review of
International Studies no. 31:3-25.
Crona, Beatrice, and Orjan Bodin. 2006. "What you know is Who you know? Communication
Patterns Among Resource Users as a Prerequisite for Co-Management." Ecology and
Society no. 11 (2):7-30.
Curlier, Maaria, and Steinar Andresen. 2002. "International Trade in Endangered Species: The
CITES Regime." In Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with
Evidence, edited by Edward L. Miles, Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen
Wettestad, Jon Birger Skjaerseth and Elaine M. Carlin. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Danielle, Claudio, and Sebastian Carenzo. 1999. Biosphere Reserve Implementation: The Latin
American Experience. Working Paper #25. Paris: UNESCO.
318

Dauvergne, Peter. 1997. Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast
Asia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Davies, Paul. 2006. "The Physics of Downward Causation." In The Re-Emergence of Emergence:
The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, edited by Paul Davies and Philip
Clayton, 35-52. New York: Oxford University Press.
de Fontaubert, Charlotte, and Tundi Agardy. 1998. "Critical Analysis of the SPAW Protocol: The
Dilemma of Regional Coordination." University of Miami Inter-American Law Review no.
30 (1):85-99.
de Onis, Juan. 1992. The Green Cathedral: Sustainable Development of Amazonia. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." The American Economic Review
no. 57 (2):347-359.
Diamond, Jared. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking Press.
Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Patrick Stern. 2003. "The Struggle to Govern the Commons."
Science no. 302:1902-1912.
Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2010. "Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance." Global
Environmental Politics no. 10 (2):18-24.
Dinar, S., ed. 2011. Beyond Resource Wars: Scarcity, Environmental Degradation, and
International Cooperation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Direccion Nacional de Parques. 1991. Plan de Uso y Gestion del Parque Nacional de Los Haitises
y Areas Perifericas. Santo Domingo: Direccion Nacional de Parques.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. "Managing the Evolution of
Multilateralism." International Organization no. 52 (2):297-419.
Drori, Gili S.; Meyer, John W.; Ramirez, Francisco, O.; Schofer, Evan. 2003. Science in the Modern
World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Duit, Andreas, and Victor Galaz. 2008. "Governance and Complexity: Emerging Issues for
Governance Theory." Governance no. 21 (3):311-335.
Dull, Robert A. 2007. "Evidence for Forest Clearance, Agriculture, and Human-Induced Erosion in
Precolumbian El Salvador." Annals of the Association of American Geographers no. 97
(1):127-141.
EarthTrends. 2003. Biodiversity and Protected Areas--Dominican Republic. Washington, D.C.:
World Resources Institute.
Elster, Jon. 1989. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.

319

Erisman, Jan Willem. 2004. "The Nanjing Declaration on Management of Reactive Nitrogen."
BioScience no. 54 (4):286-287.
European Environment Agency. 2013. Late Lessons from early warnings: Science, precaution,
innovation. Copenhagen: EEA.
Faizi, S. 2004. "CBD: The Unmaking of a Treaty." Current Science no. 86 (11):1471-1474.
Fall, Juliet. 2006. "Designing Framework Conventions to Promote and Support Transboundary
Protected Areas: Theory and Practice from the Carpathian Convention." In Biodiversity
and Protected Areas: The Evolution of the Italian and Ukrainian Legislation, edited by G.
Tamburelli. Milan, Italy: Giuffre.
Falleti, Tulia G., and Julia F. Lynch. 2009. "Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis."
Comparative Political Studies no. 42 (9):1143-1166. doi: 10.1177/0010414009331724.
Farrell, Alex, Stacy D. VanDeveer, and Jill Jager. 2001. "Environmental Assessments: Four UnderAppreciated elements of Design." Global Environmental Change no. 11:311-333.
Farrier, David, and Linda Tucker. 2000. "Wise Use of Wetlands Under the Ramsar Convention: A
Meaningful Implementation of International Law." Journal of Environmental Law no. 12
(1):21-42.
Fee, Eric, Kristin Gerber, Jenny Rust, Katrin Haggenmueller, Horst Korn, and Pierre Ibisch. 2009.
"Stuck in the Clouds: Bringing the CBD's Ecosystem Approach for conservation
management down to Earth in Canada and Germany." Journal for Nature Conservation
no. 17:212-217.
Ferrer, Gabriel Real, ed. 2000. Integracion Economica y Medio Ambiente en America Latina.
Madrid: McGraw Hill.
Ferris, Elizabeth G. 1981. "The Andean Pact and the Amazon Treaty: Reflections of Changing
Latin American Relations." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs no. 23
(2):147-175.
Finlayson, C. Max, Nick Davidson, Dave Pritchard, G. Randy Milton, and Heather MacKay. 2011.
"The Ramsar Convention and Ecosystem-Based Approaches to the Wise Use and
Sustainable Development of Wetlands." Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy
no. 14:176-198.
Fioretos, Orfeo. 2011. "Historical Institutionalism in International Relations." International
Organization no. 65 (02):367-399. doi: 10.1017/s0020818311000002.
Folke, Carl. 2006. "Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems
analyses." Global Environmental Change no. 16:253-267.
Folke, Carl, Thomas Hahn, Per Olsson, and Jon Norberg. 2005. "Adaptive Governance of SocialEcological Systems." Annual Review of Environment and Resources no. 30:441-473.

320

Foresta, Ronald A. 1992. "Amazonia and the Politics of Geopolitics." Geographical Review no. 82
(2):128-142.
Fung, Archon. 2006. "Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance." Public Administration
Review:66-75.
Garcia, Beatriz. 2011. The Amazon from an International Law Perspective. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Garmestani, Ahjond S., and Melinda Harm Benson. 2013. "A Framework for Resilience-Based
Governance of Social-Ecological Systems." Ecology and Society no. 18 (1):9-19.
GEF. 2011. GEF Project Database. http://www.gefonline.org/ 2011 [cited 3/1 2011].
GEF Small Grants Programme. 2011. GEF Small Grants Programme Project Search.
http://sgp.undp.org/index.cfm?module=Projects&page=AdvancedSearch 2011 [cited
3/1 2011].
Gehring, Thomas, and Eva Ruffing. 2008. "When Arguments Prevail over Power: The CITES
Procedure for the Listing of Endangered Species." Global Environmental Politics no. 8
(2):123-160.
Gellert, Paul K. 2007. "From Managed to Free(r) Markets: Transnational and Regional
Governance of Asian Timber." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science (610):246-259.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2004. Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerring, John. 2010. "Causal Mechanisms: Yes, but..." Comparative Political Studies no. 43
(11):1499-1526.
Gibson, Clark C., Krister Andersson, Elinor Ostrom, and Sujai Shivakumar. 2005. The Samaritan's
Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gille, Zsuzsa, and Seán Ó Riain. 2002. "Global ethnography." Annual Review of Sociology:271295.
Gillespie, Alexander. 2002. "Forum Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC,
CITES, and the Management of Cetaceans." Ocean Development & International Law no.
33:17-56.
Global Environment Facility. 2008. Dominican Republic-Reengineering the National Protected
Area System In Order to Achieve Financial Sustainability. GEF Grant 3424.
Global International Waters Assessment. 2006. Challenges to International Waters--Regional
Assessments in a Global Perspective. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment
Programme.

321

Goffman, Erving. 1969. Strategic interaction. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Gough, Clair, and Simon Shackley. 2001. "The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The
Epistemic Communities and NGOs." International Affairs no. 77 (2):329-345.
Gourevitch, Peter. 2002. "Domestic Politics and International Relations." In Handbook of
International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons,
310-328. London: SAGE Publications.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology no. 78
(6):1360-1380.
Gregory, Stanley V., Frederick J. Swanson, W. Arthur McKee, and Kenneth W. Cummins. 1991.
"An Ecosystem Perspective of Riparian Zones." BioScience no. 41 (8):540-551.
Griffith, Daniel M. 2000. "Agroforestry: A Refuge for Tropical Biodiversity after Fire."
Conservation Biology no. 14 (1):325-326.
Gross, Neil. 2009. "A Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms." American Sociological Review
no. 74 (3):358-379. doi: 10.1177/000312240907400302.
Grundig, Frank. 2012. "Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness: A further
conceptual development of the Oslo-Potsdam Solution." International Environmental
Agreements no. 12 (4):111-127.
Guillen, Maria Silvia. 2001. "El Salvador." In Parlamentos, Descentralizacion, y Desarrollo Local:
Centroamerica y Republica Dominicana, edited by Ronny Rodriguez, 73-113. San Jose,
Costa Rica: Unidad para la Promocion de la Democracia de la OEA.
Gulbrandsen, Lars H. 2004. "Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification
Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest Regime." Global Environmental Politics no. 4 (2):75-99.
Gulbrandsen, Lars H. 2008. "The Role of Science in Environmental Governance: Competing
Knowledge Producers in Swedish and Norwegian Forestry." Global Environmental
Politics no. 8 (2):99-124.
Gulbrandsen, Lars H., and David Humphreys. 2006. International Initiatives to Address Tropical
Timber Logging and Trade: A Report for the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment.
Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
Gunderson, Lance, Carl Folke, and Michelle Lee. 2010. "Riding a Wave of Creative Destruction."
Ecology and Society no. 15 (2):29-32.
Gunderson, Lance H. 2000. "Ecological Resilience--In Theory and Application." Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics no. 31:425-439.
Gunderson, Lance H., Stephen R. Carpenter, Carl Folke, Per Olsson, and Garry D. Peterson. 2006.
"Water RATs (Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability) in Lake and Wetland SocialEcological Systems." Ecology and Society no. 11 (1).
322

Gunderson, Lance H., and C.S. Holling, eds. 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in
Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Gunderson, Lance H., C.S. Holling, and Garry D. Peterson. 2002. "Suprises and Sustainability:
Cycles of Renewal in the Everglades." In Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in
Human and Natural Systems, edited by Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling, 315-332.
Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Gunderson, Lance H., and Stephen S. Light. 2006. "Adaptive Management and Adaptive
Governance in the Everglades Ecosystem." Policy Sciences no. 39 (4):323-334.
Gupta, Joyeeta, Catrien Termeer, Judith Klosterman, Sander Meijerink, Margo van der Brink,
Pieter Jong, Sibout Nooteboom, and Emmy Bergsma. 2010. "The Adaptive Capacity
Wheel: A Method to Assess the Inherent Characteristics of the Institutions to Enable the
Adaptive Capacity of Society." Environmental Science & Policy no. 13:459-471.
Haas, Ernst B., Mary Pat Williams, and Don Babai. 1977. Scientists and World Order: The Uses of
Technical Knowledge in International Organizations. Berkley, CA: University of California
Press.
Haas, Peter M. 1990a. Saving the Mediterranean. New York: Columbia University Press.
Haas, Peter M. 1990b. Saving the Mediterranean: The politics of International Environmental
Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Haas, Peter M. 1992. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
coordination." In Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, edited by
Peter M. Haas and Emmanuel Adler, 1-35. Columbia, SC: USC Press.
Haas, Peter M. 2000. "International Institutions and Social Learning in the Management of
Global Environmental Risks." Policy Studies Journal no. 28 (3).
Haas, Peter M. 2001. "Epistemic Communities and Policy Knowledge." In International
Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences, 11578-86. New York: Elsevier.
Haas, Peter M. 2004a. "Science Policy for Multilateral Environmental Governance." In Emerging
Forces in Environmental Governance, edited by Norichika Kanie and Peter M. Haas. New
York: United Nations University.
Haas, Peter M. 2004b. "When does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the
Policy Process." Journal of European Public Policy no. 11 (4):569-592.
Haas, Peter M., and Emmanuel Adler, eds. 1992. Knowledge, Power and International Policy
Coordination. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Haas, Peter M., and Ernst B. Haas. 1995. "Learning to Learn: Improving International
Governance." Global Governance no. 1:255-285.

323

Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. 1993. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of
Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hale, Thomas N., and Denise L. Manzerall. 2004. "Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Can the
Johannesburg Partnerships Coordinate Action on Sustainable Development." Journal of
Environment & Development no. 13 (3):220-239.
Hall, Peter A. 1993. "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic
Policymaking in Britain." Comparative Politics no. 25 (3):275-296.
Hall, Peter A. 2006. "Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it." European
Management Review no. 3 (1):24-31. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500050.
Hardin, Garrett James. 1968. "Tragedy of the Commons." Science no. 162.
Harris, Larry D. 1984. The Fragmented Forest: Island Biogeography Theory and the PReservation
of Biotic Diversity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1998. The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic. Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
Harvey, Celia A., Oliver Komar, Robin Chazdon, Bruce G. Ferguson, Bryan Ginegan, Daniel M.
Griffith, Miguel Martinez-Ramos, Helda Morales, Ronald Nigh, Lorena Soto-Pintos,
Michiel van Breugel, and Mark Wishnie. 2008. "Integrating Agricultural Landscapes with
Biodiversity Conservation in the Mesoamerican Hotspot." Conservation Biology no. 22
(1):8-15.
Hasselman, Klaus, and Terry Barker. 2008. "The Stern Review and the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report: Implications for Interaction between Policymakers and Climate Experts. An
Editorial Essay." Climate Change no. 89:219-229.
Hecht, Susana B., Susan Kandel, and Ilena Gomez. 2006. Forms of Decentralization, Governance
and the Politics of Natural Resources in El Salvador. San Salvador: PRISMA.
Hecht, Susana B., and Sassan S. Saatchi. 2007. "Globalization and Forest Resurgence: Changes in
Forest Cover in El Salvador." BioScience no. 57 (8):663-672.
Hedstrom, Peter, and Richard Swedberg. 1998. "Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay." In
Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, edited by Peter Hestrom
and Richard Swedberg. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hedström, Peter, and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. "Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences." Annual
Review of Sociology no. 36 (1):49-67. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102632.
Helm, Carsten, and Detlef Sprinz. 2000. "Measuring the Effectiveness of International
Environmental Regimes." The Journal of Conflict Resolution no. 44 (5):630-652.
Herrfahrdt-Pähle, Elke, and Claudia Pahl-Wostl. 2012. "Continuity and change in social-ecological
systems: the role of institutional resilience." Ecology and Society no. 17 (2).
324

Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2011. "Under Construction: Debating the Region in South America." In
Comparative Environmental Regionalism, edited by Lorraine Elliott and Shaun Breslin.
New York: Routledge.
Hochstetler, Kathryn, and Margaret E. Keck. 2007. Greening Brazil: Environmental Activism in
State and Society. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Holland, John H. 1992. "Complex Adaptive Systems." Daedalus no. 121 (1):17-30.
Holling, C.S. 1973. "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems." Annual Review of Ecology and
Systematics:1-23.
Holling, C.S., Lance H. Gunderson, and Donald Ludwig. 2002. "In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive
Change." In Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems,
edited by Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling, 3-22. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Holling, Crawford S. 2005. "From complex regions to complex worlds." Ecology and Society no. 9
(1):11-21.
Holmes, George. 2010. "The Rich, the Powerful and the Endangered: Conservation Elites,
Networks and the Dominican Republic." Antipode no. 42 (3):624-646. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00766.x.
Hooghe, Lisbet, and Gary Marks. 2001. Multi-Level Governance and European Integration.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Hoster, Patrick, Tobias Kummerla, Volker C. Radeloff, and Daniel Muller. 2008. "Post Socialist
Land-Use and Land-Cover Change in the Carpathian Mountains." IHDP Update (2):70-73.
Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2001. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State:
Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Humphreys, David. 2003. "The United Nations Forum on Forests: Anatomy of a Stalled
International Process." Global Environmental Change no. 13:319-323.
Humphreys, David. 2004. "Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest
Negotiations." Global Environmental Politics no. 4 (2):51-75.
ICC-MAB. 1988a. Tenth Session, Action Plan for Biosphere Reserves. Paris: UNESCO.
ICC-MAB. 1988b. Tenth Session, Action Plan for Biosphere Reserves: Implementation for the
Period 1990-1995. Paris: UNESCO.
ICC-MAB. 1988c. Tenth Session, Report of the Expert Group Examining the Results of the
Biosphere Reserve Survey. Paris: UNESCO.
ICC-MAB. 1992. Report of the MAB Bureau. Paris: UNESCO.

325

IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011. The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank- Regional Program Review.
Illueca, Jorge. 1997. "The Paseo Pantera Agenda for Regional Cooperation." In Central America:
A Natural and Cultural History, edited by Anthony G. Coates, 241-258. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Insanally, Riyad. 2010. The Caribbean Sea: Our Common Patrimony. Association of Caribbean
States 2003 [cited 12/24/2010 2010]. Available from http://www.acsaec.org/About/SG/Girvan/Speeches/Caribbean_Sea.htm.
International Resources Group, Ltd. 2001. Dominican Republic Environmental Assessment.
Santo Domingo: USAID.
Ishwaran, Natarajan, Ana Persic, and Nguyen Hoang Tri. 2008. "Concept and Practice: The Case
of UNESCO Biosphere Reserves." International Journal of Environment and Sustainable
Development no. 7 (2):118-131.
IUCN- The World Conservation Union. 2000. Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements. London: IUCN.
IUCN. 1980. World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable
Development. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
Ivanova, Maria. 2010. "UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership,
Location." Global Environmental Politics no. 10 (1):30-59.
Izzo, Michela, Pietro Patrizio Ciro Aucelli, Yudith Javier, Caridad Pérez, and Carmen Maria
Rosskopf. 2009. "The tropical storm Noel and its effects on the territory of the
Dominican Republic." Natural Hazards no. 53 (1):139-158. doi: 10.1007/s11069-0099417-9.
Janssen, Marco A., and Elinor Ostrom. 2006. "Empirically Based, Agent-based Models." Ecology
and Society no. 11 (2).
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2004. States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order. New
York: Routledge.
Jen, Erica, ed. 2005. Robust Design: A Repertoire of Biological, Ecological, and Engineering Case
Studies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jinnah, Sikina. 2011. "Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade Agreements in Global
Environmental Governance." The Journal of Environment & Development no. 20:191215.
Johnson, Steven. 2001. Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software.
New York: Scribner.

326

Jonas, Harry, Kabir Bavikatte, and Holly Shrumm. 2010. "Community Protocols and Access and
Benefit Sharing." Asian Biotechnology and Development Review no. 12 (3):49-76.
Jones-Walters, Lawrence. 2007. "Pan-European Ecological Networks." Journal for Nature
Conservation no. 15 (4):262-264.
Jongman, Robert, and Dana Kamphorst. 2002. Ecological Corridors in Land Use Planning and
Development Policies. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.
Jordan, Andrew\, and Adriaan Schout. 2006. The Coordination of the European Union: Exploring
the Capacities of Networked Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jordan, Robert S. 1984. "Boycott Diplomacy: The U.S., the U.N. and UNESCO." Public
Administration Review no. 44 (4):263-265.
Kaiser, Jocelyn. 2001. "Bold Corridor Project Confronts Political Reality." Science no. 293
(5538):2196-2199.
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. "Transnational Advocacy Networks in international
and regional politics." International Social Science Journal no. 159:89-101.
Kelly, Judith. 2004. "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and
Socialization by International Institutions." International Organization no. 58 (2):425457.
Keohane, Robert O. , and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory."
International Security no. 20 (1):39-51.
Kettunen, M., O. Carter, S. Gantioler, D. Baldock, P. Torkler, A. Arroyo Schnell, A. Baumueller, E.
Gerritsen, M. Rayment, E. Daly, and M. Pieterse. 2011. Assessment of the Natura 2000
Co-Financing Arrangements of the EU Financing Instrument. Brussels, Belgium: Institute
for European Environmental Policy.
Kim, Joy A. 2004. "Regime Interplay: The case of biodiversity and climate change." Global
Environmental Change no. 14:315-324.
Knoke, David, and Song Yang. 2008. Social Network Analysis. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
Koetz, Thomas, Peter Bridgewater, Sybille van den Hove, and Bernd Siebenhuner. 2008. "The
Role of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice to the
Convention on Biological Diversity as a Science-Policy Interface." Environmental Science
& Policy no. 11:505-516.
Kraatz, Matthew S. 1998. "Learning by association? Interorganizational networks and adaptation
to environmental change." Academy of Management Journal:621-643.
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Silke Adam, and Margit Jochum. 2006. "Comparative Analysis of Policy
Networks in Western Europe." Journal of European Public Policy no. 13 (3):341-361.

327

Krishnarayan, Vijay, Yves Renard, and Lyndon John. 2006. "The SPAW PRotocol and Caribbean
Conservation: Can a Regional MEA Advance a Progressive Conservation Agenda?"
Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy no. 9 (2):265-276.
Le Preste, Philippe G. 2002. "The CBD at Ten: The Long Road to Effectiveness." Journal of
International Wildlife Law and Policy no. 5:269-285.
Lebel, Louis, John Anderies, Bruce Campbell, Carl Folke, Steve Hatfield-Dodds, Terry P. Hughes,
and James Wilson. 2006. "Governance and the Capacity to Manage Resilience in
Regional Social-Ecological Systems." Ecology and Society no. 11 (1).
Leonard, H. Jeffrey. 1987. Natural Resources and Economic Development in Central America: A
Regional Environmental Profile. Oxford, England: IIED/Earthscan.
Levin, Simon A. 2002. "Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the Unknown and the
Unknowable." Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society no. 40 (1):3-19.
Levitt, Barbara, and James G. March. 1988. "Organizational Learning." Annual Review of
Sociology no. 14:319-340.
Levy, Marc. A., Peter M. Haas, and Robert O. Keohane. 1992. "Institutions for the Earth:
Promoting International Environmental Protection." Environment no. 34 (4):12-36.
Lidskog, Rolf, and Goran Sundqvist. 2002. "The Role of Science in Environmental Regimes: The
Case of LRTAP." European Journal of International Relations no. 8 (1):77-101.
Lidskog, Rolf, and Goran Sundqvist. 2011. Governing the Air: The Dynamics of Science, Policy,
and Citizen Interaction. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.
Light, Carruyo. 2008. Producing Knowledge, Protecting Forests: Rural Encounters with Gender,
Ecotourism, and International Aid in the Dominican Republic. University Park, PA.:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 1996. Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The
Politics of Nature from Place to Planet. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Litfin, Karen. 1994a. Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation.
Edited by Helen; Ruggie Milner, John Gerard, New Directions in World Politics. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Litfin, Karen T. 1994b. Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental
Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lotman, Aleksei. 2011. The Need to Assess Progress in the Implementation of the Bern
Convention. Strasbourg, France: Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local
and Regional Affaris, Council of Europe.
Lovins, Amory, and L. Hunter Lovins. 2001. Brittle Power: Energy Policy for National Security.
Denver, Co: Rocky Mountain Institute.
328

Lundberg, Per, and Peter Frodin. 1998. "Ecosystem Resilience and Productivity: Are Predictions
Possible?" Oikos (3):603-306.
Lyster, Simon. 1985. International Wildlife Law. New York: Grotius Publications.
MacArthur, Robert H., and Edward O. Wilson. 1963. "An Equilibrium Theory of Insular
Zoogeography." Evolution no. 17 (4):373-387.
Mahoney, James. 2001. "Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and
Method." Sociological Forum no. 16 (3):575-593.
Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change." In
Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, edited by James
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Manning, Carrie. 2007. "Peace-Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Mozambique." Democratization no. 14 (2):253-272.
Martello, Marybeth Long, and Sheila Jasanoff. 2004. "Introduction: Globalization and
Environmental Governance." In Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental
Governance, edited by Marybeth Long Martello and Sheila Jasanoff, 1-29. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
May, Peter J. 1992. "Policy Learning and Failure." Journal of Public Policy no. 12 (4):331-354.
Mayntz, Renate. 2004. "Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena." Philosophy of
the Social Sciences no. 34 (2):237-259. doi: 10.1177/0048393103262552.
McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2008. "Methods for Measuring Mechanisms
of Contention." Qualitative Sociology no. 31:307-331.
Merton, Robert K. 1948. "The Self-fulfilling Prophecy." The Antioch Review no. 8 (2):193-210.
Merton, Robert K. 1957. "The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory." British Journal of
Sociology no. 8 (2):106-120.
Meseguer, Covadonga. 2004. "What Role for Learning? The Diffusion of Privatisation in OECD
and Latin American Countries." Journal of Public Policy no. 24 (3):299-325.
Miles, Edward L. 2002. Environmental regime effectiveness : confronting theory with evidence.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Miles, Edward L., Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen Wettestad, Jon Birger Skjaerseth, and
Elaine M. Carlin. 2002. Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with
Evidence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Biodiversity
Synthesis. Washington D.C.: World Resources Institute.

329

Miller, Kenton, Elsa Chang, and Nels Johnson. 2001. Defining Common Ground for the
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute.
Miller, Marian A.L. 1996. "Protecting the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region:
The Challenge of Institution-Building." Global Green Yearbook:37-46.
Mills, L Scott, Michael E Soulé, and Daniel F Doak. 1993. "The keystone-species concept in
ecology and conservation." BioScience no. 43 (4):219-224.
Mitchell, Ronald B. 2006. "Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness
of International Environmental Agreements." Global Environmental Politics no. 6 (3):7290.
Mooney, Harold A., Angela Cropper, and Walter V. Reid. 2004. "The Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment: What is it all about?" TRENDS in Ecology and Evolution no. 19 (5):221-224.
Moya Pons, Frank. 1998. The Dominican Republic: A National History. Princeton, NJ: Markus
Wiener Publishers.
Murawski, Steven A. 2007. "Ten Myths Concerning Ecosystem Approaches to Marine Resource
Management." Marine Policy no. 31 (3):681-690.
Najam, Adil, Ioli Christopoulou, and William R. Moomaw. 2004. "The Emergent "System" of
Global Environmental Governance." Global Environmental Politics no. 4 (4):23-35.
Newman, M.E.J. 2006. "Modularity and community structure in networks." Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences no. 103 (23):8577-8582.
Norberg, Jon, James Wilson, Brian Walker, and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. "Diversity and Resilience of
Social-Ecological Systems." In Complexity Theory for a Sustainable Future, edited by Jon
Norberg and Graeme S. Cumming, 46-79. New York: Columbia University Press.
Nowell, Kristin. 2012. Wildlife Crime Scorecard. Gland, Switzerland: World Wildlife Federation.
Oberthur, Sebastian, and Thomas Gehring. 2006. "Institutional Interaction in Global
Environmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade
Organization." Global Environmental Politics no. 6 (2):1-31.
Olsson, Per, Lance H. Gunderson, Stephen R. Carpenter, Paul Ryan, Louis Lebel, Carl Folke, and
C.S. Holling. 2006. "Shooting the Rapids: Navigating Transitions to Adaptive Governance
of the Social-Ecological Systems." Ecology and Society no. 11 (1).
Ong, Aihwa, and Stephen J Collier. 2008. Global assemblages: technology, politics, and ethics as
anthropological problems: Wiley-Blackwell.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2005. "Explanations by mechanisms in the social sciences. Problems,
advantages and alternatives." Mind & Society no. 4 (2):163-178. doi: 10.1007/s11299005-0013-8.

330

Ostermann, Ole P. 1998. "The Need for Managment of Nature Conservation Sites Designated
Under Natura 2000." Journal of Applied Ecology no. 35:968-973.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2010a. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex
Economic Systems." American Economic Review no. 100:641-672.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2010b. "Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change." Global Environmental Change no. 20:550-557.
Paavola, Jouni. 2007. "Institutions and Environmental Governance: A Reconceptualization."
Ecological Economics no. 63:93-103.
Padilla, Art, and Jerome L. McElroy. 2005. "The Tourism Penetration index in Large islands: The
Case of the Dominican Republic." Journal of Sustainable Tourism no. 13 (4).
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia. 2009a. "A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multilevel learning processes in resource governance regimes." Global Environmental Change
no. 19 (3):354-365.
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia. 2009b. "A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Adaptive Capacity and
Multi-level Learning Processes in Resource Governance Regimes." Global Environmental
Change no. 19:354-365.
Paige, Jeffery M. 1997. Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central
America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Perkins, Richard, and Eric Neumayer. 2007. "Implementing Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives." Global Environmental Politics no. 7 (3):14-40.
Peters, B. Guy. 2005. Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'. New
York: Continuum.
Peterson, Garry D., Craig R. Allen, and C.S. Holling. 1998. "Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity, and
Scale." Ecosystems no. 1 (1):6-18.
Philpott, S.M., and T. Dietsch. 2003. "Coffee and conservation: a global context and the value of
farmer involvement." Conservation Biology no. 17 (6):1844-1846.
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Pittock, Jamie. 2010. "A Pale Reflection of Political Reality: Integration of Global Climate,
Wetland, and Biodiversity Agreements." Climate Law no. 1 (3):343-373.
331

Poore, Duncan. 2003. Changing Landscapes: The Development of the International Tropical
Timber Organization and Its Influence on Tropical Forest Managemetn. Sterling, Va:
Eartscan.
Poteete, Amy R., and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. "Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective
Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases on
Qualitative Research." World Development no. 36 (1):176-195.
Preston Jr., William, Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller. 1989. Hope and Folly: The United
States and UNESCO, 1945-1985. New York: Institute for Media Analysis, Inc.
Price, Martin F. 2000. "The Alpine Convention: A Model for Other Mountain Regions?" Mountain
Research and Development no. 20 (2):192-194.
Price, Martin F., Jung Jin Park, and Meriem Bouamrane. 2010. "Reporting Progress on
Internationally Designated Sites: The Periodic Review of Biosphere Reserves."
Environmental Science & Policy no. 13:549-557.
Princen, Thomas. 1994. "The Ivory Trade ban: NGOs and International Conservation." In
Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global, edited by
Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, 121-159. New York: Routledge.
PRISMA. 1995. "El Salvador: Dinamica de la Degradacion Ambiental." no. 4 (San Salvador).
PROARCA. 2003. El Sistema Centroamericano de Areas Protegidas: Mas de Tres Decadas de
Desafios en su Conceptualizacion y Gestion. Managua: Programa Ambiental Regional
para Centroamerica (PROARCA).
Proyecto Estado de la Región. 1991. Informe Estado de la Región en Desarrollo Humano
Sostenible. San Jose, Costa Rica: Proyecto Estado de la Región.
Ragin, Charles. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Ramčilović, Sabaheta, and Margaret Shannon. 2008. Principles of Environmental Governance in
Policy Design and Implementation: Experiences from Alpine and Carpathian Conventions
and Implications for the Balkan Mountain Initiative. Paper read at 10th International
Symposium on Legal Aspects of European Forest Sustainable Development, at Sarajevo,
Bosnia-Herezgovina.
Ramirez Pena, Salvador. 2009. Joaquin Balaguer Padre de la Ecologia Nacionals. Santo Domingo:
Publicaciones IFP.
Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. 1997. "Biodiversity since Rio: The Future of the Convention
on Biological Diversity." Environment no. 38 (4):17-43.
Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. 2004. "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources."
International Organization no. 58:277-309.

332

Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe. 2007. Handbook of the
Carpathian Convention. Szentendre, Hungary: Regional Environmental Center for
Central and Eastern Europe.
Reiss, Julian. 2007. "Do we need Mechanisms in the Social Sciences?" Philosophy of the Social
Sciences no. 37 (2):163-184. doi: 10.1177/0048393107299686.
Resilience Alliance. 2007a. Assessing and Managing Resilience in Social-Ecological systems:
Volume 2 Supplemental Notes to the Practitioners Workbook. In Version 1.0.
Resilience Alliance. 2007b. Assessing Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems: A Workbook for
Scientists. In Version 1.1: Draft for Testing and Evaluation.
Restrepo, Carla, and Nora Alvarez. 2006. "Landslides and Their Contribution to Land-cover
Change in the Mountains of Mexico and Central America." Biotropica no. 38 (4):446-457.
Rhodes, R.A.W. 1996. "The New Governance: Governing without Government." Political Studies
no. XLIV:652-667.
Rhodes, R.A.W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and
Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Riley, Dylan. 2005. "Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and
Spain in Comparative Perspective." American Sociological Review no. 70 (2):288-310.
doi: 10.1177/000312240507000205.
Risse, Thomas. 2011. "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview."
In Governing without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, edited
by Thomas Risse, 1-35. New Yor: Columbia University Press.
Rocheleau, Dianne, and Laurie Ross. 1995. "Trees as Tools, Trees as Text: Struggles over
Resources in Zambrana-Chacuey, Dominican Republic." Antipode no. 27 (4):407-428.
Rocheleau, Dianne, Laurie Ross, Julio Maorrobel, Luis Malaret, Ricardo Hernandez, and Tara
Kominak. 2001. "Complex Communities and Emergent Ecologies in the Regional
Agroforest of Zambrana-Chacuey, Dominican Republic." Cultural Geographies no. 8
(4):465-492.
Rodrigues, Ana S.L., and et. al. 2004. "Effectiveness of the global protected area network in
representing species diversity." Nature:640-643
Roessingh, Carel, Hanneke Duijnhoven, and Myrte Berendse. 2008. "Caribbean Delight: Moving
Beyond the Sustainability Discourse in Tourism." ARA Journal of Tourism Research no. 1
(1):21-33.
Rosa, Herman. 1993. AID y las Transformaciones Globales en El Salvador. Managua: CRIES.
Ross, Jane. 2007. "International Year of Mountains +5 and the Mountain Partnership." Mountain
Research and Development no. 27 (1):86-88.
333

Roth, Linda C. 2001. "Enemies of the Trees: Subsistence Farmers and the Perverse Protection of
Tropical Dry Forests." Journal of Forestry no. 99 (10):20-27.
Rudaz, Gilles. 2011. "The Cause of Mountains: The Politics of Promoting a Global Agenda."
Global Environmental Politics no. 11 (4):43-66.
Sabatier, Paul A. 1988. "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and hte Role of
Policy-Oriented Learning Therein." Policy Sciences no. 21 (2/3):129-168.
Sabel, Charles F., and Jonathan Zeitlin. 2008. "Learning from Difference: The New Architecture
of Experimentalist Governance in the EU." European Law Journal no. 14 (3):271-327.
Sand, Peter H. 1997. "Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of
Trade and Environment." European Journal of International Law no. 8 (1):29-58.
Sawyer, R. Keith. 2004. "The Mechanisms of Emergence." Philosophy of the Social Sciences no.
34:260-282.
Sawyer, R. Keith. 2005. Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Schatan, Claudia. 1998. "Cooperacion Ambiental en un Marco de Integracion Regional." In
Integracion Regional en Centroamericana, edited by Victor Bulmer Thomas, 191-218.
San Jose, Costa Rica: FLACSO-SSRC.
Schrijver, Nico. 1997. Sovereignty over Natural Resources. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Schultz, Lisen, Andreas Duit, and Carl Folke. 2011. "Participation, Adaptive Co-management, and
Management Performance in the World Network of Biosphere Reserves." World
Development no. 39 (4):662-671. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.09.014.
Secretaria General de SICA. 1993. El Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana. San Salvador:
SGSICA.
Sell, Susan K. , and Aseem Prakash. 2004. "Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between
Business and NGO networks in International Property Rights." International Studies
Quarterly no. 48:143-175.
Shelton, Napier. 1988. "Progress of the Biosphere Reserve Program." Ambio no. 17 (2):155-157.
Siebenhuner, Bernd. 2002. "How do scientific assessments learn? Part 1. Conceptual framework
and case study of the IPCC." Environmental Science and Policy no. 5:411-420.
Siebenhuner, Bernd. 2003. "The Changing Role of Nation States in International Environmental
Assessments--The case of the IPCC." Global Environmental Change no. 13:113-123.
Siebenhuner, Bernd. 2008. "Learning in International Organization in Global Environmental
Governance." Global Environmental Politics no. 8 (4):92-116.
334

Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2010. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of
World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Silvius, Kirsten M., Richard E. Bodmer, and Jose M.V. Fragoso, eds. 2004. People in Nature:
Wildlife Conservation in South and Central America. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Simberloff, Daniel, and Lawrence G. Abele. 1982. "Refuge Design and Island Biogeographic
Theory: Effects of Fragmentation." The American Naturalist no. 120 (1):41-50.
Simmons, Beth A., and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. "International Organizations and Institutions." In
Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth
A. Simmons, 192-211. London: SAGE Publications.
Simmons, Beth, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2006. "Introduction: The International
Diffusion of Liberalism." International Organization no. 60:781-810.
Skocpol, Theda. 1984. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Skodvin, Tora, and Steinar Andresen. 2006. "Leadership Revisited." Global Environmental Politics
no. 6 (3):13-28.
Slocombe, D. Scott. 1998. "Defining Goals and Criteria for Ecosystem-Based Management."
Environmental Management no. 12 (1):483-493.
Smith, Keith. 2009. Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster. New York:
Routledge.
Smith, R.J., R.D.J. Muir, M.J. Walpole, A. Balmford, and N. Leader-Williams. 2003. "Governance
and the Loss of Biodiversity." Nature no. 426:67-69.
Stanley, William Deane, and David Holiday. 1997. "Peace Mission Strategy and Domestic Actors:
UN Medication, Verification and Institution-Building in El Salvador." International
Peacekeeping no. 4 (2):22-49.
Stein, Janice Gross. 1994. "Political learning by doing: Gorbachev as uncommitted thinker and
motivated learner." International Organization no. 48:155-155.
Steinberg, Paul F. 2001. Environmental leadership in developing countries: transnational
relations and biodiversity policy in Costa Rica and Bolivia: MIT Press.
Steinberg, Paul F. 2009. "Institutional Resilience Amid Political Change: The Case of Biodiversity
Conservation." Global Environmental Politics no. 9 (3):61-83.
Stiles, Daniel. 2004. "The Ivory Trade and Elephant Conservation." Environmental Conservation
no. 31 (4):309-321.

335

Stoker, Gerry. 1998. "Governance as theory: Five Propositions." International Social Science
Journal no. 155:17-28.
Sugiyama, Natasha Borges. 2008. "Ideology and Networks: The Politics of Social Policy Diffusion
in Brazil." LAtin American Research Review no. 43 (3):82-110.
Sundqvist, Goran. 2003. "Recovery in the Acid Rain Story: Transparency and Credibility in
Science-Based Environmental Regulation." Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning
no. 5 (1):57-79.
Sutton, Mark A., Clare M. Howard, Jan Willem Erisman, Gilles Billen, Albert Bleeker, Peringe
Greenfelt, Hans van Grinsven, and Bruna Grizzetti, eds. 2011. The European Nitrogen
Assessment: Sources, Effects and Policy Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Sycos, J. Mayone, and Isis Duarte. 1994. Parks, Population, and Resettlement in the dominican
Republic. In EPAT/MUCIA Working Paper #16. Madison, WI.
Tellman, Elizabeth. 2010. "Community Resilience and Hurricane Ida: How Marginalized
Salvadorans Lacking NGO and Governmental Support Cope with Climate Shock." In
Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Reduction, edited by Michelle Leighton, Xiaomeng Shen and Koko Warner. Bonn: UNUEHS.
The Micronesia Challenge. 2010. Moving Toward Measuring Our Effectiveness: The 2nd Meeting
of the MC Measures Working Group and PICRC-JICA Coral Reef Monitoring Project
Meeting, at Koror, Republic of Palau.
The Micronesia Challenge. 2011 [cited 2/7/2011. Available from
http://www.micronesiachallenge.org/.
The Nature Conservancy. The Nature Conservancy Applauds Historic Announcement in
Dominican Republic: 31 New Protected Areas to Conserve Threatened Coral Reefs,
Habitat for Species in the Caribbean 2009 [cited 11/26/2009. Available from
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/caribbean/caribbeanchallenge/newsroom
/dominican-republic-announces-new-protected-areas.xml.
The Social Learning Group. 2001. Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risk. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Thelen, Kathleen, and James Mahoney. 2009. Explaining institutional change: Cambridge
University Press Textbooks.
Thompson, Alexander. 2010. "Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the
Global Climate Regime." European Journal of International Relations no. 16 (2):269-296.
Trochim, William M.K. 1989. "Outcome Pattern Matching and Program Theory." Evaluation and
Program Planning no. 12 (2):353-366.

336

Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 2005. Friction: An ethnography of global connection: Princeton
University Press.
Tsioumani, Elsa. 2008. "The Convention on Biological Diversity at a Crossroads: Where do we go
from here?" Environmental Policy and Law no. 38 (5):223-228.
Tsioumani, Elsa. 2010. "Access and Benefit Sharing: The Nagoya Protocol." Environmental Policy
and Law no. 40 (6):288-292.
Tullock, Gordon. 1975. "The Transitional Gains Trap." The Bell Journal of Economics no. 6
(2):671-678.
Turtis, Richar Lee. 2003. Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity
in Dominican History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 1998. United Nations Inter-Agency
Transitional Appeal for Relief and Immediate Rehabilitation in Honduras, Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize. Geneva: UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
Underdal, Arild, and Oran R. Young. 2004. Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges
and Research Strategies. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
UNEP. 2007. Compliance Mechanism under Secretary Multilateral Environmental Agreements.
Nairobi: UNEP.
UNEP. 2010. Perspectivas del Medio Ambiente: America Latina El Caribe. Panama City: Panama.
UNESCO. 1967. Meeting of the Steering Committee for the Conference on the Rational Use and
Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO. 1969. Final Report: Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for
Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO. 1970. General Conference, Sixteenth Session: Plan for a Long-Term Intergovernmental
and Interdisciplinary Programme on Man and the Biosphere. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO. 1989. Report of the International Co-ordinating Council of the Programme on Man and
the Biosphere. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO. 1996. Biosphere Reserves: The Seville Strategy and the Statutory Framework of the
World Network. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO. 2008. Madrid Plan for Biosphere Reserves (2008-2013). Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO/MAB. 1993. The Biosphere Conference: 25 years later. Paris: UNESCO/MAB.
United States General Accounting Office. 2003. USAID’s Earthquake Recovery Program in El
Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are Behind Schedule. Washington, D.C.
337

USAID. 1990. Estrategia Para El Desarrollo de Las Exportaciones de El Salvador. San Salvador: El
Grupo de Trabajo Sector Privado/Gobierno.
Uzzi, Brian. 1997. "Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of
embeddedness." Administrative science quarterly:35-67.
Valencia, Doribel Herrador, Marti Boada i Junca, Diego Varga Linde, and Enric Mendizabal Riera.
2011. "Tropical forest recovery and socio-economic change in El Salvador: An
opportunity for the introduction of new approaches to biodiversity protection." Applied
Geography no. 31 (1):259-268.
van der Borgh, Chris. 2000. "The Politics of Neoliberalism in Postwar El Salvador." International
Journal of Political Economy no. 30 (1):36-54.
van der Leeuw, Sander E. , and Chr. Aschan-Leygonie. 2000. A Long-Term Perspective on
Resilience in Socio-Natural Systems. In System Shocks- System Resilience. Abisco,
Sweden: Santa Fe Institute.
Vanzella-Khouri, Alessandra. 1998. "Implementation of the Protocol Concerning Specially
Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) In the Wider Caribbean Region." University of
Miami Inter-American Law Review no. 30 (1):53-83.
Vasiljevic, Maja, and Tomasz Pezold, eds. 2011. Crossing Borders for Nature: European Examples
of Transboundary Conservation. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
Véliz, Claudio. 1980. The Centralist Tradition of Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Vincent, Jeffrey R. 1992. "The Tropical Timber Trade and Sustainable Development." Science
(5064):1651-1655.
von Moltke, Konrad. 2001. "The Organization of the Impossible." Global Environmental Politics
no. 1 (1):23-29.
Walker, Brian. 1992. "Biodiversity and Ecological Redundancy." Conservation Biology no. 6
(1):18-23.
Walker, Brian, and Nick Abel. 2002. "Resilient Rangelands--Adaptation in Complex Systems." In
Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems, edited by
Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling, 293-314. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Walker, Brian, John M. Anderies, Ann P. Kinzig, and Paul Ryan. 2006. "Exploring Resilience in
Social-Ecological Systems through Comparative Studies and Theory Development:
Introduction to the Special Issue." Ecology and Society no. 11 (1).
Walker, Brian, Lance H. Gunderson, Ann P. Kinzig, Carl Folke, Stephen R. Carpenter, and Lisen
Schultz. 2006. "A Handful of Heuristics and Some Propositions for Understanding
Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems." Ecology and Society no. 11 (1).

338

Walker, Brian, and David Salt. 2006. Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a
Changing World. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Wapner, Paul. 1995. "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic
Politics." World Politics no. 47 (3):311-340.
Ward, Michael D., Katherine Stovel, and Audrey Sacks. 2011. "Network Analysis and Political
Science." Annual Review of Political Science no. 12:245-264.
Ward, Stephen, and Richard Williams. 1997. "From Hierarchy to Networks? Sub-Central
Government and EU Urban Environment Policy." Journal of Common Market Studies no.
35 (3).
Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, E. 2007. "Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference, and the Policy Relevance of Social
Science." Philosophy of the Social Sciences no. 37 (3):348-359. doi:
10.1177/0048393107303814.
Weible, Christopher M, Andrew Pattison, and Paul A Sabatier. 2010. "Harnessing expert-based
information for learning and the sustainable management of complex socio-ecological
systems." environmental science & policy no. 13 (6):522-534.
Wijnstekers, Willem. 1995. The Evolution of CITES: A Reference to the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Geneva: CITES
Secretariat.
Wijnstekers, Willem. 2003. The Evolution of CITES. Geneva, Switzerland: CITES Secretariat.
Wilcox, Bruce A., and Dennis D. Murphy. 1985. "Conservation Strategy: The Effects of
Fragmentation on Extinction." The American Naturalist no. 125 (6):879-887.
Willis, Eliza, Chrisopher da C.B. Garman, and Stephan Haggard. 1999. "The Politics of
Decentralization in Latin America." Latin American Research Review no. 34 (1):7-56.
Wilson, Edward O., and E.O. Willis. 1975. "Applied Biogeography." In Ecology and Evolution of
Communities, edited by M.L. Cody and J.M. Diamond, 522-534. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.
Wisner, Ben. 2001. "Risk and the Neoliberal State: Why Post-Mitch Lessons Didn't Reduce El
Salvador's Earthquake Losses." Disasters no. 25 (3):251-268.
Wolf, Frieder. 2010. "Enlightened Eclecticism or Hazardous Hotchpotch? Mixed Methods and
Triangulation Strategies in Comparative Public Policy Research." Journal of Mixed
Methods Research no. 2010 (4):144-167.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2000. Forging Democracy From Below: Insurgent Transitions in South
Africa and El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press.
339

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
World Database on Protected Areas. 2010. 2010 WDPA Annual Release. Available online:
www.wdpa.org: [Downloaded 9/10/10].
Young, Oran R. 2011. "Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge,
cutting-edge themes, and research strategies." Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences no. 108 (50):19853-19860.
Young, Oran R. 1989a. Internaitonal Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and
the Environment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Young, Oran R. 1989b. Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Young, Oran R. 1991. "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of
Institutions in International Society." International Organization no. 45 (3):281-308.
Young, Oran R. 1996. "Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives." Global
Governance no. 2 (1):1-24.
Young, Oran R., ed. 1997. Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental
Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, Oran R., ed. 1999a. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal
Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Young, Oran R., ed. 1999b. The Effectivenss of International Environmental Regimes: Causal
Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, Oran R. 2002. The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and
Scale. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, Oran R. 2010. Institutional Dynamics: Emergent Patterns in International Environmental
Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, Oran R., Leslie A. King, and Heike Schroeder. 2008. Institutions and Environmental
Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Young, Oran R., and Gail Osherenko, eds. 1993. Polar Politics: Creating International
Environmental Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Yu, Douglass W., Taai Levi, and Glenn H. Shepard. 2010. "Conservation in Low-Governance
Environments." Biotropica no. 42 (5):569-571.

340

Zainol, Zinatul A., Latifah Amin, Frank Akpoviri, and Rosli Ramli. 2011. "Biopiracy and States'
Soverignty over their Biological Resources." African Journal of Biotechnology no. 10
(58):12395-12408.
Zavala, Wilber. 1999. "Integracion Centroamericana y Participacion de la Sociedad Civil: Impacto
Sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo Sostenible." In Hacia Una Integracion Desde
Abajo: Participacion, Sociedad Civil y Integracion Centroamericana, edited by Ricardo
Grinspun, Carlos Alvarenga and Yasmine Shamsie. San Salvador: SICA.
Zimmermann, Monika. 2009. "Local Governments in International Negotiations." Environmental
Policy and Law no. 39 (2):92-94.

341

